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ABSTRACT 
 
HUSSERL AND FOUCAULT ON THE SUBJECT: 
THE COMPANIONS 
 
 
 
By 
Harry A. Nethery 
August 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer 
 In this text, I argue for the revision of Husserlian phenomenology through a 
dialogue with the work of Michel Foucault. Specifically, I argue that Foucault‟s critical 
project, in which we isolate the contingent limits of thought so as to pass beyond them, 
and thus think new ways of being, can be filled out by the work of Edmund Husserl and 
differentiated into two lines of inquiry: a critical ontology and a critical phenomenology. 
This is accomplished by bringing these two philosophers, commonly held to be 
diametrically opposed, into dialogue such that together they say something that neither 
could say on their own. 
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Introduction 
 
That Husserl regarded his teaching as 
extending “seeing” in philosophy and 
psychology may be illustrated by an incident 
which occurred in his Freiburg-period. Upon 
asking the wife of a visiting-
scholar/professor what she got out of 
listening to his so technical lectures, he was 
told that the lessons in phenomenology gave 
her so many new eyes. In Husserl‟s opinion 
this aptly expressed the spirit of his 
undertaking. Where we are accustomed to 
finding simplicity, a very complex situation 
is shown to exist; and after numerous 
distinctions have been drawn carefully, the 
reader is made to feel that only a beginning 
has been made.  
-André Schuwer1 
 
§1. The Companions (Les compagnons) 
 
In his 1966 essay “The Thought of the Outside,” Foucault argues that at the limit  
between the interiority of consciousness and the outside of language (or, the anonymous 
streaming being of language) there is a kind of figure that haunts us. This limit-figure, or 
the companion (le compagnon, a term borrowed from Maurice Blanchot), “always 
remains hidden but always makes it patently obvious that he is there; a double that keeps 
his distance, an accosting resemblance” (PD: 562/163). The companion accosts us, 
according to Foucault, by showing us “the nameless limit [la limite sans nom] language 
reaches” (PD: 564/165). In any case, this companion is a haunting presence, threatening 
to make manifest to us a limit we can never reach. 
 While we will return to the idea of the outside later in this text,
2
 I would like to 
use this idea of a companion – a hidden, accosting resemblance or double residing at a 
                                               
1 From André Schuwer‟s unpublished lecture notes, given at Duquesne University on January 21st, 1971. 
These unpublished lecture notes are housed in the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center at Duquesne 
University. I would like to thank Jeff McCurry for permission to use this citation. 
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limit – as an image for the connection between the work of Husserl and Foucault. In this 
text, I will argue that at the limit of Foucault‟s philosophy we find Husserl and that at the 
limit of Husserl‟s phenomenology we find Foucault. That is, when you take Foucault‟s 
project to its limit we find subjectivity (and therefore Husserl), and when you take 
Husserl‟s project to its limit we find history (and therefore Foucault). This argument will 
proceed in two parts. 
 In Part One of this text, „the Subject,‟ I examine two separate ways in which 
Foucault and Husserl‟s work encounter each other. In the first chapter, I show that 
Foucault implicitly engages in a reversal of Husserl‟s phenomenological reduction, which 
is, of course, the active suspension of the natural attitude from our descriptions of 
experience. To say that Foucault engages in a reversal is to say that rather than the 
suspension of the natural attitude, he instead actively suspends the modern notion of the 
subject from his analyses, such that he can describe the ways in which power and 
knowledge constitute forms of conduct that individuals are then forced to take up within 
disciplinary society. This reversal of the phenomenological method is analyzed through a 
number of Foucault‟s primary texts, essays, and interviews. In the second chapter, we 
then turn to Husserl and draw from his work a theory of the subject that is fundamentally 
open to the constitutive processes of knowledge and power. This is done through the 
analyses of Husserl‟s descriptions of internal time consciousness, apperception, 
association, and passive synthesis, in which we will find that consciousness can be 
understood as a process of becoming which is structurally open to change. Thus, we will 
find Foucault meeting Husserl in the first chapter in the form of the reversal of the 
                                                                                                                                            
2 This interpretation of Foucault is heavily indebted to the mentorship and work of Leonard Lawlor. Also, 
for the definitive exposition of Foucault‟s essay “The Thought of the Outside,” see Chapter 7 of Lawlor‟s 
Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy. 
 3 
 
 
phenomenological reduction, and we will find Husserl meeting Foucault in the second 
chapter in the form of a theory of the subject that is amenable to Foucault‟s analyses. 
 In Part Two of this text, „the Limit,‟ I argue that we can understand Husserl and 
Foucault as each examining one side of a common limit. This common limit is us – those 
individuals who live within a disciplinary society, which is itself grounded in a shared 
and objective cultural world. In the third chapter, I argue that the limit in Husserl can be 
found in his descriptions of the constitution of the cultural world. This argument proceeds 
through the analyses of Husserl‟s descriptions of the intersubjective constitution of a 
shared objective and cultural world in his 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation and through an 
analysis of Husserl‟s description of experiencing oneself as a “pathological object” in his 
Ideas II. The fourth chapter will pick up where Husserl left off, so to speak, and examine 
Foucault‟s descriptions of the ways in which forms of conduct, i.e. ways of being, are 
constituted within disciplinary society through the processes of power and knowledge. 
Specifically, we will use as our guiding example the constitution of a young man as a 
“pathological object” by his community due to his desire for a specific type of body. 
Foucault‟s limit will be found where his analyses begin, i.e. those bodies that are forced 
to take up the ways of being constituted through disciplinary power.  
 In the conclusion, I argue that, out of this companionship, we can revise 
Husserlian phenomenology in such a way as to bring it into the service of Foucault‟s 
critical project, which will have the further effect of differentiating the latter‟s project 
into two separable, but ultimately intertwined, lines of inquiry. Foucault‟s critical project, 
as outlined in his 1984 essay “What is Enlightenment,” is the attempt to isolate various 
historically constituted, and thus contingent, limits of present thought, such that we can 
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think new forms of being. Through analyzing the role of the subject in Foucault and 
Husserl‟s work and the idea that both philosophers are examining their respective side of 
a limit, we will ultimately find that isolation of the contingent limits of thought must 
proceed on two registers. The first register is Foucault‟s critical ontology, in which we 
are shown that ways of being we believe to be necessary are in fact historically 
constituted, and thus contingent. The second register is a critical phenomenology, in 
which we describe the structure and functioning of consciousness, such that we can 
understand how these limits become embedded within perception and how it is that we 
actively perceive these limits in our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior” (FL: 282). 
 As such, this text is the endeavor to bring the work of Husserl and Foucault 
together, such that they say together something that neither could have said on his own. 
Not only that, but to bring them together in such a way that their companionship can be 
productive for our thought now, in the present. 
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PART ONE – THE SUBJECT 
 
Chapter One – Foucault and the Subject 
 
I try to historicize to the utmost in order to 
leave as little space as possible to the 
transcendental. I cannot exclude the 
possibility that one day I will have to 
confront an irreducible residuum which will 
be, in fact, the transcendental. 
-Michel Foucault3 
 
§2. Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, we will examine Foucault‟s side of the companionship, and show 
how the subject is always at the limit of his thought (a subject who, in turn, will be the 
focus of the second chapter). We will begin by examining Foucault‟s overall project, 
such that we can isolate a notion of the subject that will allow us to see the ways in which 
Husserl is a companion or a limit-figure for Foucault. Using his overall project as 
context, we will then turn to Foucault‟s critique of subject-oriented philosophy, 
specifically phenomenology. Next, we will take this notion of the subject and show how 
Foucault‟s project contains an implicit methodological commitment as regards a kind of 
„suspension‟ of the subject from analysis. That is, if our goal is to find out how the 
subject is constituted through discourse and power-relations, we must first attempt to 
suspend the constitutive activities of consciousness, such that these relations can become 
manifest. This idea of „suspending the subject‟ will be traced through a selection of 
Foucault‟s texts, and we will find that this method is employed in order to show us the 
contingency of the limits of our present ways of being. 
                                               
3 From the interview titled “An Historian of Culture.” Translated by Jared Becker and James Cascaito in 
Foucault Live: Interviews 1961-1984. Ed. S. Lotringer. New York: Semiotext(e), 1996. Pg. 79.  
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§3. Foucault’s General Project: The Critical Ontology of the Present 
  
 Late in his career, Foucault argued that his work can be understood under the 
general heading of a „critical‟ or „historical‟ ontology of ourselves (or the present). 
Foucault writes that this project “could be called an ontology of the present, of present 
reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of ourselves” (GSO: 20). This critical 
ontology, as a general project, is best illustrated through the following two quotes, which, 
when taken together, give both the aim and the methodology of his project. We will first 
briefly examine each quote and then undertake a more full analysis in the following sub-
section. First, the goal of Foucault‟s project (as critical) is to: 
…separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the 
possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think. 
… [I]t is seeking to give new impetus as far and wide as possible, to the 
indefinite [indéfini] work of freedom. (WE: 1393/315, translation 
modified) 
 
At its most basic, Foucault‟s overall project is to show us both (1) what we are and (2) 
the possibility of no longer being what we currently are. That is, Foucault‟s work seeks to 
isolate the contingent limits of thought, such that the isolation of these limits will show us 
that these limits are contingent, and, since they are contingent, they can be crossed-over. 
This critical ontology operates along three axes: 
First, an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which 
we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, an historical 
ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we 
constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, an historical 
ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as 
moral agents. (MF: 237) 
 
Even to readers who are barely familiar with Foucault‟s work, the parallel between this 
statement and Foucault‟s published texts should be apparent. The History of Madness, 
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The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge make 
up the axis that Foucault refers to as the “constitution” of ourselves “as subjects of 
knowledge.” The History of Madness is concerned with the transformation of madness 
into a pathological illness, or how a “„scientific psychiatry‟ of the nineteenth century had 
become possible” (HFC: 315/296). In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault examines the 
development of the medical clinic, in which patients became „subjects of knowledge‟ 
through the way in which illness came to be perceived. The patient‟s body underwent a 
fundamental transformation from the vessel for hidden illnesses and ailments, to a space 
of open visibility in which illnesses can be pursued and laid bare, and the medical clinic 
was the place in which this constitution unfolded. Foucault writes, “[w]hat was 
fundamentally invisible is suddenly offered to the brightness of the gaze” and thus that 
“the abyss beneath illness, which was the illness itself, has emerged into the light of 
language” (NC: 195). The Order of Things is an examination of the fundamental change 
that occurred in the ways in which life, language, and labor were understood. This 
fundamental change involves the movement of the rules of ordering in these domains 
from representation to a set of laws that function behind representation in some way or 
another. Foucault writes, 
[O]ne traces… language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as they 
have been perceived and grouped together, and exchanges as they have 
been practiced; in what way then our culture has made manifest the 
existence of order, and how, to the modalities of that order, the exchanges 
owed their laws, the living beings their constants, the words their 
sequences, and their representative value. (MC: 13/xxi). 
 
This fundamental change constitutes us as subjects of knowledge, for Foucault, because a 
certain view of human beings develops from this change in ordering. Specifically, this 
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fundamental change ushers in the view of human beings as transcendental subjects.
4
 The 
Archaeology of Knowledge is also an examination of the constitution of the subject as a 
subject of knowledge, but in a more broad and general way than the specific analyses of 
these other three texts. That is, in this text Foucault is concerned with understanding how 
it is that the subject is constituted through discourse and discursive practices as such, and 
thus how, for example,  we can think of “mental illness” as “constituted [constituée]  by 
all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up,  described it, explained 
it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave 
it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own” (AS: 
45/32). 
The power axis is located within Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality, while the constitution of “ourselves as moral agents” is found within 
the other two volumes of the History of Sexuality. Discipline and Punish is an 
examination of the transformation of punishment from the public torture and executions 
of the classical era to the prison system of the modern era, in which “a specific mode of 
subjection [i.e. the penal system] was able to give birth to man as an object of knowledge 
[objet de savoir] for a discourse with a „scientific‟ status” (SP: 32/24). That is, criminals 
were transformed from “real bodies that feel pain” to “a juridical subject, the possessor, 
among other rights, of the right to exist” (SP: 20/13). While Discipline and Punish 
examines the creation of juridical subjects through relations of power, the first volume of 
the History of Sexuality is an analysis of the constitution of human beings as subjects of 
                                               
4 This argument plays out through Chapter Nine of The Order of Things, “Man and his Doubles.” 
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sexuality and the proliferation of discourses concerned with sexuality in the modern era, 
“the „putting into discourse of sex‟” (HS1: 21/12).5  
The ethical axis is found in the final two volumes of the History of Sexuality, i.e. 
The Uses of Pleasure and the Care of the Self, which examine “the forms and modalities 
of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes [constitue] and recognizes 
himself qua subject” (HS2: 12/6). Volume Two, The Use of Pleasure is primarily 
concerned with “the manner in which sexual activity was problematized by philosophers 
and doctors in classical Greek culture of the fourth century B.C.” while Care of the Self 
“deals with the same problematization in the Greek and Latin texts of the first two 
centuries of our era” (HS2: 18/12). In both cases, Foucault examines “how individuals 
were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire, a 
hermeneutics of which their sexual behavior was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not 
the exclusive domain” (HS2: 11/5). 
While laying out Foucault‟s work along these three axes is helpful for explanatory 
reasons, it is actually the case that all three axes are inextricably bound up with each 
other. For instance, when one is analyzing the constitution of the subject as a sexual 
being, one finds: “(1) the formation of sciences [saviors] that refer to it, (2) the systems 
of power that regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are 
obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects [sujets] of this sexuality” (HS2: 10/4). That 
is, the constitution of the subject as a sexual being entails the formation of discourses of 
knowledge on sexuality, the formation of systems of power to regulate sexual behavior, 
                                               
5 The first volume of the History of Sexuality is also an analysis of the constitution of human beings as 
objects of sexual knowledge. This will be described below. 
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and forms of morality wherein the subject conforms to certain moral rules so as to see 
themselves as, for example, subjects free of sin. 
In any case, when taken together, we find that Foucault‟s overall project is the 
attempt to show that what we are now is not necessary, and that there are other forms of 
living than those we have now. This is done through showing how we are constituted as 
subjects of knowledge, subjects of power within a network of power relations, and how 
we constitute ourselves as moral agents. Indeed, in reference to the project of the three 
volumes of the History of Sexuality, Foucault writes that “[t]he object was to learn to 
what extent the effort to think one‟s own history can free thought from what it silently 
thinks, and so enable it to think differently” (HS2: 15/9).6  
 
a) Critique and Ontology 
 
 In order to understand Foucault‟s use of the term „critical,‟ let us begin with a 
brief background of his text “What is Enlightenment?” It is a text on an essay by Kant, 
which the latter wrote in response to an open question in a 1784 issue of the Berlinische 
Monatschrift. Kant‟s response to the question “Was ist Aufklärung?” marks, for Foucault, 
both a definitive point in our recent history and the development of a critical attitude 
which must be modified and “permanently reactivated” (WE: 312). Kant‟s essay consists 
                                               
6 Beatrice Han-Pile, in her text Foucault’s Critical Project, argues that Foucault‟s project is a series of 
failed attempts to reinterpret Husserl‟s historical a priori without the transcendental. She writes, “Despite 
the many attempts… Foucault was unable to give the old Husserlian historical a priori a new satisfactory 
version” (196). Instead, she argues that Foucault‟s project, from beginning to end, was caught up in the 
doubles of Chapter Nine of The Order of Things. As such, while the notion of an historical ontology “is not 
contradictory per se,” it is not tenable due to Foucault‟s “insistence on the theme of the self-constitution of 
the subject” (195). For Han-Pile, self-constitution and historical ontology are not tenable together because 
the latter consists of practices that lie outside of the subject. Ultimately, however, Han-Pile misses a 
productive interpretation of Foucault‟s relationship with phenomenology through a commitment to 
Foucault‟s own authorial intentions – because Foucault intended to reject phenomenology, they cannot 
enter into a productive dialogue. And, because Foucault rejected phenomenology, the success of his project 
hinges on whether or not he was actually successful in distancing himself from phenomenology. 
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of a meditation on the relation between philosophical thought and the present, in which 
he argues that the world is itself in a state of immaturity, and that the Enlightenment 
offers a way out of this immaturity. Kant writes:  
Enlightenment [Aufklärung] is man‟s emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity. Immaturity is man‟s inability to make use of his own 
understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-
incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and 
courage to use it without the guidance of another. (WA: 481/85) 
 
For Kant, immaturity is the state in which human beings rely on the rational activities of 
another, rather than relying on their own use of rationality. For example, Kant argues that 
we are in a state of immaturity when “… I have a book to have understanding in place of 
me, a spiritual adviser to have conscience for me, a doctor to judge my diet for me...,” 
etc. (WA: 482/85) If immaturity is the state of humanity in which we rely on the 
reasoning of others, or the state in which we “do not think,” (WA: 482/85) then maturity 
would be the state in which we rely on our own reasoning activities. Thus, for example, 
we are in a state of maturity when we are in charge of our own conscience. However, 
under Foucault‟s interpretation, Kant‟s Aufklärung is not an event, but instead a process 
or an attitude. Rather than some event, like a revolution, in which everyone‟s viewpoint 
is changed all at once, Foucault argues that Kant‟s Aufklärung requires a constant 
modification of “the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of reason” 
(WE: 1381/305). We slip back into immaturity at any time when we let the reasoning of 
another stand in for our own reasoning. Thus, Aufklärung requires a constant 
determination to modify the link between will, authority, and reason within oneself. 
Indeed, the motto of the Aufklärung for Kant is “Dare to know!” (WA: 481/85) 
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Of course, for Kant the way out of this immaturity is through his critical analyses, 
i.e. the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of 
Judgment. Foucault argues that, for Kant, the critical question is the question “of 
knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaisance] must renounce exceeding” (WE: 
1393/315). Foucault writes: 
Kant, in fact, describes Enlightenment as the moment when humanity is 
going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any 
authority; now, it is precisely as this moment that the critique is necessary, 
since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of 
reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known [connaître], 
what must be done, and what may be hoped. (WE: 1386/308) 
 
For Kant, if we are to exit our state of immaturity, requiring us to modify the link 
between will, authority, and reason, then we must examine the limits of reason itself, 
such that we will not attempt to use reason outside of its own limits. Furthermore, this 
examination of reason‟s limits will show us that we must be guided by reason itself, 
rather than allow for the substitution of our own reasoning for those of another.  
Foucault appropriates this notion of critique from Kant, but modifies it drastically. 
Whereas Kant wants to find the limits of reason such that we do not attempt to pass 
beyond those limits, Foucault wants to find these very limits so that we can go beyond 
them. He writes:  
But if the Kantian question was that of knowing [savoir] what limits 
knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that 
the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one… The 
point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of a 
necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a 
possible crossing-over [franchissement]. (WE: 1393/315) 
 
Critique is the isolation of the limits of thought for the sake of going beyond them, of 
establishing new forms of life, or of modifying the “preexisting relation linking will, 
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authority, and the use of reason” but in a creative way, rather than the isolation of a limit 
such that we know where not to go. Indeed, Foucault writes that critique is the “historical 
analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them [de leur franchissement possible]” (WE: 1396/319). As such critique is 
always undertaken in the name of the present. Foucault‟s work is interested in isolating 
the series of events that have led us to see ourselves in the way that we do in our present 
era. Indeed, Foucault uses Kant‟s essay on Aufklarung for this very reason. Just as, for 
Kant, the Aufklarung is an „exit‟ from immaturity, Foucault‟s version of critique is an 
„exit‟ from our modern era. 
 The overall goal behind Foucault‟s project follows from the definition of critique 
given above, i.e. that critique is “the indefinite (indéfini) work of freedom”. Critique is 
employed in order to find and test the contingent limits of thought, which is itself 
undertaken for the sake of going beyond these very limits. As such, passing beyond these 
limits can be understood as the goal of contemporary philosophy.
7
 That this work is the 
work of freedom is directly related to the idea that the limits of thought are contingent. If 
these limits are contingent, then there is no necessary teleology behind reason, otherwise 
these limits would instead be necessary. And, if there are no necessary limits, then we are 
free. However, because there are no necessary limits, this kind of work is indefinite. That 
is, since there is no teleology behind human reason, there cannot be some final state in 
which we have attained absolute knowledge or perfect knowledge. The work of freedom 
is indefinite [indéfini]. 
                                               
7 This is confirmed by Lawlor in Chapter 9 of his Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, pg. 
202. He writes, “This indefinite work of freedom, by means of which we become other than what we were, 
by means of which we transform our thinking and our lives, is the very project of what we call continental 
philosophy. It is perhaps the only project worthy of the name „philosophy.‟” 
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Because critique is interested in isolating our contingent limits, it is not focused 
on the pursuit of universal structures of consciousness, but is instead an inquiry into the 
events that have made us what we are today. Foucault writes, “criticism is no longer 
going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value but, rather, 
as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to 
recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying” (WE: 1393/315).  
The methodology, design, and ontological status of Foucault‟s project follow 
from this basic commitment to the isolation of contingent limits through archaeology and 
genealogy: 
Archaeology: The term „archaeology‟ designates the methodology of critique, in 
that it looks for those events that have determined our contingent limits in the present, 
rather than searching for transcendental structures of consciousness. As such, instead of 
looking to first-person experience for clues as to the structures of consciousness, Foucault 
will instead turn to historical documents. He writes that critique is “[a]rchaeological – 
and not transcendental – in the sense that it will not seek to identify the universal 
structures of all knowledge [connaissance] or of all possible moral action, but will seek 
to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many 
historical events” (WE: 1393/315). 
Genealogy: The term „genealogy‟ designates the design of critique, which again 
follows from Foucault‟s overall project. Since the limits of thought are contingent, and 
not necessary, critique will not “deduce from the form of what we are what it is 
impossible for us to do and to know” (WE: 1393/315). Rather, critique will, to return to 
the text cited in the previous section, “separate out, from the contingency that has made 
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us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or 
think” (WE: 1393/315) In order to accomplish this goal, the design of Foucault‟s project 
must proceed by following the various lines which connect us to particular historical 
events, thus marking a kind of genealogy. This is in distinct opposition to a kind of 
analysis which would relate historical events to progress of reason (rather than the 
relation of the development of reason to historical events). Indeed, Foucault writes that 
genealogy is aimed at “[a]n entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) [which] 
aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity – as a theological movement 
or natural process” (NGH: 1016/380). 
Ontology: Throughout Foucault‟s later writings, one finds a constant use of the 
term „ontology‟ when Foucault describes his lifelong project. This can again be seen 
through the idea that critique focuses on limits so as to move beyond them. Specifically, 
this should be clear when Foucault writes that critique will show us the “possibility of no 
longer being, doing, and thinking what are, do, or think.” That is, if Foucault is concerned 
with no longer being what we currently are, then he is attempting to find the possibility of 
new forms of being. As such, critique is always in the name of becoming other than what 
we are now, and is thus an ontological, rather than purely historical, project. Or, as he 
tells us in his 1982-83 lecture course The Government of Self and Others: 
This other critical tradition does not pose the question of the conditions of 
possibility of a true knowledge; it asks the questions: What is present 
reality? What is the present field of our experiences? What is the present 
field of possible experiences? Here it is a question of the analytic of truth 
but involves what could be called an ontology of the present, of present 
reality, an ontology of modernity, an ontology of ourselves. (GSO: 20) 
 
That is, critique, as ontology, is concerned with the contingent limits put on our present 
ways of being.  
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We can now understand the full scope of Foucault‟s appropriation of Kantian 
critique. Foucault‟s critique is the investigation into what has made us what we are now, 
and, by recognizing that these limits are contingent, shows us the possibility of going 
beyond them. As such, Foucault‟s project, since its outset (implicitly or explicitly), has 
been thoroughly and fundamentally concerned with ontology, i.e. of thinking new forms 
or ways of being. 
 
§4. Foucault’s General Project and his Resistance to the Phenomenological 
Subject 
 
 We can understand the relation between Foucault‟s project and his resistance to 
theories of the subject on two registers. First, we can understand the relationship 
theoretically, in which we find that his resistance to the subject, and his resulting 
methodology, are entailed by his general project. Second, understood practically, his 
general project itself follows from a general resistance to the subject that resulted from 
the institutionalization of phenomenology in French academia during the middle of the 
20
th
 century. Let us briefly explore both registers. 
 Theoretical: If Foucault‟s general project is to be understood as a critical ontology 
of the present, in which we focus on the contingent limits of our present and possible 
fields of experience, then he will resist any view of the subject in which the subject is 
posited as the origin of all meaning. This follows logically from Foucault‟s general 
project. If all meaning flows from the subject, then the limits on our present and possible 
fields of experience would be necessary, as they would be part of us universally qua 
human, subject, consciousness, etc. If these limits are contingent, then we must, in some 
sense, be constituted. And, it will turn out for Foucault that we are constituted through the 
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three axes of critical ontology, i.e. knowledge, power, and ethics. As such, any theory of 
the subject which posits the subject as the source of all meaning will be inadmissible 
under Foucault‟s general project and the terms it sets out. That the phenomenological 
subject, be it through Husserl, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty, is the example par excellence 
should be of no surprise. This will be explored more in the next section. 
 Practical: Foucault‟s general project is actually a result of a concrete resistance to 
the phenomenological theory of the subject which dominated French academic thinking 
during the 1950s and 60s. To see this, let us begin by looking at how Foucault understood 
the French philosophical academic system during the 1950s.
8
 In a talk from 1981, titled 
“Sexuality and Solitude,” Foucault describes the trajectory of the academic climate in 
France in the following manner:  
In the years that preceded the Second World War, and even more so after 
the war, philosophy in continental Europe and in France was dominated by 
the philosophy of the subject. I mean that philosophy took as its task par 
excellence the foundation of all knowledge and the principle of all 
signification as stemming from the meaningful subject. The importance 
given to this question was due to the impact of Husserl, but the centrality 
of the subject was also tied to an institutional context, for the French 
university, since philosophy began with Descartes, could only advance in 
a Cartesian manner. (EWF1: 176, my emphasis) 
 
As we can see, Foucault understood the French academic system as committed to a basic 
sense of Cartesianism, in which “the principle of all signification [stems] from the 
meaningful subject” – both as a kind of cultural commitment to Descartes (“…since 
philosophy began with Descartes”) and in the revival of this commitment in France 
through the introduction of phenomenology in Husserl‟s lectures given at the Sorbonne in 
1929 (which were later published as the Cartesian Meditations). In either case, it is clear 
                                               
8 See Alan Schrift‟s “The Effects of the Ageregation de philosophie on Twentieth-Century French 
Philosophy” and Gary Gutting‟s Thinking the Impossible for discussions of the intellectual horizon of 
academic philosophy at the Ecole Normale Superior during the 1950s. 
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that a philosophy of the subject involves, for Foucault, “the principle of all signification 
as stemming from the meaningful subject.”  
For Foucault, Husserl‟s entrance onto the philosophical scene in France 
revitalized the philosophical commitment to the idea that all meaning is constituted by 
the subject, while also setting up a line of opposition to this idea. In the introduction to 
Canguilhem‟s Normal and the Pathological, Foucault writes that: 
Delivered in 1929, modified, translated and published shortly afterward, 
the Cartesian Meditations soon became the contested object of two 
possible readings: one that sought to radicalize Husserl in the direction of 
a philosophy of the subject, and before long was to encounter the 
questions of Being and Time: I have in mind Sartre‟s article on the 
“Transcendence of the Ego” in 1935; and the other that would go back to 
the founding problems of Husserl‟s thought, the problems of formalism 
and intuitionalism; this would be, in 1938, the two theses of Cavaillès on 
the M’ethode axiomatique and on La Formation de la theorie des 
ensembles. Whatever the ramifications, the interferences, even the 
rapprochements may have been in the years that followed, these two forms 
of thought constituted in France two strains that remained, for a time at 
least, rather heterogeneous (LES: 1584/466).  
 
In both cases, it would seem that, for Foucault, Husserl‟s impact on French philosophy 
took the form of a kind of rupture, from which two paths divergent paths emerged. On the 
one hand, there is the renewed interest in the subject, revitalized through Husserl‟s 
phenomenological project. On the other hand, in the face of this renewed interest, there is 
the attempt to show that certain things are not themselves the result of the constitutive 
acts of the subject, e.g. mathematical or logical truths.
9
 This split then results in a line of 
opposition between those who take the subject to be the source of all meaning (existential 
phenomenology) and those that are concerned rather with showing the autonomous 
                                               
9 Of course, Foucault recognizes that this is Husserl‟s argument as well. In an interview from 1978, 
Foucault tells us that “The great texts of Edmund Husserl, of Alexandre Koyré,  formed the other face of 
phenomenology, opposite the more existential phenomenology of le vecu” (EWF3: 252). 
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operations of knowledge and rationality. Earlier in this same piece, Foucault writes that 
this dividing line: 
… separates a philosophy of experience, of meaning, of the subject, and a 
philosophy of knowledge, of rationality, and of the concept. On one side a 
filiation which is that of Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; and 
then another, which is that of Jean Cavaillès, Gaston Bachelard, Alexandre 
Koyré, and Canguilhem (LES: 1583/466). 
 
 For Foucault, the Husserlian phenomenological subject became institutionalized 
within French academic thought, through the philosophies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, 
both of which he understands as using phenomenology to give a theoretical basis to 
Marxism. In an interview from 1968, Foucault tells us:  
I belong to a generation of people for whom the horizon of reflection was 
defined by Husserl in a general way, Sartre more precisely, and Merleau-
Ponty even more precisely. It‟s clear that around 1950-55, for reasons that 
are equally political, ideological and scientific, and very difficult to 
straighten out, this horizon toppled for us. (FL: 695/41) 
 
Later, in an interview from 1983, Foucault traces a connection between the various 
philosophical projects in France during the 1960s to a resistance against this 
institutionalization, and its perceived failure in bringing about any kind of change, which 
its Marxist tie was supposed to bring about. Again, Foucault tells his interviewer that: 
So I would say that everything that took place in the sixties arose from a 
dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the subject, and 
involved different escapades, subterfuges, breakthroughs, according to 
whether we use a negative or a positive term, in the direction of 
linguistics, psychoanalysis or Nietzsche. (EWF2: 1256/438) 
 
Ultimately, this dissatisfaction led Foucault to a series of analyses aimed at the very idea 
of the subject as the foundation of knowledge and meaning. 
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§5. Foucault’s Critique of Subject-Oriented Philosophy 
 
 Let us now turn to Foucault‟s critique of subject-oriented philosophy. Through 
analyses of Foucault‟s critique, we will be able to see what I am calling a reversal of the 
phenomenological method within Foucault‟s methodology. Simply put, I will argue that 
Foucault‟s resistance to the subject leads him to suspend the subject from his 
investigations, in a way analogous to the suspension of existential claims found in 
Husserl‟s phenomenology. Whereas Husserl suspends the world to find the subject, 
Foucault suspends the subject to find the systems in which the subject is constituted, and 
thus enacts a reversal of Husserl‟s phenomenological method. 
 Foucault‟s critique can be understood to play out on two different levels.  First, 
there is his general critique against subject-oriented philosophy, in which Foucault argues 
that there is a general theme, what he calls the “sovereignty of the subject [souveraineté 
du sujet],” (AS: 22/12) which implicitly guides the analyses of those who presume that 
the subject is the foundation of knowledge and meaning. This presumption then leads 
their analyses to conclusions that fit within a pattern generated by this general theme. 
Second, there is a more specific set of critiques laid out against phenomenology found 
within Chapter Nine of Foucault‟s The Order of Things, in which Foucault levels a series 
of charges against the modern invention of the subject. The second level of Foucault‟s 
critique has been thoroughly examined and analyzed by Leonard Lawlor, primarily in his 
text The Implications of Immanence, but let us briefly review his critique. In Let mots et 
les choses, Foucault argues that a transformation occurred in the nineteenth century 
“sciences of man,” in which “natural history becomes biology… the analysis of wealth 
becomes economics… [and] reflection upon language becomes philology” (MC: 
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323/312). Consequently, humans came to be understood as “a living being, an instrument 
of production, a vehicle for words which exist before [us]” (MC: 324/313). This then 
entailed a recognition that we are finite:  
Man‟s finitude is heralded – and imperiously so – in the positivity of 
knowledge [savoir]; we know that man is finite, as we know the anatomy 
of the brain, the mechanics of production costs, or the system of Indo-
European conjugation; or rather, like a watermark running through all 
these solid, positive, and full forms, we perceive the finitude and limits 
they impose, we sense, as though on their blank reverse sides, all that they 
make impossible. (MC: 324/313) 
 
In turn, this recognition of finitude leads to what Foucault calls an “analytic of finitude, 
in which man‟s being will be able to provide a foundation in their own positivity for all 
those forms that indicate to him that he is not finite” (MC: 326/315). The “analytic of 
finitude” entails a series of doubles that revolve around the idea that humans are both the 
subject and object of inquiry. While all of the doubles apply to phenomenology, perhaps 
the most famous critique occurs in the double of the “empirical and the transcendental” 
(MC: 329/318). Here, Foucault argues that, under the analytic of finitude, “Man… is a 
strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since his is a being such that knowledge 
[connaissance] will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge [connaissance] 
possible” (MC: 329/318). Of course, Foucault has in mind the phenomenological claim 
that we can find the transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience through the 
description of empirical objects. Thus, for Foucault, a fundamental ambiguity occurs 
between the idea that humans are both transcendental and empirical (MC: 332/322). 
The clearest formulation of Foucault‟s general critique can be found in his 
Archaeology of Knowledge. Here, Foucault tells us that history has traditionally been 
viewed as a kind of progress, in which historical events and documents are organized 
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around a general theme.  This “continuous history” (AS: 21/12) seeks to look at how 
“continuities are established, how a single pattern is formed and preserved” (AS: 12/5) 
between various historical events.  The historian, on Foucault‟s account, approaches 
historical analysis with the idea that the movement of history is one of continuity and 
progress, and thus establishes relations between historical events on the basis of 
continuity.   
The framework of continuity itself, Foucault argues, is “the indispensable 
correlative of the founding function of the subject,” or what he also calls the “sovereignty 
of the subject” (AS: 22/12).  The framing of history in terms of continuity is supplied by 
a certain idea of human beings, viz. that human beings are the foundation of knowledge 
and meaning. This idea is inextricably bound to the further idea that, because we are the 
foundation of knowledge and meaning, our faculty of reason is always moving towards 
the goal of absolute knowledge or perfect justice. If this notion of human beings is taken 
up by the historian, then historical events will be related to each other in terms of their 
own relation to the progress and unfolding of reason.  That is, human consciousness will 
be the center around which history is analyzed: “Making historical analysis the discourse 
of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical 
development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought” (AS: 22/12).   
As such, the primacy of human consciousness, and the continuity that is its 
correlate, gives rise to a general theme, the “sovereignty of the subject,” from within 
which historical analysis is to be carried out.  This yields at least two outcomes:  First, as 
we have seen, it formulates the way that historical events and documents are to be 
grouped together.  By prescribing what groupings count as valid or invalid, certain 
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questions are dismissed or passed over. Questions of continuity are privileged over 
questions of discontinuity.  Through organizing historical events in a specific way, some 
questions are taken to be valid while others are ignored or simply passed over.  Second, 
the framework prescribes tools for analysis, specifically with regard to the way in which 
historical documents are to be treated, read, and described.  Specifically, documents are 
treated as “the language of a voice since reduced to silence” (AS: 14/6) and the “inert 
material through which [one] tries to reconstitute what men have done or said, the events 
of which only the trace remains” (AS: 14/7). That is, documents are treated as the 
expression of a human consciousness that existed in a time no longer accessible to us.  
They are then read and described in regards to,  
… not only what the documents may have meant, but also whether they were 
telling the truth, and by what right they could claim to be doing so, whether they 
were sincere or deliberately misleading, well informed or ignorant, authentic or 
tampered with. (AS: 13/6) 
 
In other words, documents are described strictly in terms of the human consciousness that 
produced it, and thus the description of these documents becomes centered on the subject. 
Documents are the expression of someone, who meant to say something, on the basis of 
which we can reconstruct the past.  As we can see, the ways in which documents may be 
described is given from within the framework of continuity and its subject-oriented view 
of history. The rules for the way that historical unities are to be formed and that 
documents are to be described are called, by Foucault, “ready-made syntheses,” that “we 
normally accept before any examination” (AS: 32/22).  The investigator thus comes to 
the table already with the idea that the movement of history is the correlate of human 
consciousness.  Her questions are then framed by continuity, which limits what may be 
asked and the manner in which answers can be conceived. 
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 Ultimately, we can understand Foucault‟s argument in the following manner: if 
we subscribe to the “sovereignty of the subject,” i.e. if we presume that the subject is the 
foundation of knowledge, then our analyses will be implicitly guided by this 
presumption. Furthermore, our analyses will then confirm our implicit presumption 
through fitting evidence for our analyses into a general pattern supplied by the 
presumption itself. Specifically, if we believe that the subject is the foundation of 
knowledge and meaning, then we will view humanity as having an internal teleology 
whose end is absolute knowledge. Thus – to return to the idea of critical ontology 
outlined above – presuming an internal teleology to human beings, in the form of reason, 
will give rise to a belief in necessary limits of thought and being. If Foucault‟s goal is to 
show us the contingency of thinking and being, then this idea of the subject must be 
rejected. 
 
§6. Foucault’s Reversal of the Phenomenological Reduction 
 
 Foucault‟s rejection of the subject, I argue, leads him to a reversal of the 
phenomenological reduction through the suspension of the subject from analyses of 
historical documents. This reversal of the phenomenological reduction allows Foucault to 
isolate the processes through which we become subjects of knowledge, power, and ethics. 
In the end, we will find Foucault returning to the subject that he suspends in the three 
volumes of the History of Sexuality.
10
 
 This section begins with a brief explanation of the phenomenological reduction 
made famous by Husserl, so as to set the scene for further discussion of Foucault‟s 
reversal of the reduction. The section will then continue with an examination of three 
                                               
10 This will be the subject of Chapter Four. 
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texts in which we can find Foucault‟s employment of this reversal of the 
phenomenological reduction, followed by an explanation of how the reduction operates 
within Foucault‟s later texts. Taken together, I can then show that Foucault must return to 
that which he originally suspended, i.e. the subject. 
 
a) Husserl’s Phenomenological Reduction 
 
 Husserl‟s phenomenological reduction, developed in his 1913 text Ideas I, is a 
methodological move in which we delimit a region of experience through the suspending 
of what Husserl calls “the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude” (Hua 
III: 53/57). This general positing underlies what Husserl calls our “natural attitude,” 
which consists of an attitude towards the world, in the sense that it factually exists. That 
is, for Husserl, our belief in the world “does not consist of a particular act” or “an 
articulate judgment about existence” (Hua III: 53/57). Instead, our belief that the world 
and those around us factually exist is instead a constant attitude that we have towards the 
world. Husserl writes that it is “something that lasts continuously throughout the whole 
duration of the attitude, i.e. throughout natural waking life.” (Hua III: 53/57). This 
attitude is what Husserl calls the “natural attitude.” 
 For Husserl, in order to separate off the question of the structure of consciousness 
from the thorny question of the relation of the mind to the world, or mind to body, he 
argues that we must describe our experience in such a way that this general positing, as 
an attitude, is not in play. As such, rather than “remaining in this attitude, we propose to 
alter it radically” (Hua III: 53/57). This radical alteration, for Husserl, involves the 
modification of the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude, specifically 
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through the “parenthesizing,” “putting out of action,” “excluding,” or “suspending”11 of 
the world‟s existence. That is, in order to describe consciousness such that we can 
elucidate the structures through which it constitutes the world, we must first put the 
factual existence of the world “out of play” or “in suspense.” Husserl writes: 
Nevertheless the positing undergoes a modification: while it in itself 
remains what it is, we, so to speak, “put it out of action” we “exclude it,” 
we “parenthesize” it. It is still there, like the parenthesized in the 
parentheses, like the excluded outside the context of inclusion. We can 
also say: The positing is a mental process, but we make “no use” of it… 
(Hua III: 54/59) 
 
Furthermore, this “reduction” does not only consist of the suspending of the general 
positing of the existence of the world. Husserl argues that any idea which presumes the 
existence of the world must be suspended as well: (1) the totality of the cultural and 
natural sciences, with their theories and beliefs about the consciousness and the world 
(Hua III: 108/131), (2) the transcendence of God (Hua III: 110/134), and all natural or 
religious teleologies (Hua III: 111/134). 
 These reductions, Husserl argues, “initially makes possible the turning of regard 
to transcendentally pure consciousness” (Hua III: 108/131). Once we have suspended all 
theories and notions given to us by science, we are left only with the world as it appears 
to consciousness, rather than the way it appears to us in the natural attitude, i.e. filtered 
through all sorts of beliefs and theories. We can then carry out analyses of the very 
structures of consciousness. 
 How we understand the notion of structure, however, changes depending upon 
whether Husserl is engaging within a “static” or “genetic” phenomenological analysis.12 
                                               
11 Husserl, in a discussion of whether or not the pure ego can be excluded, says that there are investigations 
in which one would put the pure ego “in suspenso” (Hua III: 133). 
12 The difference between static and genetic phenomenology is discussed in Chapter Two. 
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At the static level, such as in Ideas 1, consciousness appears, after the reduction, through 
the structure of noesis and noema (consciousness-of). However, once Husserl focuses on 
the constitution of internal time and other genetic analyses, consciousness is usually 
referred to as a kind of flow or process.
13
 So, while it is true that in one sense the 
reduction yields essential structures, it can also be understood as yielding essential 
processes wherein our experience of the world is constituted. 
 
§7. The Motivation for the Reduction in Foucault 
 
 The general motivation for a reversal of Husserl‟s phenomenological reduction 
can be found in an interview from 1976, in which Foucault tells his interlocutor the 
following: 
I wanted to see how these problems of constitution [problems de 
constitution] could be resolved within a historical framework, instead of 
referring them back to a constituent subject [un sujet constituent] 
(madness, criminality, or whatever). But this historical contextualization 
needed to be something more than the simple relativization of the 
phenomenological subject. I don‟t believe the problem can be solved by 
historicizing the subject as posited by the phenomenologists, fabricating a 
subject that evolves through the course of history. One has to dispense 
[débarrassant] with the constituent subject, to get rid [débarrasser] of the 
subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis that can account for the 
constitution of the subject [la constitution du sujet] within a historical 
framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a form of 
history that can account for the constitution of knowledge, discourses, 
domains of objects, and so on, without having to make a reference to a 
subject that is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs 
in its empty sameness throughout the course of history. (EWF3: 147/118, 
my emphasis) 
 
As we have already seen, Foucault‟s project is to show that the limits of thought and 
being are historically constituted, and therefore contingent, and that this project occurs 
through the analyses of the axes of knowledge, power, and ethics. However, if Foucault 
                                               
13 The idea that consciousness is a flow or a process is discussed in Chapter Two. 
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wants to show how the subject is constituted along these three themes, then he cannot 
take the constitutive activities of the subject into account. 
 Foucault‟s methodological statement, that he had to “dispense with the constituent 
subject” so as to “account for the constitution of the subject within a historical 
framework,” plays out in Foucault‟s work through the active suspension14 of the subject 
from his analyses. Concretely, this suspension occurs when Foucault examines historical 
documents.
15
 So as not to interpret historical documents in a way that falls in line with 
the “sovereignty of the subject,” one has to “suspend” the subject from analyses, and all 
of the notions that this theme brings into play. 
 This idea of suspension plays out in three different ways throughout Foucault‟s 
works. First, in two texts from 1966, viz. “The Thought of the Outside” and “Les 
suivantes” (the first chapter of The Order of Things), the idea of suspending the themes of 
the “sovereignty of the subject” take the form of the “exclusion” of the subject in the 
former and the erasure of proper names in the latter. Second, in two texts from 1969, viz. 
The Archaeology of Knowledge and “What is an Author?”, Foucault is directly concerned 
with the “suspension” of the themes associated with the “sovereignty of the subject.” 
Third, Foucault‟s later texts, viz. Discipline and Punish and the three volumes of the 
                                               
14 Foucault uses this term repeatedly throughout his Archaeology. This will be examined further in §8. 
15 Dreyfus and Rabinow recognize the dialogue between Foucault‟s method in his early texts and Husserl‟s 
phenomenological reduction and project of description, in their description of archaeology as “the 
bracketing of serious meaning” (MF: 49). Dreyfus and Rabinow interpret Foucault‟s archaeological method 
as the attempt to “bracket the truth claims of the serious speech act he is investigating” (MF: 49). 
Ultimately, they argue that the archaeological project fails due to Foucault falling victim to the ambiguous 
doubles outlined in Chapter Nine of Let mots et les choses. However, Dreyfus and Rabinow miss other 
interpretations of Foucault‟s relationship with the reduction through interpreting Foucault‟s work through 
his own critiques of phenomenology. As such, for them, the only question is whether or not Foucault can 
free himself from the doubles of man, which they see happening with Foucault‟s move to genealogy. 
Furthermore, because Dreyfus and Rabinow describe Husserl‟s project as a series of “implausible 
methodological contortions” and an “implausible tour de force,” it is no surprise that they miss any 
productive interpretations of Foucault‟s work, and seek only to understand what Foucault „actually meant‟ 
(MF: 36). 
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History of Sexuality, can be understood as analyses carried out from within this reversal 
of the phenomenological reduction. Ultimately, the reversal of the reduction is deployed 
in order to reveal those processes through which we become subjects of knowledge, 
power, and ethics.
16
 
Let us now examine each of these in turn.
17
 
 
§8. The Exclusion of the Subject (1966): “The Thought of the Outside”18 and 
“Les suivantes” 
 
Foucault‟s 1966 essay “The Thought of the Outside” is an attempt to elucidate 
and describe “language in its raw being (être)” (PD: 547/148, translation modified) in 
which we will find the “dispersion” of subjectivity (PD: 549/150). That is, the subject is, 
for Foucault, constituted by language, rather than the other way around. Contra the 
common idea that the subject is the foundation of language (thus the foundation of 
knowledge and meaning), Foucault argues instead that the subject is merely a 
“grammatical fold” [un pli grammatical] in the “continuous streaming of language” (PD: 
565/166). That the subject is a fold implies a relation of constitution from language in its 
raw being to the subject. In fact, Foucault argues in this text that the subject of literature 
is a void or a position in which language expresses itself: “The „subject‟ of literature 
(what speaks in it and what it speaks about) is less language in its positivity than the void 
                                               
16 Foucault‟s movement from the structures of discourse in his early works to the processes of power in his 
later works almost mirrors Husserl‟s movement from static to genetic phenomenology. That is, as Husserl‟s 
work progressed, we see a move from a focus on the structures of consciousness to a focus on 
consciousness as process, primarily in terms of internal time consciousness as „flow.‟ 
17 The elaboration of the idea that Foucault‟s later works are analyses from within his reversal of the 
phenomenological reduction can be found in Chapter Four, though it will be discussed briefly in this 
chapter. 
18 The most interesting and philosophically insightful discussion of this essay can be found in Leonard 
Lawlor‟s Early 20th Century Continental Philosophy. 
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that language takes as its space when it articulates itself in the nakedness of „I speak.‟” 
(PD: 548/149). 
The only way for us to see this, he argues, is through the exclusion of the subject, 
or in an experience of “language from which the subject is excluded” (PD: 548/149). He 
writes that “the being of language only appears for itself with the disappearance of the 
subject” (PD: 549/149). In order to examine the being of language we must first find a 
way to exclude the subject and all of the constraints on meaning that the modern view of 
the subject entails and thus analyze the being of language in a way that “escapes the 
mode of being of discourse – in other words, the dynasty of representation…” (PD: 
548/148). That is, we have to exclude the bearer of discourses if we want to analyze 
language free of “the mode of being of discourse.” 
This exclusion of the subject occurs through the statement “I speak,” which 
“distances, disperses, effaces that existence [that of the subject] and lets only its empty 
emplacement appear” (PD: 548/149). Foucault argues that the statement “I speak” acts as 
a kind of experience in which one can glimpse that which is exterior to the interiority of 
consciousness, i.e. language in its raw being. This occurs because the statement “I speak” 
“refers to a supporting discourse” which is itself missing. Foucault writes: 
“I speak” refers to a supporting discourse that provides it with an object. 
That discourse, however is missing: the sovereignty of “I speak” can only 
reside in the absence of any other language; the discourse about which I 
speak does not preexist the nakedness articulated the moment I say “I 
speak”; it disappears the moment I fall silent. (PD: 547/148). 
 
Normally, the statement “I speak” is accompanied by an “of” or an “about” – I speak of 
or about something, for instance I can speak about some philosopher or another. 
However, without the presence of the “of” or the “about,” any supporting discourse that 
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might “provide it with an object” is not found (PD: 547/148), and a shift in focus occurs. 
While the subject would seem to be the seat of meaning, and that anytime the subject 
speaks meaning follows, the “I speak” takes this relationship and turns it upside-down. 
Since the “I speak” carries no meaning, it is not of or about anything, the subject that 
speaks it becomes merely a position or a place in which language articulates itself. When 
I say “I speak,” I become that position in its nakedness. 
 This position is a kind of „void‟ within the streaming of language in its raw being. 
Foucault writes that this void is “an absolute opening through which language endlessly 
spreads forth, while the subject – the „I‟ who speaks – fragments, disperses, scatters, 
disappearing in that naked space” (PD: 547/148). Rather than a unity or an identity, 
which would serve as the foundation for language, the subject is instead an opening for 
language‟s articulation of itself. Again, Foucault writes “And the subject that speaks is 
less the responsible agent of a discourse… than a nonexistence in whose emptiness the 
indefinite [indéfini] outpouring of language uninterruptedly continues” (PD: 547/148, 
translation modified). 
 However, while Foucault argues in this text that we must exclude the subject in 
order to see that the subject is a kind of void or “empty emplacement,” this does not mean 
that excluding the subject eliminates it. Rather, Foucault is here concerned with 
excluding the subject and the discourses that she brings to the table in order to show us 
the contingency of our own limits. Again, though Foucault excludes the modern notion of 
the subject, he does so such that he can illuminate what we are now in our current era. 
 Similar language to exclusion occurs in Foucault‟s analysis of Las Meninas, the 
1656 painting by Diego Velázquez (from the former‟s 1966 text The Order of Things). 
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As Lawlor argues, Foucault analyzes Velázquez‟s Las Meninas in order to show us “the 
prior law that makes the play of representation possible,” which itself “is the fundamental 
condition for all these epochs and perhaps for the epochs that are still to come” (II: 95).  In 
order for this to occur, however, Foucault argues, we must “erase the proper names” of 
the figures in the painting.
19
 He writes that if one wishes to analyze the painting in a way 
that allows for us to see this “fundamental condition,” we must “erase (effacer) those 
proper names and preserve the infinity of the task” (MC: 24/9).  
According to Foucault, proper names obscure our analysis of the painting. Simply 
put, if we want to understand the play of representation in Las Meninas, then we need to 
focus on the gazes within the painting itself, which can be obscured if we focus on who is 
who in the painting. In fact, there is a fundamental ambiguity to representation and to Las 
Meninas that is completely done away with if we assign proper names to the painter and 
to the subjects within the painting. Foucault writes that “[t]hese proper names would form 
useful landmarks and avoid ambiguous designations; they would tell us in any case what 
the painter is looking at, and the majority of the characters in the picture along with him” 
(MC: 25/9). However, for Foucault, it is precisely within the ambiguity of these gazes 
that the play of representation is revealed, and if one wishes to keep this ambiguity open, 
one “must pretend not to know who is to be reflected in the depths of that mirror, and 
interrogate that reflection in its own terms” (MC: 25/10).  
For us to keep the ambiguity of the painting open, so as to see the play of 
representation, we must erase the proper names of those in the painting. This erasing, in 
effect, removes the subject from the painting and allows for the painting to be 
                                               
19 In Ch. 8 of Implications of Immanence, Lawlor gives an extended discussion on Foucault‟s removal of 
proper names in Las Meninas. However, Lawlor does not connect this with Husserl‟s phenomenological 
reduction. See his Ch. 8 for a complete analysis of Foucault‟s treatment of Las Meninas. 
 33 
 
 
interrogated precisely on its own terms, rather than filtered through our cultural and 
historical knowledge of who those figures were and what the painting might then 
represent. In fact, Foucault does not use the proper name “Velázquez,” which suggests a 
similarity between this analysis and Foucault‟s later essay “What is an Author?” If we 
attach the name Velázquez to the painting we, in effect, constrain the possible meanings 
given by the painting, just like the author constrains the possible interpretations of a text. 
Furthermore, the original title for this chapter in the French edition of The Order of 
Things is “Les suivantes” or “the followers,” which, as Lawlor argues, is a “reversing or 
even denying what the painting seems to represent, its principle theme, the sovereigns or 
the infant” (II: 105). As such, the name of the chapter itself suggests the exclusion of the 
“sovereignty of the subject.” 
However, though Foucault tells us we must “erase” (effacer) the proper names of 
the painting, this is again in the name of his overall project, i.e. the isolation of the 
contingent limits of our present possible experience. As such, he is not arguing that we 
must erase ourselves, but that we must suspend a specific notion of ourselves, and the 
underlying themes that this notion entails, in order to find these limits and their 
contingency.  
 
§9. The Suspension of the Subject (1969): The Archaeology of Knowledge and 
“What is an Author?” 
 
 Perhaps the most striking example of Foucault‟s reversal of the phenomenological 
reduction occurs within his methodological treatise The Archaeology of Knowledge. In 
this text, Foucault attempts to outline the method that was present in his earlier books and 
essays, i.e. “the archaeological method.” This method, Foucault writes, is the “project of 
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a description of discursive events” (AS: 39/27, translation modified, my emphasis). This 
project of a description of discursive events requires that we first delimit the field of 
discourse and its element the “statement” (AS: 39/27), which, as we will soon see, 
requires a “change of viewpoint” on the part of the investigator (AS: 123/111). It is only 
through the statement that, Foucault argues, we can understand how it is that we are 
constituted as subjects of knowledge. 
 However, this discursive field must be delimited from the field of normal 
language or culture. Foucault writes that the description of the statement “requires a 
certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be recognized and examined in itself” (AS: 
123/111). This change in viewpoint occurs through the “suspension” of a series of four 
notions that the traditional historical analyst imposes upon historical events and 
documents themselves, which may or may not be native to the events and documents. 
“Once these immediate forms of continuity are suspended [suspendue], an entire field is 
set free” (AS: 38/26, my emphasis). And, again, Just as Husserl suspends the existence of 
the world so as to delimit a field of experience wherein we can describe the constitutive 
activities of consciousness, Foucault suspends the “sovereignty of the subject” so as to 
delimit a field of language wherein we can describe the constitutive activities of 
knowledge on the subject through the residuum of the statement. 
First among the notions to be suspended are the ideas of tradition, influence, 
development and evolution, and spirit.  These five notions, when put to use in historical 
analysis, carry within themselves certain aspects that motivate historical events to be 
organized around the primacy of human consciousness.  The notion of tradition, Foucault 
writes, “is intended to give a special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are 
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both successive and identical (or at least similar)” (AS: 31/21). For example, one could 
take various reenactments of a story that is handed down by tradition and group them 
according to their continuity with each other, in that they share an element in common 
though they occur at different times.  As such, tradition enables the historical analysis to 
“isolate the new against a background of permanence” (AS: 31/21). Influence is used to 
describe a kind of causal process that can occur between two disparate events, thus 
connecting them in continuity with each other (AS: 31/21).  The notions of development 
and evolution supply historical analysis with a kind of teleology by giving “the outline of 
a future unity” (AS: 32/22). Finally, the notion of spirit allows the traditional historical 
analyst to establish continuity through the idea that given periods of time share a 
“community of meanings” (AS: 32/22) and can thus be connected up with each other on 
the basis of continuity between these communities.  Of all these notions, Foucault writes 
that “these pre-existing forms of continuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without 
question, must remain in suspense [il faut donc les tenir en suspens]” (AS: 37/25, my 
emphasis). 
 Second, according to Foucault, the investigator must put out of play “those 
divisions or groupings with which we have becomes so familiar” (AS: 32/22). Creating 
histories of genres, Foucault argues, is to impose a continuity upon historical events and 
documents that may not have existed at the time they actually occurred.  The genre of 
literature is a genre distinction that is specific to our modern episteme.  For example, a 
tale that we may classify as belonging to the history of literature may have been first used 
primarily as an ethical tool.  In any case, genre distinctions are a category that the 
historian imposes back onto historical events such that they may be grouped in terms of 
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unities continuous with the development of that distinction.  Foucault writes that these 
distinctions “are always themselves reflexive categories, principles of classification, 
normative rules, and institutional types” (AS: 33/22). So that historical events and 
documents can be described prior to the framework of continuity, these genre distinctions 
must be suspended, as they give us a pattern through which to group historical events and 
documents. 
 With regard to the third set of notions, Foucault writes, “…the unities that must be 
suspended [suspens] above all are those that emerge in the most immediate way: those of 
the book and the oeuvre” (AS: 33/23, my emphasis). These two unities lend continuity to 
historical analysis by explicitly implicating the subject in the description of historical 
documents. The unity of a book is seen as coming from the author:  the reason why The 
Confederacy of Dunces is not Blood Meridian is because they have different authors. The 
oeuvre seeks to make a unity out of a number of books through their sharing the same 
author, and this implicates the subject directly into historical analysis. The historian 
imposes the notions of the book and oeuvre onto the objects of her analysis, and this 
limits her analyses such that they only be carried out in terms of the subject that produced 
them. As such, both notions, of the book and the oeuvre, must be suspended. 
 The final step in the act of suspension is to put out of play “two linked, but 
opposing themes,” viz. the secret origin and the already-said (AS: 36/25). Of these 
themes, Foucault writes, 
The first theme sees the historical analysis of discourse as the quest for and the 
repetition of an origin that eludes all historical determination; the second sees it as 
the interpretation of „hearing‟ of an „already-said‟ that is at the same time a „not-
said.‟ (AS: 36/25) 
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The theme of the secret origin supplies continuity to historical analysis by offering a kind 
of teleological impetus that sustains the notion of history as progress, i.e. rationality. For 
Foucault, historians search for the origin of various historical phenomena, and implicitly 
connect this origin with the rationality of human beings. However, this origin can never 
be found. Foucault writes, “Thus one is led inevitably, through the naivety of 
chronologies, towards an ever-receding point that is never itself present in any history” 
(AS: 36/25). However, the search for this origin also organizes historical events in a 
linear progression through the search itself. That is, if the historian is searching for an 
origin of some historical event, and this origin is conceived of in terms of human 
rationality, all the events that she organizes will be along this same progression. 
Furthermore, this theme is what disallows historical analysis in terms of discontinuity or 
rupture, since it arranges history in a “great chronology of reason” (AS: 16/8). The 
second theme, that of the already-said, revolves around the idea that historical documents 
are the expression of a human consciousness.  Historical analysis thus becomes the task 
of interpreting what a document meant to say, which is itself something that is both said 
and not-said.  Thus, what we have are two themes that impose continuity onto the ways 
in which historical events and documents are to be grouped and analyzed.  As with the 
previous notions, these two themes must be suspended.  
The sovereignty of the subject prescribes to the analyst that historical documents 
are only analyzed in terms of how „what the document says‟ relates to „the subject that 
produced it.‟  That is, what did the author „mean‟ to say?  Was the author right?  Can we 
reconstruct the deductive process that led the author to say what she did?  However, by 
peeling away the traditional notion of continuity, historical documents can instead be 
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analyzed in radically different ways which are not tied to the primacy of the subject.  If 
we can put the framework that assumes these notions „out of play,‟ the investigator is 
able to see how a group of signs can function in relation to other domains, rather than 
simply the domain of author and book. Foucault calls this group of signs a “statement.” 
Foucault describes it as: 
A modality that is proper to that group of signs; a modality that allows it to be 
something more than a series of traces… a modality that allows it to be in relation 
with a domain of objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject, 
to be situated among other verbal performances, and to be endowed with a 
repeatable materiality. (AS: 140/107) 
 
The statement can be described in terms of: (1) how the statement formulates the objects 
that it is talking about, (2) the ways in which the statement assigns a position to whoever 
formulates it, (3) the way that it is organized in relation to other statements, and (4) how 
the statement varies or remains identical through different uses.  These avenues of 
analysis are closed off, or simply not accounted for, when a group of signs contained 
within a historical document are interpreted through the framework of continuity.  “One 
is not seeking, therefore, to pass from the text to thought… One remains within discourse 
itself” (AS: 101/76). 
  As such, what we find here in Foucault‟s Archaeology is the elaboration of a 
method of a suspension whose goal is to delimit a field of language for the description of 
the statement. Similarly, in Husserl we saw that the phenomenological reduction is the 
suspension of the natural attitude such that we can delimit the field of pure 
consciousness. Foucault‟s methodology in this text is perhaps the most direct example of 
Foucault‟s reversal of the phenomenological reduction, as regards the ideas of method 
and description. The goal of the Archaeology is to lay out a methodology with which one 
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can describe historical documents, rather than interpret them as evidence of the progress 
of human rationality. This requires the active suspension, on the part of the investigator, 
of a set of themes and notions that implicitly guide to interpret historical documents as 
evidence of the teleological progression. It is only after we suspend these themes and 
notions that a field of language is “set free” in which one can describe historical 
documents as statements, which are themselves the general element of a discursive field. 
Similarly, for Husserl, in order for us to delimit a field of experience in which we can 
describe our experience (such that essential structures and processes come to the 
foreground) we must actively perform the phenomenological reduction, which is itself the 
suspense of the “general positing of the natural attitude,” which is accomplished through 
the phenomenological reduction. In both cases, the act of delimiting a field requires an 
act of reduction. 
 The notion of the oeuvre is expanded in Foucault‟s essay “What is an Author?” 
Originally presented as a lecture in 1969 before the Société Française de philosophie, 
Foucault argues that, contra Barthes, the author has not yet died or disappeared. Rather, 
the author is more present than ever within contemporary literature. However, for 
Foucault, the author is not an element within discourse, but rather a kind of role that plays 
a classificatory function. Foucault writes that the author-function “permits one to group 
tougher a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them 
to the others… it establishes a relationship among the texts” (QA: 826/210). For instance, 
the name Aristotle lets us group together texts that he wrote, differentiate them from texts 
that he did not write, and put him in contrast with what others said during his time and 
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during other time periods. However, this kind of grouping ends up limiting or 
constraining the possible meanings we can get from a text. Foucault writes:  
The author is not an indefinite [indéfinie] source of significations that fill a 
work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional 
principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in 
short by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the 
free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction (QA: 
839/221). 
 
This limitation and exclusion occurs through the implicit presumption of authorial 
intention. Simply speaking, a text can only mean what an author intended it to mean, and 
thus interpretation becomes the hunt for authorial intentions. These authorial intentions 
then guide how it is that we interpret a philosopher or a piece of fiction. Under the 
guiding sway of the author-function, one would argue that her interpretation is “correct” 
because it is closest to what the author intended to mean, compared to other 
interpretations. This ends up constraining or limiting the proliferation of meaning through 
the restraint on what a text can mean, thereby foreclosing in advance other possible 
interpretations and meanings that may be elicited from a text. 
The author-function serves to unite and keep a set of works within a single 
coherent unity, which, in effect, forces us to interpret texts according to the intentions of 
the author. In order to free the meaning of literature from the sovereignty of the subject, 
and the analysis that it dictates (this time in terms of authorial intention), one must 
remove the author from analysis. Again, though Foucault does not make this latter move 
in his text explicitly, it seems bound up with his idea that “as our society changes, at the 
very moment when it is in the process of changing, the author function will disappear, 
and in such a manner that fiction and its polysemous texts will once again function 
according to another mode...” (EWF2: 839/222). 
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If we understand Foucault‟s idea of the author-function as an elaboration of the 
theme of the oeuvre from the Archaeology, the notion of suspension must be implicitly at 
play. That is, if we are to examine a document in terms of its possible meanings, then we 
must suspend the author‟s proper name from the work, such that we do not interpret all of 
her works according to what we understand to make up her „work.‟  
 
§10. The Reduction in Later Works  
 
While the notion of suspension does not occur in Discipline and Punish and later 
works, I suggest that it is still operating at an implicit level, and on two registers. First, 
Foucault‟s approach to historical documents outlined in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
is still present throughout his later career, in the sense that archaeology becomes 
incorporated into his more general critical project. If we are to use historical documents 
to analyze how the subject has been constituted through knowledge, power, and ethics, 
then we cannot bring the guiding theme of the sovereignty of the subject to the table with 
us. Even though he not does acknowledge this, it would seem that the same 
methodological principle must still be at play. If Foucault wants to analyze ancient Greek 
and Roman texts for clues into the constitution of the self in light of the imposition of 
forms of conduct or ways of being, then he cannot approach these texts with a framework 
that tells him in advance that, for instance, the ancients represent crude or better ethical 
ways of thinking. To escape this kind of interpretation, Foucault simply must suspend 
those notions he laid out in his earlier writings. 
The second register lies in Foucault‟s general project, in the sense that this project 
requires the very suspending that we have examined in this section. If we are to see the 
ways in which we have been constituted through knowledge, power, and ethics, and thus 
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see that our limits are contingent and the possibility of going beyond them, then his 
analyses must suspend the idea of the subject as the foundation of knowledge and 
meaning. If we did not suspend this idea, then we would never see that our limits of 
thinking and being are in fact contingent. That is, this suspending is a kind of 
methodological motor for his general project. 
As such, we can understand Foucault‟s later works, especially Discipline and 
Punish and the three volumes of the History of Sexuality, as analyses that occur from 
within the reversal of the phenomenological reduction and whose aim is to show us the 
processes that yield subjectivity, i.e. the constitution of ourselves as subjects of 
knowledge, power, and ethics. 
 
§11. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that Foucault‟s general project can be understood as 
a critical ontology of the present, in which the contingent limits of present possible 
experience are isolated. This project entails a resistance to the modern notion of the 
subject, which plays out in the form of a reversal of Husserl‟s phenomenological 
reduction throughout Foucault‟s texts. This reversal of the reduction operates through the 
suspension of all of the themes associated with the theme of the “sovereignty of the 
subject,” and is undertaken so as to show that we are not, essentially, the modern notion 
of the subject, and thus that the limits of our present experience are contingent.  
  
 43 
 
 
Chapter Two – Husserl and the Subject 
 
Consciousness is an incessant process of 
becoming... It is a never ending history. 
-Edmund Husserl20 
 
§12. Introduction 
 
 The goal of this chapter is to draw, from Husserl‟s analyses of internal time 
consciousness and passive synthesis, a picture of the subject whose experience of the 
world can be, in a sense, constituted in the ways that Foucault lays out throughout his 
work; for example, a subject that can be disciplined through the arrangement of desks in a 
classroom (SP: 149/147). This constitution, I will argue, occurs through apperception, the 
structure through which consciousness constitutes meanings that are not themselves 
directly present. Apperception itself is grounded in the structure of internal time 
consciousness, where the activities of protention and retention extend consciousness 
beyond what is directly given in experience. As we will see, it is the fundamental 
openness of both retention and protention that allows for change in the content of our 
apperceptions, which is then a change in the meaningful experience of our world. 
Ultimately, the work done in these two chapters will lay out the structure of 
consciousness such that a subject can be phenomenologically described as enmeshed 
within a network of knowledge, power, and ethics. 
 This argument, however, will require two chapters. In the first chapter, I will lay 
out the structure of apperception through an analysis of Husserl‟s writings on internal 
time consciousness, and the related syntheses of association, motivation, and 
sedimentation. I will show that it is the openness of internal time consciousness and its 
                                               
20 From Husserliana XI, pg. 31/69, 
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syntheses that provide the structure of an agent that can take up a discursive practice. The 
next chapter will follow Husserl as he „bumps‟ against the limit of his own thought, and 
begins to tumble into that of Foucault‟s. 
 
§13. “The Theory of Consciousness is a Theory of Apperceptions” 
  
 The leading clue for my argument is to be found in a manuscript from 1921, 
published posthumously in Husserliana XI, in which Husserl describes the difference 
between static and genetic phenomenology, and the necessity of the latter. In this 
manuscript Husserl writes that: 
The theory of consciousness is directly a theory of apperceptions: the 
stream of consciousness is a stream of a constant genesis; it is not a mere 
series [nacheinander], but a development [auseinander], a process of 
becoming according to laws of necessary succession in which concrete 
apperceptions of different typicalities (among them, all the apperceptions 
that give rise to the general apperception of a world) grow out of 
primordial apperceptions or out of apperceptive intentions of a primitive 
kind. (Hua XI: 339/628, my emphasis) 
 
Here, Husserl argues that the theory of consciousness is properly understood as a theory 
of apperceptions, specifically as the development of consciousness through apperception. 
In so far as apperceptions follow “from” [aus] each other, as much as “after” [nach] each 
other, consciousness is to be understood as a “process of becoming.” Understood in this 
way, Husserl argues that we can describe consciousness from two perspectives. First, we 
can undertake a “static” description of consciousness in which we elucidate its basic 
structures in basic terms. Second, a “genetic” description instead looks to describe 
consciousness in its development, so as to elucidate those operations through which a 
meaningful world is constituted. 
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 Ultimately Husserl concludes that to understand consciousness in its development 
is to understand consciousness in terms of apperception, since it is through apperception 
that we constitute a meaningful world, in which we make judgments, imagine, perceive, 
etc. However, how are we to understand this? What is apperception, and how does it 
function such that a meaningful world is constituted?  
 
§14. Apperception
21
 
 
 What is apperception?
22
 The word itself gives an introductory clue as to its 
meaning: the prefix „ap‟ signifies a kind of distance, thus making apperception a kind of 
distant perception. For Husserl, the „distant‟ does not signify our ability to, for instance, 
perceive spatially far away objects. Instead, the „distant‟ refers to the way in which 
apperception intends meanings within experience that are not themselves directly present. 
Before turning to examples, let us first look at Husserl‟s definition of apperception: 
Apperceptions are intentional lived-experiences [intentionale Erlebnisse] 
that are conscious of something as perceived, [but this something as 
perceived] is not self-given in these lived-experiences (not completely); 
and they are called apperceptions to the extent that they have this trait, 
even if in this case they also consciously intend what in truth is self-given 
in them. (Hua XI: 336/624) 
                                               
21 This reading of Husserl is heavily indebted to the work and mentorship of Lanei Rodemeyer. In her text 
Intersubjective Temporality, Rodemeyer shows the openness of the subject in Husserl, specifically in terms 
of the constitution of world-time, which then provides the setting for our experiences of a shared world. 
The constitution of world-time, in turn, depends on the openness of consciousness to the constitutive 
activities of others. In any case, I will take the openness of the subject farther than Rodemeyer does in her 
text, by showing how this openness to, and passive synthesis of, the constitutive activities of others can be 
understood within the Foucauldian framework of the constitution of the subject by discourse, knowledge, 
power-relations, etc. 
22 By apperception, I am grouping two terms that Husserl used, though not consistently, viz. appresentation 
and apperception. Appresentation, the way in which an object indicates sides which are not present, will be 
subsumed within the general term „apperception.‟ This will be done for the sake of simplicity, though the 
author recognizes the difference between the two terms. For a complete discussion on this distinction in 
Husserl‟s writings, please see Lanei Rodemeyer‟s Intersubjective Temporality, specifically Chapter Two. 
See also, Klaus Held‟s “Einleitung,” in Edmund Husserl: Die Phänomenologische Methode, Ausgewählte 
Texte (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam), I: 5–53. Translation by Lanei Rodemery as “Husserl‟s Phenomenology 
of the Life-World,” in The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Ed. Donn Welton.  Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2003.  
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Here, Husserl directly defines the notion of apperception as a kind of intentionality, 
within which consciousness intends meanings that are not themselves directly given. For 
example, I look at the six-sided die on my desk. Since my vision is anchored to a 
perspective, when I look at the die I only see one profile of it, perhaps the „six‟ side. 
However, within this perception of the die, along with the profile of the die that is facing 
me now, I also perceive that the die has sides which I cannot see, though could, were I to 
pick up the die and turn it around in my hands. When I walk down the streets of 
Pittsburgh, I see rows of apartments and townhouses. I look at them, and in my 
perception of the front side of the house is necessarily included the back side of the 
house. In either case, the experience of an object as an object, i.e. as an object that takes 
up space, simultaneously contains my perception of the side of the object currently facing 
me and the indirect perception of the other sides of the object that I cannot see at the 
present moment. Husserl writes, “… the two [presentations and apperceptions] are so 
fused that they stand within the functional community of one perception, which 
simultaneously presents and appresents, and yet furnishes for the total object a 
consciousness of its being itself there” (Hua I: 150/122, Husserl‟s emphasis). Thus, 
apperception is a making “co-present” within perception that which is not directly given 
(Hua I: 109). That is, my experience of the die goes beyond that which is immediately 
given in it – I apperceive the sides that I cannot see but experience as belonging to the 
object none the less. Indeed, for Husserl, “… every perception of this type [apperception] 
is transcending: it posits more as itself-there than it makes „actually‟ present at any time” 
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(Hua I: 151/122) and “[a]pperceptions transcend their immanent content […]” (Hua XI: 
336/624).
23
  
 However, it would be misleading to think that apperception is only active in terms 
of our perception of spatial objects. Apperception is the generic term for all of the 
meanings which we constitute that are not themselves directly given in experience. For 
example, when my gaze sweeps across the desk and rests upon the die, I do not only 
perceive a physical object taking up space, but I perceive precisely a six-sided die, an 
object for playing, for testing luck, for deciding who will play first in a game, etc. Again, 
this is a case of apperception. The uses of the die are not directly present in perception, 
but they are given as possibilities of use which define the object as such. In his Cartesian 
Meditations, Husserl describes apperception as “charged with certain characters of value 
and practices – characters that altogether transcend the stratum of the mere thing” (Hua I: 
27).  
We can see how our experience of objects as meaningful occurs through 
apperception. Without apperception I would only ever have a profile of the object, and 
thus never actually experience the object as meaningful:  since I would not be able to 
experience that which is not itself directly present, no meanings would be attached to the 
bare perception. Thus, if apperception is the structure through which a meaningful world 
is constituted, then it is through apperception that discourse would constitute the subject. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
23 See also §50 of Husserl‟s Cartesian Meditations, in which he describes apperception as a making „co-
present‟ (Hua I: 109).  
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§15. Apperception and Internal Time Consciousness 
 
 In order to enter into the complexities of Husserl‟s analyses on internal time 
consciousness, it would be best to first engage in a brief sketch of his overall theory.
24
 Let 
us use Husserl‟s favorite example – a tone played on a violin. I hear a violin tone – I hear 
the tone begin, and as it plays, I perceive the tone as extending through time, and when it 
ends, I can recall experiencing an „entire‟ tone. That I perceive the tone as „extended 
through time‟ is due to consciousness – the current moment of the tone that I am hearing 
is „connected‟ with the moments of the tone that have just past and, furthermore, as I 
listen to the tone I „expect‟ the tone to keep going or to stop, signaling its end. Now I 
listen to a melody rather than a single tone. I hear the melody begin, and as I perceive the 
different tones, they are all connected with the tones that have passed, such that I have the 
experience of a continual melody, and a melody that „builds-up‟ over time. That is, the 
perception of a melody is intimately involved with the retention of the tones that have 
passed and those tones that I expect to come. Or, to use a final example, I am listening to 
someone speak. This person says to me, “Husserl was a phenomenologist.” For me to 
experience this as a whole statement after the speaker finishes the sentence is due, again, 
to the structure of internal time consciousness. Each guttural sound that I hear is 
connected to sounds that have just past and to sounds that are not yet, sounds that I expect 
to hear. In the case of each example, without the functioning of internal time 
consciousness, we, as humans, would only ever have experiences of a „now‟ with no 
connection to the past or to the future. As such, we would only experience a series of 
„frames‟ with no link between them such that they could even be called a series – what 
                                               
24 An excellent brief overview of what is meant by “internal time consciousness” can be found in 
Rodemeyer‟s Intersubjective Temporality. 
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Rodemeyer calls “instant amnesia” (IST: 9). Or, without internal time consciousness, 
each letter that is read in a text would only ever be that letter, and words would never 
form (nor would I be able to identify each letter as I see them, since this would require 
the comparison of the current perception with others that have passed). In Husserl‟s 
terminology, these experiences that have just passed, but are still connected to the now, 
are held onto through the form of „retention.‟ Similarly, the experiences that we expect, 
but have not yet come, are given through the form of „protention.‟ As to the present 
moment, or the „now‟ moment, this will have a handful of names throughout Husserl‟s 
life. All of these terms will be delineated in much more detail shortly. 
 While the basic idea that our experience of an extended present requires the 
holding of past appearances and the anticipation of appearances to come remains 
constant, Husserl‟s understanding of the basic conceptual structure of internal time 
consciousness changed throughout his life.
25
 Let us now look briefly at two of these basic 
conceptual structures: (1) the schema of content and the apprehension of content and (2) 
absolute consciousness.
26
 The second, absolute consciousness, will be the basic 
conceptual framework that we will use in the analyses in this text, as this is Husserl‟s 
main approach in his middle and later works. 
First, there is the „schema of content and the apprehension of content,‟ (1893-
1909)
27
 which was applied to the general question of how it is that we perceive 
                                               
25 For an exceptional exposition on the many twists and turns in Husserl‟s thought, as regards time 
consciousness, see Kortooms, Toine. Phenomenology of Time. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010. 
26
 Different scholars understand the movement of these structures in Husserl‟s through in different ways. 
Brough and Bernet see Husserl as abandoning the schema (1907 for Brough and 1917 for Bernet), while 
Kortooms finds the schema still operative in Husserl‟s C-Manuscripts. Furthermore, Mensch argues that 
Husserl never left the schema behind at all, and that a proper understanding of internal time consciousness 
requires the schema. I will follow the Brough and Bernet interpretation, and examine the structure of 
internal time consciousness in terms of a self-constituting flow. 
27 I follow Brough‟s interpretation. 
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succession or transcendent objects as temporal. According to this view, contents are 
given to consciousness as temporally neutral, and it is our apprehensions that assign to 
them their temporal modality, viz. as present or just past. If we hear a violin tone now, it 
is not the tone itself that designates its various moments as now or just past. Rather, it is 
the animating activity of apprehension that gives each moment of the tone a temporal 
designation within consciousness. While there are issues of infinite regress as well,
28
 
Husserl‟s rejection of this schema ultimately stems from the idea that the content is 
temporally neutral. Since, as Brough writes, “If the contents were genuinely neutral with 
respect to time-determination, then tone a, for example, which objectively is Now, could 
in principle be apprehended as past.”29 Indeed, Husserl explains: 
The question then is: Cannot the same content that is now the presentat in 
a perception arbitrarily function as the representat in a memory? (Hua X: 
317/329) 
 
As such, and for a number of other reasons, Husserl abandons this model for what 
he terms „absolute consciousness.‟30  However, Brough points out that the idea of 
absolute consciousness appears in writings before Husserl explicitly rejects the schema in 
1909.
31
 Specifically, in an earlier manuscript from 1907, Husserl slightly shifted his focus 
from the perception of transcendent objects as temporal to the temporality of immanent 
objects – to the object as experienced rather than to the experienced transcendent object 
(the perceived tone rather than the tone as such).
32
 This shift, Brough argues, opens for 
                                               
28
 See Kortooms, Toine. Phenomenology of Time. Also, Brough 1972. 
29 Brough, 312 (1972) 
30 Again, Kortooms argues that the schema is operative as late as Husserl‟s Bernau Manuscripts, while 
Mensch argues that it is never abandoned at all. 
31 Brough, 307 (1972) 
32 See Rodemeyer‟s Intersubjective Temporality for a discussion of other ways in which this shift is 
understood (27). 
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Husserl “the theme of an absolute dimension of consciousness,”33 which becomes 
Husserl‟s notion of absolute consciousness – a stream of intentionality that both 
constitutes immanent temporal unities as well as its own unity as a stream. Of this new 
interpretation, Brough writes: 
First, it does not explain time-consciousness in terms of apprehensions and 
contents, of whatever sort. Second, it is primarily and unambiguously a 
theory of the experiencing of immanent temporal objects, and includes the 
identification of experiencing or inner time-consciousness with the 
absolute time-constituting flow.
34
 
 
As regards the first point in the citation above, instead of apprehensions and contents, 
Husserl focuses on the intentionality through which immanent temporal objects are 
constituted, i.e. the activities of retention and protention. As regards the second point, 
rather than asking how it is that we perceive a transcendent temporal content as temporal, 
Husserl focuses directly on the constitutive activities of consciousness and how it is that 
the immanent appearance of an object is constituted as a persisting and identical temporal 
object. Husserl discovers that our experience of the now has a „streaming‟ quality to it. 
We do not experience single fragmentary nows, which are then somehow connected 
together. Instead, our experience is fluid. Husserl writes: 
Now if we consider the constituting appearances of the consciousness of 
internal time, we find the following: They form a flow, and each phase of 
this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle […] 
no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession […] 
On the contrary, we necessarily find the flow of continuous “change”… 
(Hua X: 370/381) 
 
Here, Husserl is pointing to our experience of a temporal object. We do not simply find a 
succession of nows, but rather a „flow‟ whose moments can only be abstracted in terms of 
                                               
33 Brough, 308 (1972) 
34 Brough, 313 (1972) 
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phases, each of which is itself a continuity of present appearances, retentions of these 
appearances and protentions of appearances in the future. The idea that our experience of 
the now is a phase rather than a point will be examined in the next section.  
This flow of consciousness not only constitutes the unity of immanent temporal 
objects, but its own unity as well. This, Husserl writes, is not to be understood as two 
flows: one flow in which an immanent object is constituted and one flow in which the 
continuity of the subject is constituted. Rather: “The self-appearance of the flow does not 
require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself…” 
(Hua X: 381/393). Again, he writes: 
As shocking (when not initially even absurd) as it may seem to say that the 
flow of consciousness constitutes is own unity, it is nonetheless the case 
that it does and that this is something that can be made intelligible on the 
basis of the flow‟s essential constitution. Our regard can be directed, in the 
one case, through the phases that “coincide” in the continuous progression 
of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard 
can also go along the flow, be aimed at a section of the flow, at the 
passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its 
end. (Hua X: 378/390) 
  
Here, Husserl is pointing out the following: if we examine the experience in which 
temporal objects are constituted, we find two things. First, we find the constitution of the 
object as an immanent temporal object. Second, we find that our constitution of the object 
is connected with other previous constitutions, such that each experience is connected 
with the last, and each are connected in terms of one single flow. For example, my 
experience of the violin tone also consists, at least latently, of the experience of putting 
the record onto my record player. In turn, this experience is connected to the previous 
experience of wanting to put the record on, or of looking for the record itself. That is, the 
description of any phase is already going to point to phases that have already preceded, 
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thus constituting a continuity to the flow itself. Furthermore, Husserl identifies this flow 
as the absolute level of consciousness: “[The flow] is absolute subjectivity and has the 
absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as „flow‟…” (Hua X: 
371/382). 
 Let us now look more closely at the components of internal time consciousness. 
 
a) The Present 
 
 For Husserl, the „now‟ must be understood in terms of an extended present, or a 
duration, or, as he will call it in his later manuscripts, “the living present.” To speak of a 
„now‟ in Husserl‟s analyses is, in itself, misleading, since the „now‟ seems, in ordinary 
language, to denote some kind of point, perhaps in the way that I can say “This is now.” 
Yet, for Husserl the „now‟ cannot be understood as a point, simply since we never 
experience the now as a point. He writes, “What is „given‟ to perception is necessarily 
something temporally extended, not something with the character of a mere point in time” 
(Hua X: 168/173). By „temporal extension,‟ we should understand a kind of continuum: 
in the center, I have an immediate appearance directly before me, around which radiates 
both the retentions of past appearances and the protentions, or anticipations, of 
appearances yet to come. Of this continuum Husserl writes: “[In the flow] I find a phase 
of the „now‟… But I find „together‟ with this phase a continuity of phases that make up 
the consciousness of what elapsed earlier…” (Hua X: 378/389). For example, I pick up 
the six-sided die on my desk and turn it over in my hands – running my gaze along one 
side of it, and now along another side. This experience of gazing at the die is always an 
experience of the continuum of the appearances of the die, which are constituted 
temporally – an immediate appearance is given to me, with which is combined the 
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retention of a past appearance of the object and the protention of a side that I expect to 
see. As such, to speak of the „now‟ is always to abstract from the flow of experience a 
duration of time with somewhat arbitrary boundaries.  
 Husserl refers to this immediate experience alternately as “primordial impression” 
[Urimpression] and “primordial sensation” [Urempfindung].35 In the example of a 
musical tone, the term “primordial impression” indicates “the absolutely original 
consciousness in which the actual tone-point stands before us „in person‟” (Hua X: 
325/338). This “in person” aspect of the tone can be understood as follows: it is the 
center, around which past primordial impressions are held and future primordial 
impressions are expected. Even still, this primordial impression is itself only a limit or a 
border [Grenze]: “But the perception of what is present is, after all, only a limit [Grenze] 
in an enduring perception…” (Hua X: 354/364), and again: 
The primal sensation-consciousness flows, which means: If a primal 
sensation belonging to the flow exists, then, looking at the entire 
succession, there are – in continuous sequence – primal sensations that do 
„not yet‟ exist and others that „no longer‟ exist; and the primal sensation 
that actually exists is a limit [Grenzpunkt] between two continua – the 
continua of the „not-yet‟ and of the „no longer.‟ (Hua X: 372/383) 
 
As such, even though primordial impression designates the in-person aspect of, for 
instance, a tone or a present adumbration, this in-person aspect cannot be thought of as a 
mathematical point of sensation, but rather as itself the limit or border between retention 
and protention. Or, as Rodemeyer argues, we can think of a primordial impression as a 
protention that is always already in the process of fulfillment or disappointment (IST: 
142). Once the protention is fulfilled or disappointed, this fulfilled or disappointed 
protention sinks back into retention, as the retained in the next phase of consciousness, 
                                               
35 Rodemeyer argues that in his later texts the term Empfindung is used in reference to hyletic data (IS 10f). 
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etc. Rodemeyer argues on this basis, and I agree, that this description of the living present 
gives us a fundamental link between the intentionalities of retention and protention, since 
retentions are themselves newly or past fulfilled protentions (IST: 141). However, while 
Rodemeyer will argue that it is protention which is fundamentally open and thus serves as 
the link to other human beings (IST: 183), I will argue retention shows its own openness 
as well. I will return to this in the next two sub-sections. 
 
b) Far and Near Retention 
 
 Thus far, I have discussed the basic definition of retention – the holding onto of a 
past primordial impression and its connection with a present primordial impression. It is 
now my task to go much deeper into this form of intentionality, as it is through retention 
that past meanings are held in such a way that they can silently and implicitly motivate 
how it is that we experience the world.  
 Within temporal consciousness, retention plays a two-part role. For Husserl, the 
flow of consciousness consists of both immanently constituted temporal objects, e.g. 
violin tones, and of the unity of the flow itself. Husserl writes, “There is one, unique flow 
of consciousness… in which both the unity of the tone in immanent time and the unity of 
the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once” (Hua X: 378/390). As such, 
retention functions at both the level of the constitution of the immanent temporal object 
and at the level of the unity of the flow itself. Again, Husserl writes: 
Every adumbration of consciousness of the species “retention” has, I 
answer, a double intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the 
immanent object, of the tone… The other intentionality is constitutive of 
the unity of this primary memory in the flow… In its process of being 
continuously adumbrated in the flow, it is continuous reproduction of the 
continuously preceding phases. (Hua X: 379/390) 
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As such, retention has a kind of double intentionality, in that it is active at both the level 
of the constitution of an immanent temporal object and at the level of the constitution of 
the unity of the flow itself. As to the first kind of intentionality, when a primordial 
impression elapses, i.e. becomes „just past,‟ this impression is held onto by consciousness 
and synthesized with the next primordial impression, thus giving us a temporal object. 
For example, each moment of the violin tone that elapses is held onto by consciousness 
such that we have an experience of an enduring tone. The second kind of intentionality, 
however, is much more complex. Let us return to the example of the violin tone. The tone 
itself is not experienced as completely detached or distinct from the continuous flowing 
duration of, for example, my day. Rather, the violin tone is part of the larger context of 
the experience of my day – there is my single flow of consciousness in which the violin 
tone takes part. This is due to the second function of retention, in which the flow of 
experience as a unity is constituted. Each „now‟ is the result of the synthesis of retention 
and protention, and, as such, any retention of a previous „now‟ is also the retention of the 
retentions and protentions that went into the constitution of that previous „now.‟ To 
follow the line further, if we abstract a series of three „nows,‟ the most recent „now‟ will 
contain the retentions and protentions that were involved in the constitution of the 
previous „nows.‟ We need only multiply the abstracted „nows‟ of this example to see how 
a unity would be constituted through the system of retention. To this end, Husserl writes, 
… [T]he first primordial impression becomes changed into a 
reproduction
36
 of itself, this reproduction becomes changed into a 
reproduction, and so on. But together with the first reproduction there is a 
new „now,‟ a new primordial sensation; and the latter is combined 
continuously with the former in one moment in such a way that the second 
                                               
36 The term “reproduction” is later dropped by Husserl, as regards retention. 
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phase of the flow is primordial sensation of the new now and reproduction 
of the earlier now. (Hua X: 379/391) 
 
A further distinction can be made with retention, as identified by Rodemeyer, viz. 
between „near‟ and „far‟ retention in Husserl‟s analyses on time consciousness. These 
terms can briefly be explained as follows. Near retention is the activity of retention that 
we were examining under the generic name of „retention‟ up until now, i.e. the holding of 
past primordial impressions. Far retention is the system of „retentions of retentions‟ given 
above, yet much more. It is also the system which stands as the ground, for example, of 
our use of language. When I speak, I do not recollect the words that I use – I do not think 
before each word, and attempt to call up the word as a kind of recollection (though I can 
if I am having trouble expressing a concept). Rather, when I speak the words that I use 
come to me spontaneously – I simply call them up in the act of speaking. For Rodemeyer, 
this is evidence that language lies not in recollection but as latent and “passively 
present”37 in far retention (IST: 89). This manner of having past experience lay latent but 
passively present is what Husserl terms „passive synthesis.‟38 
 Rodemeyer locates an initial clue into the distinction between near and far 
retention in a passage from Section 37 of the Passive Synthesis Lectures (Hua XI: 
177/226), which does not mention the terms at all (IST: 87). In this section, Husserl is 
describing the “distant sphere” of “empty presentations”, the “nil” which “is the constant 
reservoir of objects that have achieved living institution in the process of the living 
                                               
37 Rodemeyer locates this notion of „passively present‟ in the work of Klaus Held. I take up her usage. 
38 The terms “passive” and “active” within Husserl‟s work require full analyses in themselves, but we can 
roughly sketch the difference as follows: By “passive,” Husserl means those processes of consciousness 
which constitute a world for us that are not themselves “active” intentions of a concrete ego. For example, 
my active intention of making a cup of coffee is undertaken on the basis of the passive constitution within 
internal time consciousness. 
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present” (Hua XI: 177/227). In this description, Rodemeyer highlights the following 
passage: 
Initially, however, we want to say that every accomplishment of sense or 
of the object becomes sedimented [niederschlägt] in the realm of the dead, 
or rather, dormant horizonal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed 
order of sedimentation [Sedimentordnung]: While at the head, the living 
process receives new, original life, at the feet, everything that is, as it 
were, in the final acquisition of the retentional synthesis, becomes steadily 
sedimented [niederschlägt]. (Hua XI: 178/227) 
 
Rodemeyer associates “at the head” with the retention that holds onto the recently „just 
past‟ and constitutes the present immanent temporal object. “At the feet,” then, is 
associated with the system of „retention of retentions.‟ It is important here to note the 
language of „sedimentation‟ in the passage quoted above, as it will play an important role 
the second part of this chapter 
 The terms far and near retention are rarely used by Husserl, but one instance 
occurs in Section 25 of the second part of the Passive Synthesis Lectures, which 
Rodemeyer, for good reason, associates with the passage given above. The passage is as 
follows: 
The present turns into the past as the past that is constituted for the ego 
through the lawful regularity of retention; and finally, everything that is 
retentional turns into the undifferentiated unity of the [far] retention 
[Fernretention] of the one distant horizon, which extinguishes all 
differentiations. However, this extinguishing is to be understood in the 
following way: The affective force is necessarily decreased with the 
submersion, which is to say, it decreases the force that makes possible the 
special prominent elements, the unities for themselves even with the non-
intuitability of retention, be they singularities or multiplicities or even 
multiplicities of a higher level, for instance, cyclical multiplicities. What is 
given there broadly in near-retention [Nahretention] as something 
extended as a unity of continuously connected affections, and likewise, 
what exists there as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow 
one after the other, but as largely diverse – [all of this] moves closer 
together; I would say that corresponding to the temporal perspective, to 
the phenomenal moving-closer-together of those matters that have just 
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been, is an affective perspective; flowing is a flowing together of 
affections. (Hua XI 288/422, translation modified) 
 
The relationship between these two passages that Rodemeyer points out should be 
striking. In this passage Husserl draws a line between two different types of retention. 
The first, far retention [Fernretention] is a “distant horizon” [Fernhorizont] of an 
“undifferentiated unity” [unterschiedslosen Einheit].39 Rodemeyer connects this 
description of far retention with the description given of retention in the first of the two 
passages above, that of the “retentional synthesis” that lies “at the feet” in which 
“acquisitions” become “steadily sedimented.” The second, near retention [Nahretention] 
is described “as a multiplicity of elements given together or that follow one after the 
other,” i.e. the constitution of immanent temporal objects. This is connected with the first 
passage, in which Husserl describes the process of retention which functions “at the 
head” wherein “the living process receives new, original life.” Near retention is the 
activity of intentionality that is described by Husserl usually as only retention, i.e. the 
holding on of consciousness to primordial impressions that are recently past. It is in near 
retention that the experience of immanent temporal objects is constituted, as it is near 
retention that holds the adumbrations of an object together in perception. Furthermore, 
Rodemeyer differentiates near retention into two different functions. First, “near retention 
                                               
39 While we do not have time to undertake a full analysis here, it must be noted that Husserl‟s use of the 
term “undifferentiated unity” can be seen as phenomenologically problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, this term extends beyond the bounds of what can be described phenomenologically. Second, since far 
retention is always related to the activities of far protention, then it must also be the case that this 
undifferentiated unity is always already on its way to differentiation, and thus this unity is never completely 
“undifferentiated.” Finally, as we will see in the section on apperception and passive synthesis, 
apperception occurs through the association of a presentation with a previous type of experience held 
within far retention. If far retention is “undifferentiated,” then it would be impossible for it to contain 
“types of experience.” The solution to this problem is perhaps to think of the idea of an “undifferentiated 
unity” as a limit concept, rather than a phenomenological reality. That is, far retention is only 
undifferentiated at its limit, which it does not reach because it always already in the process of 
differentiation through the activities of internal time consciousness.  
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forms the retentional phase that then sinks into far retention with its ever-diminishing 
affective content” (IST: 89). That is, the activity of near retention provides the form and 
content for the activity of far retention. Second, “near retention contributes to the 
formation of an experience that may later be recollected, giving us the ability to 
reproduce past events and „relive‟ them in the present if we wish” (IST: 89). This is clear 
– not only does the activity of near retention provide the content for far retention, but it 
also provides the content of memories, which can be recollected. 
 However, what about far retention? Already we have seen that it is a “retentional 
synthesis” in which retentions become sedimented, as well as a “distant horizon” of an 
“undifferentiated unity.” This retentional synthesis is the system of the „retentions of 
retentions‟ discussed above, which forms a level of experience that is latent, but still 
passively present, e.g. the level of the retention of such things as language. Each phase of 
the living present passes into retention, through its synthesis with a present primordial 
impression, and is then contained within the synthesis of the next primordial impression 
as well. However, these retentions do not get reproduced ad infinitum. Instead, their 
specific content gets diminished and these retentions become part of an undifferentiated 
unity, which then forms a “distant horizon.” Just like the „just past‟ forms a kind of „near‟ 
horizon in experience, so does far retention, but one that is “distant” in the sense that it is 
not actively present in my experience. To illustrate this distinction, let us use an example. 
Suppose that a fly enters the room, and as soon as it crosses into my field of perception I 
become annoyed, and, as it attempts to land upon my coffee cup I shoo it away. The fly 
that I had to shoo away from the cup of coffee on my desk is still „near‟ in my 
experiential horizon – I am still annoyed and my gaze sweeps across the room in the 
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attempt to locate it, and thus the experience of the fly is still in a sense present in my 
current living present. This nearness of the experience of the fly will fade as time passes, 
until I reach the point where I am not concerned with the fly whatsoever.
40
  
However, if we instead focus on the initial annoyance triggered from first seeing 
the fly, we can understand how far retention is a kind of “distant horizon” within 
experience, and how this distant horizon is passively present. All of my past encounters 
with flies, and their attempts to land on various items that I am either eating or drinking, 
have been held within the system of far retention, as a kind of general type of experience. 
This general type is then awakened upon seeing the fly enter the room. I am instantly 
annoyed when I see the fly, rather than wondering what an insect of that type might do, 
because a general type of experience within far retention has been awakened and I am 
now expecting the fly to attempt to land in my coffee.
41
 This general type of experience is 
passively present in the sense that it is not active within my current horizon of 
experience. I am not expecting to see a fly; rather, one enters my field of vision. 
However, even though it is not active, this general type is not completely absent. Instead, 
it is latent, such that should a fly enter my field of vision, I can expect it to fly towards 
whatever edible item is in my possession. In this sense, we can think of far retention, the 
system of the retention of retentions, as a “distant horizon” that is latent but passively 
present within experience. 
                                               
40 As we will see in the third chapter, the constitution of an objective world is accomplished 
intersubjectively. Thus, the cup on my desk is still an object that can be disturbed by others, such as a fly. 
Though the fly may disappear and my concern for it may dissipate, I will still have an awareness of the cup 
on my desk as a possible object for an insect to land on or crawl into. 
41 As such, we can understand Husserl‟s “undifferentiated unity” as a unity that is always in the process of 
differentiation.  
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For Husserl, as retentional experiences (consisting of retentions and protentions) 
fade into far retention, they become sedimented, and thus sedimentation occurs in far 
retention. Husserl writes, “[E]verything that consciousness undergoes through changes 
and transformations, even after the transformations, remains sedimented in it as its 
„history‟” (Hua XI: 38/77). Husserl directly refers to sedimentation as the „subsoil‟ of 
memory: 
Memories emerge as awakenings of components of the subsoil of memory 
[Gedächtnisuntergrundes]. The latter contains ordered sedimentations 
[Niederschläge] – layered in a fixed order – of all particular retentions, of 
all presents that have been constituted. (Hua XI: 194/245, emphasis mine) 
 
From these two passages cited above, we can see that sedimentation has to do with a kind 
of layering within far retention. We find another clue when Husserl writes that the 
“distant sphere” of far retention contains “sedimentations of all previous 
accomplishments of previous living presents” (Hua XI: 178/228). That is, our past 
experiences fade into the system of far retention, and they do so in terms of a kind of 
layering, hence the metaphor of sedimentation.  
 
c) Far and Near Protention 
 
 Thus far I have said very little about protention, or the intentional aspect that 
anticipates primordial impressions that have not yet arrived. For instance, my perception 
of the book on my desk as an identical temporal object involves the present adumbration 
and the retention of past adumbrations. However, part and parcel with this perception is 
my protention of the adumbrations to come, whether possible adumbrations (I do not turn 
the book over so that I can see its back) or actual adumbrations (I actively turn the book 
in my hand, and as I do so I anticipate adumbrations that immediately follow). 
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Rodemeyer often refers to protention as a kind of link: protention is the intentional 
activity that anticipates a primordial impression, and upon the fulfillment of this 
anticipation, the now present primordial impression sinks into retention. As such, 
protention links the present adumbration with adumbrations yet to come. In describing 
the experience of a tone, Husserl writes: 
… [A] continual “intention” reaches into the future: The actually present 
portion of the duration again and again adds a new now, and a protention 
adheres to the tone-constituting “appearances” – a protention that is 
fulfilled as a protention aimed at this tone just as long as the tone endures 
and that is annulled and changes if something new begins in its place. 
(Hua X 297/308) 
 
Here, protention is connected with the addition of new tone-constituting appearances. 
The protention is aimed at the tone-appearances that are yet to come, and are fulfilled 
when the tone arrives, or are not fulfilled should the tone suddenly end, which is itself 
evidence for the activity of protention. For example, I am listening to a melody build over 
a duration, and as the melody begins to build towards a kind of tonal climax, it suddenly 
stops. I experience this sudden stop as a kind of rupture, as my protention of the 
continuation of the melody is suddenly unfulfilled, with the possibility of fulfillment 
“annulled.”  
 Using the distinction between near and far retention as a guide, Rodemeyer lays 
out a similar distinction in protention, as regards temporalizing consciousness (though 
Husserl never made the distinction himself) (IST: 161). This distinction is between „near‟ 
and „far‟ protention, in which the terms near and far are understood in a similar way to 
their usage in terms of retention. Much like near retention, the concept of near protention 
has already been discussed at length in the preceding sections under the generic term 
protention, and denotes the activity of consciousness wherein future primordial 
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impressions are anticipated, as regards the constitution of an immanent temporal object. 
And again, just as far retention constitutes a structure of past experience which is 
passively present within experience itself, far protention constitutes a kind of anticipated 
structure, in the sense of a horizon of possibilities. Husserl writes, “Just as a retentional 
horizon of the past is invariably connected to each impressional present [impressionale 
Gegenwart], a protentional horizon of the future is no less invariably connected to an 
impressional present” (Hua XI 73/115). Both of these activities of protention are partially 
responsible for the openness of consciousness as such, in that both my perception of a 
present object and the field of perception (within which it occurs) are a going beyond of 
consciousness, in the sense of going beyond what is immediately given. The ground of 
this going beyond is the activity of protention, in terms of: (1) the constitution of an 
immediate temporal object in near protention and (2) the constitution of a protentional 
horizon in far protention. 
 Since near protention should be clear enough, I will instead turn my attention 
directly to far protention. For Rodemeyer, far protention has a parallel function with far 
retention, though with an essential difference: while far retention is a system of 
„retentions of retentions,‟ in which past experiences are held yet passively present, far 
protention is a system of openness to future experience (IST: 161). While the content of 
far retention is of past retained experiences, protention does not strictly speaking have 
content. Instead, far protention „protends‟ future experience as both (1) the structure of 
openness to an extended present as such and (2) as the expectations of types of 
experience or experiential objects that are yet to come, and thus outlines in advance a 
horizon of potential and possible experience. It is the second of the two that will interest 
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us more. Rodemeyer argues that this horizon of far protention is based off of both: the 
living present and general types of experience held in far retention. She writes that far 
protention is “based not only upon current constitution but also on typifications that are 
sedimented through passive synthesis” (IST: 161).  
 Let us now turn to an example in order to further illustrate far protention. Suppose 
that I am entering a library that I have never visited before. While I have never been to 
this particular library, I have a basic set of expectations that have accrued through 
repeatedly visiting other libraries in the past. These past visits to libraries (held in far 
retention) form an expectation in terms of a general type of experience, and this general 
type of experience forms my horizon of potential experience in my visit to this new 
unfamiliar library. In the library, I expect to find rows of shelves filled with books, 
ordered according to a system, and divided up into sections such as „fiction‟ and „non-
fiction.‟ Furthermore, since this is a public library, I do not expect to find any original 
language texts by Husserl, but I do expect there to be a „New Fiction‟ section. As such, as 
I enter the library, I begin to look for a „New Fiction‟ section rather than attempting to 
see if they have a copy of Husserliana X. Or, if I become hungry, I begin to plan a way to 
find food at a nearby cafe, rather than getting up from my desk and looking for a cafe in 
the library itself, since I have never been in a library with a cafe. As such, were I to 
accidentally discover that this particular library has a cafe, the retention of this experience 
would enter into my system of far retention and alter the general type of experience 
associated with libraries. That is, perhaps I will look to see if the next new library I visit 
has a cafe. However, since this is a single occurrence, I will not expect that every library I 
visit should have a cafe, but I will be pleasantly surprised, rather than shocked, were I to 
 66 
 
 
find another library with one. And, were I to visit more and more libraries with cafes, 
then this would become part of my general type of library experience, and I would expect 
all libraries to have cafes, to the extent that I would be surprised were I to visit a library 
without one.
42
  
 As such, we can now more fully see the connection between far retention and far 
protention. Far retention is the system of past experience in which general types of 
experiences are formed and held. These general types of experience are then given within 
the system of far protention, which is itself the implicit expectation of these same general 
types. Rodemeyer writes that far protention “would be involved in current constitution 
through its protention of general types and habits (in conjunction with far retention)” 
(IST: 161). In the example above, my far protentions associated with the library are all 
taken from the well of far retention, in which these general types of experience are held. 
Far protention, then, is a linking of present experience with possible experiences yet to 
come, forming their general outline in advance through the use of general types of 
experience held passively in far retention. This aspect of far protention, in turn, points us 
to the analysis of passive synthesis, which is an analysis of how past experience can 
become integrated into present experience. 
 
§16. Apperception and Passive Synthesis 
  
 Apperceived meanings are given within a present experience as “co-present” – 
they are not linked or joined to a present experience after the fact. Rather, that which is 
perceived and apperceived are all bound up in one experience. Husserl writes: 
                                               
42 As such, we can understand Husserl‟s “undifferentiated unity” as a unity that is always in the process of 
differentiation.  
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In our example of the awakened co-presence of the antechamber, the 
empty presentation of this antechamber does not occur in an isolated way: 
rather it arises in connection with the perceptual presentation in which we 
survey the seen room with our gaze knocking on the door, as it were. The 
connection of this perceptual presentation with the empty presentation is a 
“synthetic” [synthetische] one, which is to say, a unity of consciousness is 
produced that carries out a new constitutive accomplishment, whereby 
both objectlike formations receive special characters of unity 
noematically. (Hua XI: 75/117) 
 
Here, Husserl is discussing an example in which my perception of a door within the main 
room of my house is immediately bound together with the apperception of where that 
door leads, viz. the antechamber. Here, Husserl describes this unity as synthetic. 
“Synthetic” should make us think of a compound. Since Husserl does not use the 
opposite term, “analytic,” in which a composite is dissolved into its parts, I would argue 
that we should think of this co-presence as partes intra partes rather than partes extra 
partes.
43
 In fact, Husserl often refers to the unity of apperception and perception as an 
“intertwining” [verflechtung].44 Thus, apperceived meanings are themselves co-present in 
experience, with that which is immediately perceived, as a kind of a compound rather 
than a conjunction. This co-presence often occurs through what Husserl calls 
“association.” The term “association” denotes a general process wherein contents of 
consciousness become linked together, but in terms of a kind of synthesis. To say that 
association is a general process is to say that its activity can be located at a variety of 
                                               
43 This theoretical framework of partes intra partes of course comes from Merleau-Ponty‟s descriptions, in 
his Phenomenology of Perception, of the experienced relationship between the parts of our body. 
44 We will find numerous instances of Husserl referring to apperception as “intertwining” in the third 
chapter of this text, specifically in his analyses of empathy. 
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levels within the constitution of experience.
45
 However, the activity of association is itself 
rooted within internal time consciousness.
46
  
In its most basic form, association consists of the bringing together of general 
types of experience held in (far) retention with our current present experience, based on a 
similarity between our present experience and a general type of experience held in far 
retention. This bringing together is understood in terms of a kind of “awakening.” 
Husserl, in a manuscript from 1924, writes that “Association is awakening” [Assoziation 
ist Weckung] (Hua XI: 408/508). In another manuscript, he writes, “[W]e will then find 
the similarity of something awakened with something that is immediately awakening as 
proper to immediate association, as proper to immediate awakening” (Hua XI: 122/167).  
What are we to make of this “awakened,” and why is it intimately connected with 
the notion of association? Husserl describes awakening as “the augmentation of vivacity, 
that is, of affectivity [...]” (Hua XI: 413/515). If far retention holds general types of 
experience, and association is the awakening of a past general type of experience based 
on a current experience, then we can see that awakening is supposed to denote the way in 
which a past general type of experience becomes present within a current experience. 
That is, this general type of experience becomes affective again precisely in its form as a 
general type of experience, by providing an outline of possibilities on the horizon of far 
                                               
45 We will find association operating at multiple levels in the third chapter of this text, in the analyses of the 
constitution of a shared cultural world. 
46 In this section Husserl writes, “The doctrine of the genesis of reproductions and of their formations is the 
doctrine of association in the first and more genuine sense” (Hua X 119/164). This would lead one to 
believe that association is most properly a phenomenon of remembering. However, we can also understand 
the “first and more genuine sense” of association and reproduction if we think of it in terms of access. That 
is, we have access to the phenomenon of association first through the act of remembering. Then, once we 
describe this experience, we find that it points us to a deeper level of association. Indeed, after Husserl 
describes an act of remembering he writes, “But it is precisely the analysis of associative phenomena that 
draws our attention to the fact that consciousness must not necessarily be a consciousness of a single object 
for itself...” (Hua X: 119/164). 
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protention which are themselves in accordance with the general type of experience. As 
such, we then find far retentions “awakened” within our present experience, exercising 
affective force in the form of future possibilities of experience. Indeed, Husserl writes 
that, “Association is only at work in the protentional path [der protentionalen Linie] of 
original time consciousness, and also functioning there as awakening [awakened],
47
 as we 
know, is the continual retentional path” (Hua XI: 77/119). As such, we can then make 
sense of Husserl‟s general description of association in Section 26: 
We see very quickly that the phenomenology of association is, so to speak, 
a higher [ursprünglichen] continuation of the doctrine of original time-
constitution. Through association, the constitutive accomplishment is 
extended to all levels of apperception. (Hua XI: 118/163) 
 
Here, Husserl is describing association as a “higher continuation” of the constitutive 
activities of temporalizing consciousness, since association propagates the “constitutive 
accomplishment” of temporalizing consciousness to “all levels of apperception.” 
Association extends the accomplishments of temporalizing consciousness to all levels of 
apperception because it is the passive bringing together of a retention and current 
experience. Thus, since apperception is the intention of meaning that is not itself present, 
and association is the process whereby past experience is brought passively into present 
experience, we can easily see how it is that association propagates the constitutive 
activities of temporalizing consciousness to “all levels of apperception.” 
                                               
47 The editor of the English translation of Hua XI, Anthony Steinbock, points out this is most likely a 
mistake, and that it should read “awakened.” 
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 Association is brought about, Husserl argues, through “motivation.”48 Motivation 
“occurs in the „present‟ consciousness, namely in the unity of the conscious stream, 
characterized as time-consciousness (originary consciousness) in act” and consists of:  
…either „sediments‟ [Niederschläge] of earlier acts and accomplishments 
of reason, or ones which emerge, in „analogy‟ with the former, as 
apperceptive unities without actually being formed out of acts of reason or 
else they are completely a-rational: sensibility, what imposes itself, the 
pre-given, the driven in the sphere of passivity. (Hua IV: 222/234) 
 
Past experiences, in the form of general types held deep within far retention or retentions 
whose content can still be recollected, “motivates” associations to form within 
consciousness at the passive level. For instance, if I am in an unfamiliar city and I see a 
sign (the motivating term) on a building that designates it as a library, a multiplicity of 
associations are passively motivated, i.e. without any rational act on my part. Before I 
even walk through the door of the library, I passively expect to enter a series of large 
rooms filled with rows of shelving filled with books or to find a “new fiction” section 
(the motivated terms).. It is through my past experience with libraries, now held within 
far retention as a general type of experience, that this association arises passively. In a 
paragraph remarkably similar to Hume‟s discussion of habit in his Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding, Husserl writes: 
Once a connection is formed in a stream of consciousness, there then 
exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection, similar 
to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity 
and to strive to complete itself in a total nexus [Gesamtzusammenhang] 
similar to the previous total nexus. (Hua IV: 223/234) 
 
My first experience with a library forms a connection in my stream of consciousness, 
which then has the tendency to arise again should I encounter another library. The more 
                                               
48In Ideas II, Husserl makes a distinction between two different kinds of motivation, viz. passive motivation 
and “motivation in the pregnant sense of Ego-motivation (motivation of reason)” (Hua IV: 223/234). In 
what follows, I will be concerned primarily with the former. 
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libraries I visit, the stronger this connection becomes, until merely the sight of a library 
motivates a set of passive expectations in regards to that building. 
  However, we must not understand the functioning of association in terms of 
deterministic causality.
49
 Rather, the motivated associations can always be disappointed 
or unfulfilled. Husserl writes,  
By motivation we mean that certain data and their protentional horizons 
are demanded as co-emerging [mitauftretend] along with the emergence of 
other data in our lived-experience. But such associative demands can be 
annulled [aufheben] in the course of present experiencing. (Hua XI: 
107/152) 
 
The concept of motivation is not deterministic since, for example, my perceptual 
intentions can always be disappointed. For instance, I pick up the six-sided die on my 
desk and begin to turn it in my hands, looking at each side in turn. Based on my past 
experience with dice, in which I found that they were always numbered on their sides and 
that no number is repeated, I implicitly expect to see the numbers one through six 
represented on the sides of the die. However, this does not determine my perception of 
the die in any way. If, as I turn the die in my hand, I find that there is not a side with the 
number six, but instead two sides with the number five, then my implicit expectation is 
disappointed or unfulfilled – it is “annulled in the course of present experiencing.” That 
is, any present state of affairs can resist my expectations for it and consciousness must 
then adjust accordingly. It is in this sense that motivation is not deterministic. 
To summarize, apperception is the perception of meanings that are not directly 
present, which occurs through the process of association. In this process, a facet of 
present experience awakens a past general type of experience through similarity, and this 
                                               
49 Within the phenomenological reduction all natural sciences and their findings are suspended. Thus, one 
cannot make use of natural or physical causality. 
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past general type of experience becomes present within our current experience; not as a 
mere addition, but is given within the experience itself as a horizon of possible 
experience through association. That is, the passive addition of a past general type of 
experience lays out in advance the possibilities for our current experience, though not in 
any kind of strict causal manner. Instead, our protentions may themselves be 
disappointed, which then itself will become part of a sedimented layer of experience 
within far retention. 
 
§17. “Radiating Back” and the Openness of Consciousness 
 
 Throughout this chapter, I have argued that various facets of the structure of 
internal time consciousness and apperception show us that consciousness is 
fundamentally open. It is now time to make clear what this claim means. By open, I mean 
that we can find the following in Husserl‟s phenomenological descriptions of 
consciousness (whether or not he realized it or intended it): (1) consciousness is not static 
but can instead be understood as a process of becoming and (2) this process of becoming 
is not closed off to external influences through being open to the influence of discursive 
and non-discursive practices, knowledge, and power. 
 First, it is quite clear that Husserl himself understood consciousness as a process 
of becoming, rather than a static entity. In §48 of Passive and Active Syntheses, in a 
section titled “Consciousness as a Storied Structure of Constitutive Accomplishments,” 
Husserl writes: 
Consciousness is an incessant process of becoming [unaufhörliches 
Werden]. But it is not a mere succession of lived-experiences, a flux, as 
one fancies an objective river. Consciousness is an incessant process of 
becoming as an incessant process of constituting objectivities in an 
 73 
 
 
incessant progressus of graduated levels. It is a never ending history [eine 
nie abbrechende Geschichte]. (Hua XI: 218/270) 
 
We have already seen Husserl describe consciousness as a “stream of constant genesis,” 
which consists of a development [auseinander] rather than a series [nacheinander] (Hua 
XI: 339/628), but here we can directly see Husserl‟s insistence that consciousness is a 
process of becoming, or a “never ending history.” While Husserl repeatedly refers to 
consciousness as a flow, here he is making a differentiation between a flow as a river, 
which would be a series of successive phases, and a flow as a kind of process or 
development. That consciousness is a process or a development can be understood 
through the functioning of far retention and far protention. As experience accrues within 
far retention, they form general types of experience which are then given through far 
protention as a horizon of possible experience. As such, past experience is carried within 
my experience of the present. This will be crucially important in the next chapter, when 
we find that the present, for Husserl, is always constituted historically, within a 
community of subjects undergoing and acting. 
Second, aside from the question of teleology in Husserl‟s Crisis, the picture of the 
subject that Husserl gives us in his phenomenological descriptions is one whose 
experience of the world is open to external influences. In order to illustrate this point, let 
us examine a discussion on fulfillment and disappointment from Husserl‟s Passive and 
Active Syntheses. In this section, Husserl argues that when one of our perceptions is 
disappointed, i.e. a protention is unfulfilled, this disappointment “radiates back” [strahlt 
zurück] through the system of far retention and alters the content of the previously 
sedimented layers (Hua XI: 27/65). 
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In Section Five, Husserl tells us that the term „fulfillment,‟ in the case of 
perception, is connected to the system of protention. Each primordial impression is 
connected to a protention, or an expectation of a primordial impression in the future. 
Indeed, Husserl writes that “all fulfillment progresses as the fulfillment of expectations” 
(Hua XI: 26/64). For example, suppose that I am turning a solid red ball (the size of an 
apple) in my hand. As I turn the ball, each adumbration in which the ball is red and solid 
fulfills the protention that was connected to the previous primordial impression.  
Disappointment, on the other hand, occurs when a protention is not fulfilled by 
the arriving primordial impression. For example, as I turn the solid red ball around in my 
hand, the protentions attached to the current primordial impression will continue to 
expect „red‟ and „solid.‟ However, as the ball turns, I find that one side of the ball is 
actually indented and green, and thus, rather than a solid red ball in my hand, I am 
holding a ball that is red on one side, but green and indented on another. This 
disappointed protention becomes an “alteration of sense” [Sinnesänderung] which, 
Husserl writes, “radiates back to the preceding perception and all its previous 
appearances… They are reinterpreted in their very sense as „green‟ and „indented‟” (Hua 
XI: 27/65, my emphasis). If, in the face of my disappointed protention, I were to recall 
turning the ball in my hand, the content of this recollection would be different than if I 
had never made the discovery at all. If I had never made the discovery that the ball is 
green and indented on one side, my recollection of turning the ball in my hand would be 
simply that – the recollection of turning a red and solid ball in my hand. However, now 
that this protention has been disappointed, the recollection of turning the ball in my hand 
would now consist of both the original protention (that the ball is red and solid) and, 
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superimposed upon it, the retention that the ball is actually green and indented on one 
side. That is, the original intention is still contained in the recollection, but now with the 
additional retention that the ball was actually different than what I had expected. To this 
end Husserl writes, 
[I]f we were to bring the retentional elements (i.e. the series of appearance 
of which we are still freshly conscious, but which have become 
completely obscure) to intuitive givenness in an explicit remembering, we 
would notice the following situation in memory: We would find in all the 
horizons of these retentional components not only the previous prefiguring 
[Vorzeichnung] in the previous structures of expectation and fulfillment… 
but we would find superimposed [darübergelagert] upon it the 
corresponding transformed prefiguring that now points continually to 
„green‟ and „indented.‟” (Hua XI: 31/69). 
 
Let me use a more concrete example. Suppose that I am in a monogamous relationship 
with a partner, and I have recently found out that she has been romantically involved with 
someone else without informing me. As I think back to the previous days, weeks, and 
months, a whole range of activities that I had not noticed, nor would I recollect as strange 
had I not known my partner was cheating, become strange or suspicious, and now 
indicate to me the presence of my partner‟s romantic involvement with another. For 
instance, perhaps the frequency of my partner‟s late nights at work has gone up 
substantially, but not enough for me to notice outright. Or, perhaps my partner has been 
spending an increasing amount of time with an “old friend” that she does not introduce to 
me. In both examples, my recollection changes depending on whether or not I know that 
my partner is romantically involved with someone else. Those late nights at work or days 
spent with an “old friend” are now remembered as moments of suspicion and sadness, in 
that I am now aware that she was not at work on those days and was, instead, in the arms 
of another. In other words, the disappointment of the expectation of my partner‟s 
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commitment to a monogamous relationship “radiates back” and partially alters the 
content of the sedimented layers of retention held in far retention. This alteration is only 
partial as I can still remember my original expectations. 
Furthermore, the alteration that “radiates back” [zurückstrahlen] through 
disappointment also “radiates ahead” [vorstrahlen] and affects how it is that I experience 
relationships or solid red balls in the future. Husserl writes,  
And these configurations radiating ahead [vorstrahlend] in a protentional-
expectational manner will awaken the projected image or model of this 
configuration, allowing it to be expected, and through this the coalescence 
of the configuration will simultaneously be favored once more as 
fulfillment. (Hua XI: 190/241, my emphasis) 
 
Since the content of protention is taken from the system of far retention, the next time 
that I approach this specific ball, I will expect a side to be green and indented. That is, an 
aspect of experience that is not itself directly present has changed and thus altered how I 
experience the ball. Perhaps now I will be suspicious of solid balls that I encounter in the 
future. Or, perhaps in a future monogamous relationship I will experience “late nights at 
work” or “time with an old friend” as suspicious. Or, to return to the example of an 
unfamiliar library, if I were to find that this library has a café, my disappointed 
expectation (that the library did not have a café) radiates back and then radiates forward 
through my new expectation that libraries can have cafes, whereas before I dismissed the 
notion outright. As such, the structure of consciousness, at the level of internal time 
consciousness and apperception, is fundamentally open – it allows for a change in the 
content of our far retention, which then motivates a change in the ways that we 
experience the world.  
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 These two facets of openness that I have just outlined, i.e. that consciousness is a 
process of becoming and that our apperceptions can be altered through the radiating 
backward of disappointed protentions into far retention and the radiating forward of the 
altered general type of experience as a horizon of possible experience, allow us to see 
within Husserl‟s middle and late writings a theory of the subject that is amenable to the 
constitutive activities of discursive and non-discursive practices. For example, in 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault describes the ways in which schools took on the 
organizing principles found in the military in order to discipline students (SP: 149/147). 
Desks were arranged in rows and aisles such that the teacher could see what each student 
was doing from her desk or from walking down the aisles. This disciplines students in the 
sense that since they know that they are being watched, they must control their activity, 
pay attention, and do their work. If one student were to believe that he could get away 
with not paying attention, and then was caught by the teacher, his disappointed protention 
(of not being caught) would then radiate back into the system of far retention, altering 
one of the general types of experience associated with “school,” and then radiate forward 
as the apperception of “constantly being watched.” If this apperception of being 
surveilled is then repeated in different areas – perhaps the student works in a factory after 
school – then the apperception of “constantly being watched” would become a facet of 
his experience. Anywhere he goes and anything he does is at risk of being seen and 
reported, and thus he must regulate his behavior according to what his culture deems 
proper. As such, we have a subject constituted through the non-discursive practice of 
having his body arranged within a space. 
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§18. Conclusion 
 
What is remarkable is that Husserl does not follow this discussion further or 
describe other instances in which an alteration of meaning can occur in the content of the 
sedimented layers of far retention. That is, he does not look at other ways in which our 
experience of the world can change due to external influences. Instead, the discussion of 
alteration “radiating back” through the system of far retention is dropped once Husserl 
moves beyond his discussions of perceptual disappointment in his Passive and Active 
Synthesis. However, my position is that if he had pursued this further, he would have 
paralleled the analyses of Foucault. That is, this line of inquiry would have lead Husserl 
to the idea that our experience of the world, and of each other, can be fundamentally 
altered through discourse and practice. Indeed, the picture of the subject that I have 
drawn from Husserl goes against the picture of the subject that Foucault locates within 
phenomenology. That is, even though Husserl would assert that the subject is the origin 
and foundation of meaning, we find in his phenomenological descriptions a subject that is 
receptive at its most fundamental level to the influence of meaning from outside the 
subject. As such, the subject and its relationship with meaning is not one-way. 
As such, I have now sketched out a theory of the subject in Husserl‟s work that 
will be amenable to Foucault‟s descriptions of the constitution of the subject as a subject 
of knowledge and power through discursive and non-discursive practices. In the next 
chapter, we will follow Husserl as he begins to reach the thought of Foucault in the latter 
half of his 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation and his descriptions of the constitution of oneself as a 
“pathological object” [pathologischen Object] in Ideas II (Hua IV: 80/85). 
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PART TWO – THE LIMIT 
 
 
In the next two chapters, we will see how Husserl, through apperception and the 
constitution of a social world, runs into the work of Foucault, and how Foucault, through 
his idea that systems of thought have become part of our perceptions, attitudes, and 
behavior, runs into the work of Husserl. 
 
Chapter Three – Husserl at the Limit 
 
Even Husserl‟s last philosophy is in no way 
a gathered harvest, an acquired domain of 
cultivated spirit, a house in which one can 
conveniently set up housekeeping. 
Everything is open, all its paths lead out into 
the open. 
- Eugen Fink50 
 
§19. Apperception and History 
 
 While Husserl‟s best known, and most discussed, analyses of history occur in his 
late text The Crisis of European Philosophy, perhaps his most interesting analyses occur 
in the second half of his 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation. Here, Husserl examines how it is that 
we constitute an objective and cultural world, i.e. a world that is “there for everyone” and 
whose meaning is infused with cultural predicates. In these analyses, Husserl argues that 
our perception of the world is inextricably bound to history, through the passive 
constitution of a cultural world within perception, which is itself formed through the 
“undergoing and acting” of a community of subjects. If, for Husserl, our perception of the 
present is intertwined with cultural meaning, and thus co-determined through history, 
                                               
50 Fink, Eugen. “Die Spätphilosphie Husserls in der Freiburger Zeit,” in Edmund Husserl, 1859-1959, 
Phaenomenologica IV. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. Pg. 113-114. This translation is by John 
O‟Neil, and it is found in the English translation of Merleau-Ponty‟s resumé for his 1960 course Husserl at 
the Limits of Phenomenology. Ed. Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo. Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 2002. Pg. 9. 
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then we are remarkably close to Foucault‟s insistence that “systems of thought… have 
become part of our perceptions, attitude and behavior” (FL: 282). It is in the second half 
of the 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation, specifically Section 58, that we find Husserl‟s analyses 
paralleling those of Foucault. However, instead of pursuing this line of thought further in 
the 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation – i.e. the constitution of the subject‟s experience through 
external influences such as knowledge and power – Husserl merely indicates problems 
associated with the constitution of the cultural world rather than giving the analyses 
themselves. 
 In this chapter, we will follow Husserl right up to this limit, and examine how it is 
that history can permeate perception such that our perception of the present is 
inextricably bound to the past, through its functioning at the level of passive synthesis. 
Then, we will turn to Husserl‟s Ideas II, in which we find a description of a subject 
becoming a “pathological object.” In both cases, these analyses of Husserl‟s work will 
rely heavily on the analyses of apperception and passive synthesis from the previous 
chapter, as it is through apperception that we experience meanings which are not 
themselves directly present, e.g. cultural predicates, and which allows for the openness of 
consciousness to becoming. That is, while the previous chapter set up a theory of the 
subject whose experience of the world can be constituted through systems of thought, this 
chapter will show such constitution in action through Husserl‟s descriptions of the 
passive constitution of a shared objective and cultural world. 
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§20. The Constitution of the Cultural World: Husserl’s 5th Cartesian 
Meditation 
 
 Husserl‟s Cartesian Meditations are an expansion of two lectures given in Paris in 
1929, in the Amphithéatre Descartes at the Sorbonne. Ostensibly, the Meditations are one 
of Husserl‟s many “introductions” to phenomenology, whose aim was to introduce 
French academia to the idea of transcendental phenomenology. In this text, Husserl 
develops phenomenology as a radical transformation of Cartesianism, in the sense that 
phenomenology begins with an “absolute poverty of knowledge” but ends up with results 
vastly different from those of Descartes. That is, while Descartes, in his Meditations on 
First Philosophy, achieves a “regress to the philosophizing ego… as subject of his pure 
cogitationes,” he misinterprets this ego and ends up in solipsism (Hua I: 3).51 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, begins from this regress but finds constituted within 
it a shared Objective and cultural world formed with other subjects. 
 While the Cartesian Meditations are an introduction to phenomenology, under the 
surface this text constitutes a reply to perhaps the most famous objection against 
phenomenology, viz. the charge of solipsism.
52
 The phenomenological reduction and its 
move to the first-person perspective, so the objection goes, leaves us alone in a world 
without others, and thus as the solus ipse. As such, by beginning with the “subject of his 
pure cogitationes” like Descartes, Husserl is forced into a world absolutely devoid of 
other subjects. However, what we find in the Cartesian Meditations, specifically in the 
                                               
51 Husserl argues in Ideas II that solipsism is a contradictory notion, in that the isolation from a group of 
subjects is not true solipsism, it is a mere isolation. “This abstraction [solipsism] does obviously not consist 
in our arranging for a mass murder of the people and animals of our surrounding world, sparing one human 
alone. For in that case the remaining subject, though one and unique, would still be a human subject, i.e., 
still an intersubjective Object, still apprehending and positing himself as such” (Hua IV: 81/86). The 
actually radically abstraction of intersubjectivity occurs in the reduction to the sphere of ownness, which 
we will examine in this chapter. 
52 Perhaps the most famous articulation of the charge of solipsism is found in Heidegger‟s Being and Time. 
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5
th
 Cartesian Meditation, is not the subject as the solus ipse – a subject forced to 
undertake various philosophical contortions in order to emerge from the void into a world 
of other subjects – but rather a subject who has before her a shared objective and cultural 
world that is “already finished” [immerfort schon fertig] in perception (Hua I: 136/106). 
The description of experience, at its most basic level, leads us to the constitutive activities 
of others, in so far as my experience of the world is of a shared objective world infused 
with cultural meanings. 
 Let us now follow Husserl through the constitution of the cultural world, starting 
from what he calls the “sphere of ownness” to empathy (the constitution of other 
subjects), and to the constitution of the objective and cultural world that occurs through 
empathy.  
 
a)  Strata, Static and Genetic Phenomenology 
 
 Before we turn to an analysis of the 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation, we must first 
examine how Husserl understands the constitution of the cultural world in relation to 
static and genetic phenomenology. Throughout the 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation, Husserl 
describes the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world in terms of 
apperception, and as taking place within a structure that consists of multiple strata 
[Schichten] or levels [Stufen] that occurs at the passive level. For explanatory purposes, 
these levels can be roughly divided as follows: 
 
First Stratum: The Sphere of Ownness [Eigensphäre] 
The first stratum of constitution is that of one‟s own stream of subjective 
processes and modes of appearance, which is itself the necessary condition of the 
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possibility of having a world at all – much less a world that is shared with other 
subjects and infused with cultural predicates – and is thus the “founding stratum” 
[fundierende Schicht] of experience (Hua I: 127/96). This level of constitution 
occurs through internal time consciousness and the activities of passive synthesis, 
in which the living present is constituted. 
 
Second Stratum: Empathy [Einfühlung] 
The second stratum of constitution is that of empathy, or the constitution of 
another subject as another subject within experience. At this level, bodies 
[Körper] are constituted as lived bodies [Leiber] through the apperception of the 
Ego of the other. 
 
Third Stratum: Objective World [objectiven Welt] 
The third stratum of constitution occurs through the difference between my 
subjective modes of appearance and the subjective modes of appearance 
appresented by another subject. That is, the difference between the world as it 
looks from my „here‟ and the world as it looks from your „there‟ gives rise to the 
apperception of the world as shared and objective. 
 
Fourth Stratum: Cultural World [Kulturwelt] 
The fourth stratum of constitution occurs through a community of subjects that 
are “vitally immersed in a concrete surrounding world” [in eine konkrete Umwelt 
hineinlebt] and “are related to it in undergoing and doing” (Hua I: 162/135). That 
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is, a cultural world is built through the practices of a concrete community of 
subjects. Furthermore, this final stratum consists of the accrual of cultural 
meaning through “temporal genesis” (Hua I: 162/135). 
 
 While I stressed the importance of genetic phenomenology in the previous 
chapter, specifically as regards understanding apperception, it would be a mistake to 
understand the constitution of the cultural world as progressing temporally through the 
four levels given above. For Husserl, it is not the case that we begin with the experience 
of our own subjective stream of appearances, and then move up temporally through the 
higher levels of constitution every time we perceive anything. Rather, the constitution of 
a shared objective and cultural world happens “all at once.” Husserl writes: 
[The analysis of the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world] 
is not a matter of uncovering a genesis going on in time, but a matter of 
“static analysis.” The Objective world is constantly there before me as 
already finished, a datum of my livingly continuous Objective experience 
and, even in respect of what is no longer experienced, something I go on 
accepting habitually. (Hua I: 136/106) 
 
Since the constitution of a shared objective and cultural world is “constantly there before 
me as already finished,” we must describe the constitution of the objective world as a 
structure rather than a process. For Husserl, this means that we must engage in the 
“precise explication of the intentionality actually observable in our experience of 
someone else and discovery of the motivations essentially implicit in that intentionality” 
(Hua I: 150/121). Rather than search for the origin of this or that particular cultural 
world, we are instead examining how it is that a cultural world is constituted at all. 
 However, a differentiation must be made here. While the description of the multi-
leveled intentionality wherein we constitute other subjects and a shared world is a static 
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analysis, thus only examining it qua structure, this does not mean that certain levels 
within this structure (or the structure itself) is not amenable to a genetic analysis – in fact, 
far from it. As we have already seen, apperceptions are the result of a temporal genesis, 
and thus are always amenable to genetic analysis. And, if the constitution of a shared 
cultural world is given within perception through apperception, then any level that 
consists of apperception is amenable to genetic analysis as well. It is important to note 
that the fourth level, that of the cultural world, can also be analyzed genetically. This 
analysis would look at how a specific concrete cultural world was constituted through the 
specific historicity of that community, i.e. it would be a genetic inquiry into the contents 
of intersubjective consciousness. 
 I would like to note now that the following multi-leveled structure of constitution 
is operative at the level of passive synthesis. Apperceptions are always at the level of 
passive synthesis, since, according to Husserl, they are not “acts of thought” (Hua I: 
141/111) and are always “intertwined” [verflechtung] (Hua I: 143/114) with a 
presentation. As such, we will find that a cultural world is always given „beforehand‟ and 
is thus the basis for active acts of the ego. 
 
§21. First Stratum: the Sphere of Ownness 
 
 In order to examine how it is that we constitute other subjects within experience, 
and thus a shared objective and cultural world as well, we must first “carry out, inside the 
transcendental sphere, a peculiar kind of epoché with respect to our theme” (Hua I: 
124/93) in order to bring us to a “horizon of transcendental experience [that] is peculiarly 
my own” (Hua I: 126/95). Even though the phenomenological reduction has been in 
effect throughout the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl argues we risk begging the question 
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if we do not actively attempt to suspend the constitutional activities of others within our 
description. Husserl writes: 
If the transcendental constitution of other subjects and accordingly the 
transcendental sense, “other subjects,” are in question [ …] then the sense, 
“other subjects,” that is in question here cannot as yet be the sense 
“Objective subjects, subjects existing in the world.” (Hua I: 124/92) 
 
The standard phenomenological reduction, as we have already seen, involves the active 
suspension of the general positing that characterizes the natural attitude. Yet, this is not 
enough, because it will turn out that my descriptions of an object within the 
phenomenological reduction are already shot through with the constitutive activities of 
others, in so far as I apperceive the sides of an object that are not themselves directly 
present (Hua I: 153/125). As such, Husserl argues that we must put into effect a new 
phenomenological reduction, within the already deployed original reduction, by actively 
suspending all of the “constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or 
mediately to other subjectivity” (Hua I: 124/93). 
 This new reduction, however, must not be understood as simply trying to imagine 
oneself in a world without other subjects, as the solus ipse objection might maintain. 
Rather, Husserl writes, “such abstraction is not radical; such aloneness in no respect 
alters the natural world-sense, „experienceable by everyone,‟ which attaches to the 
naturally understood Ego and would not be lost, even if a universal plague had left only 
me” (Hua I: 125/93).53 The solipsistic move is not radical enough because it still posits a 
shared world but one that is now devoid of subjects, while the ground for this positing is 
the constitutional activities of others. For Husserl, solipsism either never achieves or 
misunderstands its goal. 
                                               
53 This argument is mirrored in Hua IV: 81/86. 
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 Husserl argues that this novel epoché
54
 requires (at least) three steps in which we 
attempt to “delimit, within my horizon of transcendental experience, what is peculiarly 
my own” (Hua I: 126/95, Husserl‟s emphasis). First, 
[…] we abstract first of all from what gives men and animals [Tieren] 
their specific sense as, so to speak, Ego-like living beings and 
consequently from all determinations of the phenomenal world that refer 
by their sense to “other” as Ego-subjects, and accordingly, presuppose 
these, such as cultural predicates [Kulturprädikate]. (Hua I: 126/95, 
translation modified). 
 
Here, we first suspend the idea that other humans and animals are subjects, i.e. 
consciousness, with their own subjective stream of appearances and all of the results of 
these activities. For example, we suspend the idea that this object is a pencil or that object 
is a cup, since “pencil” and “cup” refer back to the constitutive activities of others. 
Second, we suspend the idea of the soul, or whatever it is that we think is behind the 
activity of humans and animals, or what Husserl calls “other-spiritual” [Fremdgeistigen] 
(Hua I: 127/95). Finally, we suspend: 
[…] the characteristic of belonging to the surrounding world 
[Umweltlichkeit für jedermann], not merely for others who are also given 
at the particular time in actual experience, but also for everyone, the 
characteristic of being there for and accessible to everyone, of being 
capable of mattering or not mattering to each in his living and striving – a 
characteristic of all Objects belonging to the phenomenal world and the 
characteristic wherein their otherness consists... (Hua I: 127/95, Husserl‟s 
emphasis) 
 
This final step in the novel epoché requires that we suspend the idea that myself, 
everyone who does exist or has existed, and all objects, are experienceable by other 
subjects, or, in other words, we suspend the characteristic of “belonging to the 
surrounding world” to all subjects and objects. 
                                               
54 The initial transcendental epoché is assumed (Hua I: 126/95). 
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 After this novel epoché has been affected, we are left with what Husserl calls our 
“sphere of ownness” [Eigensphäre], which is a “unitarily coherent stratum of the 
phenomenon world” and is “essentially the founding stratum” of experience (Hua I: 
127/96). This founding stratum consists of the stream of subjective appearances in which 
I constitute a living present (Hua I: 135/104). Within this stream of subjective 
appearances, Husserl says we find a field of bodies [Körper], with one body that all of the 
appearances are “reflexively related” to, i.e. my body (Hua I: 128/97). Husserl writes,  
Among the bodies belonging to this “Nature” and included in my peculiar 
ownness, I then find my animate organism as uniquely singled out – 
namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an 
animate organism. (Hua I: 128/97, Husserl‟s emphasis) 
 
The body that is singled out is my body, in which I find a field of sensations that can be 
directed by the ways in which I govern my body. For example, as I turn my head a series 
of appearances follow, and they change if I turn my head the other direction. “[T]he 
kinesthesias pertaining to the organs flow in the mode „I am doing,‟ and are subject to my 
„I can‟” (Hua I: 128/97).55 As such, my stream of subjective processes is always oriented 
according to the position of my body. Since the constitutive activities of others have been 
suspended, we further find in this reduced world our own “value predicates” and “works” 
(those that stem from my activity only) (Hua I: 129/98) and my own “habitualities” (Hua 
I: 134/104). 
 However, even with all of the constitutive activities of other subjects suspended 
from description, we find “a division” within our “whole transcendental field of 
experience,” “namely the division into [the] sphere of ownness […] and the sphere of 
                                               
55 In order to illustrate this point, Husserl uses the example of the reversibility of touch. The reversibility of 
this relation becomes of the utmost importance to Merleau-Ponty, especially in The Visible and the 
Invisible. 
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what is „other‟” (Hua I: 131/100). This division or separation occurs through what 
Husserl calls a “mundanizing self-apperception” [verweltlichende Selbstapperzeption], in 
which I, in the sphere of ownness, apperceive a separation between my body and other 
bodies, since this body is the only I can control (Hua I: 130/99). Even though the 
predicate “experienceable by everyone” has been suspended, we still find a basic division 
within the sphere of ownness between: (1) “the systems that constitute what is included in 
my peculiar ownness” and (2) “the systems that constitute what is other” (Hua I: 129/98). 
As such, this division gives us the founding stratum for the experience of an “Objective 
world,” but, at this level, transcendent objects are experienced as “objects of possible 
experience” rather than as objects within a world shared with other subjects (Hua I: 
135/104). It is through empathy that this founding stratum of an objective world is fully 
constituted as a shared objective and cultural world. 
 
§22. Second Stratum: Empathy 
  
 The constitution of other subjects (both human and animal) occurs through what 
Husserl terms “empathy” [Einfühlung]. Empathy is the act through which an alter-ego is 
apperceived as intertwined [verflochten] with another lived body. Husserl‟s analyses of 
empathy have been widely discussed, as this concept is, to put it mildly, a source of 
controversy. In what follows I will only engage in a brief analysis of empathy, as there 
are numerous expositions of this concept in the secondary literature. What will be of 
primary interest to us, for the remainder of this chapter, are the results of empathy rather 
than the process itself, since, for Husserl, “the other Ego makes constitutionally possible 
a new infinite domain of what is „other:‟ an Objective Nature… to which all other Egos 
and I myself belong” (Hua I: 137/107).  
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 Let us begin by attempting to circumvent some of the objections against Husserl‟s 
notion of empathy by clarifying what is and what is not at issue in his descriptions. 
Husserl‟s notion of empathy does not designate some ontological or metaphysical claim, 
in which the existence of the other depends on myself, i.e. the constituting consciousness. 
Rather, the notion of empathy is supposed to describe the fact of the perception of the 
other. As I walk through the streets of Pittsburgh, I have sidewalks, buildings, cars, 
garbage cans, fire hydrants, and other people in my field of perception. My experience of 
other human beings is factually different than my experience of a fire hydrant. This 
difference in constitution is Husserl‟s main concern, and specifically, he is examining 
how it is that we continuously and harmoniously experience other subjects as having an 
Ego which can, by definition, never be given in perception. Throughout the 5
th
 Cartesian 
Meditation, and in his analyses of empathy in Ideas II, Husserl constantly insists that the 
constitution of the other requires a lived body to be present to me in experience (Hua I: 
142/112), and begins his descriptions with another human “enter[ing] our perceptual 
sphere” (Hua I: 140/110). It is the fact of the experience of other human bodies as human 
bodies that is of concern for Husserl. And, as we will see, the act of empathy does not 
impose upon another lived body anything that is not already there, i.e. temporalizing 
consciousness – the lived body is not a “sign” of another ego, but a “presentation” of it 
(Hua I: 153/124).  
 For Husserl, the experience of other lived bodies as lived bodies consists of two 
features (Hua I: 141/112). First, I only experience another lived body as a lived body 
when that body is present to me in perception, and, when this lived body is present, I 
continuously experience it as lived. Second, while the lived body is always present to me, 
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the alter-ego, the ego of the other, is never directly present. Rather, it is apperceived, and 
this apperception is intertwined with the presentation of the lived body: “The 
appresentation which gives that component of the Other which is not accessible 
originaliter is intertwined [verflochten] with an original presentation (of „his‟ body as part 
of the Nature given as included in my ownness)” (Hua I: 143/114, translation modified, 
my emphasis).
56
 As such, for Husserl, the act of empathy, much like the structure within 
which it operates, consists of at least two strata: (1) the associative pairing that occurs at 
the level of the lived body and (2) the higher level associative pairing in which the alter-
ego is apperceived. Husserl writes, 
The general style of this and every other apperception that arises 
associatively is therefore to be described as follows: With the associative 
overlapping of the data founding the apperception, there takes place an 
association at a higher level (Hua I: 147/118). 
 
It is the associative pairing of my lived body and the lived body in my field of perception 
that is the founding stratum for a higher level apperception, in this case, the apperception 
of the alter-ego. Let us briefly examine each level in turn. 
 First, when another living body enters my “perceptual sphere” it is “apprehended 
as an animate organism,” and thus immediately as a living body (Hua I: 140/110). That 
the body entering my field of vision is experienced as lived is, according to Husserl, due 
to “an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism” to the former (Hua I: 140/110). 
This apperceptive transfer is termed “pairing,” which is itself a “primordial form 
[Urform] of that passive synthesis which we designate as „association‟” (Hua I: 141/112, 
Husserl‟s emphasis, translation modified). As examined in the previous chapter, 
                                               
56 See also Hua IV: 169/177. In both cases, Husserl uses the term verflechtung, which is taken up by 
Merleau-Ponty. 
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association is a form of passive synthesis in which a general type of experience held in 
far retention is “awakened,” due to some similarity between the general type and the 
currently experienced entity/object, and then apperceived as intertwined with my current 
experience, perhaps as a horizon of experience or a side of the object that I am not 
currently perceiving. In this case, pairing is the awakening of a general type of experience 
“based” on my experience of my own body, which “comes about when the Other enters 
my field of perception” (Hua I: 143/113).57 This experience of my body is “awakened” 
and “transferred” apperceptively to the lived body in my field of perception. However, 
two caveats must be made. First, this transfer of meaning from my body to the lived body 
is not an “inference by analogy,” specifically because it is “not a thinking act” – it occurs 
at the level of passive synthesis and is given within the perception itself, before any 
rational act by the concrete ego (Hua I: 141/111). Second, the passive synthesis of pairing 
is not a synthesis of “identity” (Hua I: 142/112). That is, pairing does not collapse the 
newly perceived lived body into part of my own consciousness, but rather associates this 
lived body with my own and forms a “pair.” The primary feature of pairing, which 
further distinguishes it from identity, is that it involves a mutual imposition of sense 
between that which is paired. Husserl writes, 
On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional 
overreaching, coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as 
soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and 
simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly a living mutual 
awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the 
other… an apperception of each according to the sense of the other… 
(Hua I: 143/113) 
 
                                               
57 This, of course, is a genetic analysis, but Husserl still holds that the structure occurs “all at once,” and 
thus the overall framing of the descriptions as “static.” However, it is interesting to note that even though 
Husserl wants to engage within a static analysis of this structure, the analysis of each level are themselves 
genetic. Thus, Husserl is pushed, perhaps against his own will, into the realm of the genetic. 
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When my lived body, “prominent” in my field of sensation, perceives another lived body 
(which is also prominent within my field of perception but in a different way), pairing 
occurs, and through this pairing I acquire the sense of my body as the lived body for 
another, or as outside the other, in addition to apperceiving that body as a lived like my 
own (Hua I: 143/113).  
 The second, higher stratum of empathy, founded on the pairing of my lived body 
with another, is the apperception of the alter-ego, which can never itself be directly 
present in perception. That this second level is founded on the original pairing can be 
understood through Husserl‟s description of the other‟s lived body as the “core of an 
appresentation” of the alter-ego.58 Husserl describes this stratum as follows: 
But, since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my 
body here and, being given perceptually, becomes the core of an 
appresentation, the core of my experience of a coexisting ego, that ego, 
according to the whole sense-giving course of the association, must be 
appresented as an ego now existing in the mode There, „such as I should 
be if I were there.‟ My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-
perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. 
Therefore an ego is appresented, as other than mine. (Hua I: 148/119, 
Husserl‟s emphasis). 
 
Within my sphere of ownness, my body is always given to me as “here” through a stream 
of subjective appearances that are oriented to the position of my body (Hua I: 145/116). 
Furthermore, through “the free modification of my kinesthesias, particularly those of 
locomotion, I can change my position in such a manner that I convert any There into a 
Here” (Hua I: 146/116). When a body enters my field of vision, I “apperceive him as 
having spatial modes of appearances like those I should have if I should go over there and 
                                               
58 Again, it must be kept in mind that while empathy is amenable to a genetic analysis, the process is itself 
“all at once.” That is, empathy is already finished in an act of perceiving another body and thus these two 
stratum must be understood as occurring “all at once” – the world I experience is always already an 
objective and thus shared world with other subjects. This will be examined in greater detail in the following 
section. 
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be where he is” (Hua I: 146/117). This is due to a higher level of pairing, in which my 
oriented stream of subjective appearances is „transferred‟ to the other lived body, but not 
in such a way that I think it is seeing what I am seeing. Rather, he is apperceived as 
seeing the world from “there,” which is a position that I could have were I to walk over to 
him and look at where I was previously standing. Furthermore, the alter-ego apperceived 
in pairing is apperceived as having its own type of fulfillment, since it can never come to 
presence like the back side of an object can. The alter-ego is fulfilled through continuous 
harmonious experience (Hua I: 144/114).
59
  
 As such, we have now examined the dual-leveled structure of empathy. At the 
level of passive synthesis, first a body becomes paired with my own through association, 
in which it gains the sense „lived body‟ through its similarity to my own. Second, this 
body becomes the “core of an appresentation,” i.e. that of the alter-ego. Through 
empathy, the other is constituted as a living body, with its own stream of subjective 
appearances, and thus external to myself. Again, this relation is reciprocal, as I also 
experience myself as outside the other. It is through the experienced difference between 
our stream of subjective appearances that a shared objective world is constituted, to 
which I and all others belong. 
 
§23. Third Stratum: The Constitution of the Objective World (Space and 
Time) 
  
 Empathy, through which we apperceive another lived body as an ego with its own 
subjective stream of appearances (from the orientation of over „there‟), also produces our 
                                               
59 Suppose that a body enters my field of vision, but it is completely still. It is only through continually 
watching for movement or through walking up to it for further investigation that I will verify whether that 
body is a living body or, perhaps, a statue. 
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experience of a shared objective world, i.e. our experience of one single Nature to which 
I and everyone else (who does exist, has ever existed, or possibly exist in the future) 
belong. The passive synthesis of associative pairing constitutes for me, in the form of an 
apperception, an experience of an alter-ego governing a body like mine, yet from over 
„there.‟ Husserl writes that this pairing: 
[…] appresents first of all the other Ego‟s governing in his body, the body 
over there, and mediately his governing the Nature that appears to him 
perceptually – identically the nature to which the body over there belongs, 
identically the Nature that is my primordial Nature. It is the same Nature, 
but in the mode of appearance: “as if I were standing over there, where the 
Other‟s body is.” (Hua I: 151/123) 
 
We already examined the immediate appresentation of the alter-ego through empathy. 
However, how is a shared Nature appresented through empathy? The answer is actually 
deceptively simple. Husserl writes, 
In the appresented other ego the synthetic systems are the same, with all 
their modes of appearance, accordingly with all the possible perceptions 
and the noematic contents of these: except that the actual perceptions and 
the modes of givenness actualized therein, and also in part the objects 
actually perceived, are not the same; rather the objects perceived are 
precisely those perceivable from there, and as they are perceivable from 
there. (Hua I: 152/123) 
 
In other words, when another body enters my visual field, I perceive it as looking, or 
potentially looking, at the same objects that I am, but as seen from over „there‟ and as 
having a corresponding stream of subjective appearances of these objects, the same as I 
would have if I were to go stand where this other body is currently standing.
60
 The 
                                               
60
 The previous two citations may perhaps be interpreted as the projection of a privileged model of 
perception onto all subjects. However, whatever model that may be (of, say, white male bodies) is not 
operative at this level of constitution, in that discriminatory apperceptions of race and gender are at a higher 
level of constitution. Here, by identity, Husserl is only arguing that all subjects have to perceive themselves 
as sharing a basic world, in order for them to constitute cultural worlds (with their own systems of 
discrimination). Again, this stratum of constitution is the condition of the possibility of the perception of 
bodies in racial or gendered ways. 
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constant and incessant repetition of this experience forms an objective Nature (Hua I: 
155/127) on two inextricably related levels, viz. space and time. 
 The objectivity of the world as a spatial objectivity is constituted through the 
apperception of objects as having sides that I cannot currently see, which occurs through 
empathy. That is, when I experience the alter-ego as perceiving the same object as I am, 
she is doing so from a perspective which gives her a side of the object that is not 
currently visible from my perspective „here‟ (Hua I: 153/125).61 Thus, the object is 
constituted as an „objective‟ object. Husserl writes, 
[…] every natural Object experienced or experienceable by me in the 
lower stratum receives an appresentational stratum (though by no means 
one that becomes explicitly intuited), a stratum united in an identifying 
synthesis with the stratum given to me in the mode of primordial 
originality: the same natural Object in its possible modes of givenness to 
the other Ego. (Hua I: 153/125, Husserl‟s emphasis) 
 
The first stratum of the object is its constitution within our sphere of ownness through the 
activities of internal time consciousness and passive synthesis. The object then receives 
the second “appresentational stratum” through the act of empathy, which produces the 
difference in perspective between an object seen from my here and from your there. This 
givenness to others, through the apperception of the object as having sides that I cannot 
see but are experienceable by others, constitutes our experience of a shared world, i.e. of 
a world experienced, through our bodies, from over there and from over here. As such, 
this difference results in “the „real,‟ the mundane separation of my psychophysical 
existence from someone else‟s, a separation that shows itself as spatial, owing to the 
spatial character of our Objective animate organisms” (Hua I: 157/129). 
                                               
61 For a full analysis of this stratum of intersubjectivity, see Dan Zahavi‟s text Husserlund die 
transzendentale Intersubjectivität:Eine Antwort auf die sprachpragmatische Kritik. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1996. English translation by Dan Zahavi, as Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to 
the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002. Specifically, see Chapter 2. 
 97 
 
 
 However, what about the constitution of a shared objective time? Rodemeyer, in 
her text Intersubjective Temporality, fills in a crucial piece of the puzzle (as to the 
constitution of a shared world) through her analyses of world-time, a term occasionally 
used by Husserl but one that he never fully described.
62
 According to Rodemeyer, 
„world-time‟ is “a synthetic structure connecting” my internal temporalizing 
consciousness and objective time (clock time) (IST: 70), “which rests in the 
consciousness of all subjects, rather than just that of the individual” (IST: 69). That is, the 
constitution of an objective shared time occurs through a structure that is itself 
transcendentally intersubjective, in that it is through the constitutional activities of myself 
and others that one world-time is constituted, which then serves as the ground for 
figuring out ways to measure this objective and shared time. Rodemeyer uses the 
following citation from Husserl: 
My passivity stands in connection with the passivity of all others: One and 
the same thing-world is constituted for us, one and the same time [is 
constituted] as objective time such that through this, my Now and the Now 
of every other – and this life-present (with all immanences) and my life-
present – are objectively „simultaneous.‟ (Hua XI: 343/632) 
 
Similar to the constitution of an objective space, world-time is constituted through the 
repetition of the experience of the alter-ego as experiencing the same world that I am, yet 
from a different perspective. The living-present constituted within my sphere of ownness 
is fundamentally the same with the living present of the other and this connection occurs 
through empathy, which is itself passive, and thus “my passivity stands in connection 
with the passivity of all others” – we are both experiencing the same world and at the 
same time. 
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 As such, we have now examined the stratum of constitution wherein our 
experience of the world as shared with others spatially and temporally is constituted 
passively through the experience of the other. That is, our experience of the world, which 
is itself the founding stratum for us to constitute a world of discourses and non-discursive 
practices, is accomplished intersubjectively. 
 
§24. Fourth Stratum: The Constitution of the Social World 
 
 We are now at the final stratum of the passive constitution of the world as shared 
and shot through with cultural predicates. This stratum consists of the accrual of cultural 
meaning created and taken up in perception through the “undergoing and doing” of a 
subject within a community (Hua I: 162/135). Our perception of the world is built on this 
cultural stratum, insofar as, for example, objects of perception are always given to 
perception with a cultural meaning. For example, a hammer is not perceived as first an 
object of my experience, then as an object within a world that I share with others, and 
then finally as an object used for a specific purpose. Instead, it is immediately perceived 
as a hammer, i.e. as an object that is used for such and such a purpose.
63
 For Husserl, the 
perception of the hammer includes the presentation of the object and the apperception of 
the object as both shared and used for some general purpose. That is, our apperception of 
the usefulness of objects is intertwined with the presentation of the object itself. 
Remember that the entire structure we have outlined so far, and thus this level as well, is 
operative at the passive level of consciousness – thus, the cultural world is the passive 
                                               
63 The best discussion of the intertwining between cultural predicates and objects of perception is found in 
Heidegger‟s discussion of “worldliness” in Being and Time. 
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ground upon which (active) acts of the ego are carried out. As such, our perception of the 
present is intertwined with cultural meaning and is also historical. 
 Section 58 of the 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation is devoted to the constitution of the 
cultural world. However, Husserl does not actually describe this stratum but instead 
indicates the various phenomenological problems that stem from it. Nevertheless, we can 
still make an outline of this stratum through specific selections within this section, and I 
will ultimately suggest that it is with Foucault that we find the concrete analysis of this 
stratum.  
 
a) The Two Correlates of Intersubjectivity 
 
 Section 58 begins with the rather fascinating description of this fourth stratum as 
consisting of two correlates: (1) the constitution of “spiritual Objectivities [geistige 
Objektivitäten]” and “the various types of social communities with their possible 
hierarchical order” and (2) the constitution of the “specifically human surrounding world 
[Umwelt], a surrounding world of culture for each man and each human community” 
(Hua I: 160/132). Husserl calls these constitutive problems “correlated” [korrelative] 
which means that they are in a relationship of mutual reciprocity, and thus each 
constitutive side of the correlate influences the other. The first correlate is that of the 
constitution of “spiritual Objectivities,” which we can perhaps understand as cultural 
predicates, and types of communities with various hierarchies. Both aspects of this first 
correlate can be understood as made up of intersubjectively created meanings whose 
existence is not dependent upon me, but instead as cultural predicates of the community 
within which I exist and types of intersubjectively created hierarchies within 
communities. 
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The second side of the correlate is the cultural world as experienced from a 
specific perspective, in each case „mine,‟ or of a world that has a “restricted objectivity” 
(Hua I: 160/132). The objectivity of the world as shared is “unconditional,” as it is an 
“absolutely unconditional accessibility to everyone which belongs essentially to the 
constitutional sense of Nature, of the animate organism, and therefore of the 
psychophysical man (understood with a certain generality)” (Hua I: 160/132). The 
cultural world as experienced from my perspective is a restricted objectivity precisely 
because my experience of the cultural world is my expression or taking up of cultural 
objectivities and predicates, and through the arrangement of my body in various ways. 
My partner and I share the same cultural world, though we each experience it from our 
own individual perspective, in which the world “presents itself to us according to our 
personal upbringing and development or according to our membership in this or that 
nation, this or that cultural community” (Hua I: 163/136). 
The connection between these two correlates, and the reason why they are in a 
mutually reciprocal relationship, lies in the “undergoing and doing” of human subjects 
within a community (Hua I: 162/135).
64
 In a fascinating passage, we find Husserl telling 
us the following:  
That every such [cultural] predicate of the world accrues from a temporal 
genesis and, indeed, one that is rooted in human undergoing and doing, 
needs no proof. A presupposition for the origin of such predicates in the 
particular subjects (and for the origin of their intersubjective acceptance as 
abiding predicates of the common life-world) is, consequently, that a 
community of men and each particular man are vitally immersed in a 
                                               
64 The following descriptions from Husserl can be viewed, at least partially, as a solution to the problem 
posed by Ian Hacking in the latter‟s essay “Making up People.” In this essay, Hacking debates the 
intelligibility of a doctrine of “dynamic nominalism” that argues “numerous kinds of human beings and 
human acts come into being hand in hand with our invention of the categories labeling them” (Hacking, 
170).  
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concrete surrounding world, are related to it in undergoing and doing – 
that all of this is already constituted. (Hua I: 162/135, my emphasis) 
 
This is an extremely important passage, and warrants a sentence-by-sentence analysis. 
 To begin, Husserl writes that “Every such [cultural] predicate of the world 
accrues from a temporal genesis […].” Here, we immediately find a connection between 
cultural predicates and the activities of internal time consciousness, association, and 
apperception, through Husserl‟s description of predicates as accruing through a “temporal 
genesis.” This tells us that cultural predicates are apperceived within experience, and are 
therefore are already given to us “beforehand” within experience, as “intertwined” with 
the original presentation. Indeed, Husserl ends the passage by saying that a cultural world 
is already constituted. As a hammer enters my perceptual field, I immediately perceive it 
as a hammer, and not, for example, as a pencil. When the hammer enters my field of 
vision, its presentation awakens a general type of experience held within far retention, i.e. 
the various uses for this object, and this general type of experience becomes associated 
with the presentation as a horizon of possible uses (through protention). And, as such, the 
cultural predicate is apperceived within experience. 
 Husserl completes the first sentence by telling us that the temporal genesis of 
cultural predicates is “rooted in human understanding and doing.” Indeed, he goes on to 
say that the presupposition for both the origin of cultural predicates in a subject and the 
origin of cultural predicates (as ideal meanings) are to be found within the vital 
immersion of a community actively related to each other and a world. Thus, we can 
understand this idea of rootedness in two ways: (1) that cultural predicates are rooted in 
me through my own activity within a world and a community of subjects and (2) that 
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cultural predicates as such are rooted in the activity of a community of subjects “vitally 
immersed” in a world. Let us look at each in turn. 
 First, my apperception of cultural predicates is entirely due to my own activity in 
relation to myself, others, and the world that I am “vitally immersed in.” Simply, cultural 
predicates are not innate within consciousness. That is, while the meanings may (and 
usually do) pre-exist my own birth, they are not in my consciousness at the moment of 
conception. Rather, as intersubjectively created meanings, they are meanings which must 
be „picked up‟ by me and integrated into my experiential horizon in some way or another, 
either explicitly or implicitly. To use a benign example, it is only after my first 
experience with a hammer that the meaning „hammer‟ (along with all of its uses and 
functions) can settle into my system of far retention as a general type of experience, such 
that it can be later associated with a presentation and apperceived with my horizon of 
experience. A meaning can be taken up by me implicitly, perhaps, through the attitudes 
that surround me as a child. For instance, if I were raised by two parents with a negative 
outlook on life, this negative outlook will be taken up by me implicitly and apperceived 
within my horizon of experience as the attachment of a negative valence to my relevant 
experiential possibilities. Indeed, Husserl writes that the surrounding world [Umwelt] 
“presents itself to us according to our personal upbringing and development or according 
to our membership in this or that nation, this or that cultural community” (Hua I: 
163/136). That is, the world is apperceived by us according to the cultural meanings that 
we take up, and this is done either explicitly or implicitly. This brings us to the second 
sense of rootedness from the above passage. 
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 While cultural predicates have their origin in each particular subject through their 
active relation to a community and to the world, cultural predicates as such have their 
origin within the intersubjective constitutive activities of a community of subjects 
actively related to each other and the world. For Husserl, cultural predicates are „ideal,‟ in 
the sense that they are not subjective meanings that are confined only to me, but are 
objective meanings that other subjects can take up as well – e.g., the meaning „hammer.‟ 
However, a meaning can only be ideal if it is repeatable and reproducible by other 
subjects, and thus has an existence separate from my own.
65
 As such, the presupposition 
for the constitution of ideal meaning, which is intersubjective (UG: 370/359), is a 
community of subjects to repeat the original meaning. In a passage from his Origin of 
Geometry, Husserl writes that “in the unity of the community of communication among 
several persons the repeatedly produced structure becomes an object of consciousness, 
not as a likeness, but as the one structure common to all” (UG: 371/360). For example, 
the meaning „hammer‟ was first created by someone through an initial use. As this initial 
use fades into far retention, it is then available as a general type of experience that “can 
be reawakened,” i.e. I can use another object in the same way that I used the initial object 
(if it is roughly similar in shape). Husserl writes that this initial use  
[…] immediately turns into the passivity of the flowingly fading 
consciousness of what-has-just-now-been. Finally this “retention” 
disappears, but the “disappeared” passing and being past has not become 
nothing for the subject in question: it can be reawakened. (UG: 370/359). 
 
                                               
65 Ultimately, this existence is obtained when the meaning is written down and, thus, in order to be ideal 
ideal (omnitemporal) these meanings must become temporal, i.e. written down. See Lawlor‟s “The Need 
for Survival: The Logic of Writing in Merleau-Ponty and Derrida” for a fascinating analysis of the way in 
which we can understand the work of both Merleau-Ponty and Derrida as fundamentally linked to Husserl‟s 
discussion of the creation of ideal meaning in the latter‟s Origin of Geometry. 
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Since I experience a shared and objective world, there are other subjects with whom I am 
in contact, and they can perceive my use of this object in this specific way, and they 
reproduce and repeat this action. Husserl writes, 
In this full understanding of what is produced by the other, as in the case 
of recollection, a present co-accomplishment on one‟s own part of the 
presentified activity necessarily takes place; but at the same there is also 
the self-evident consciousness of the identity of the mental structure in the 
productions of both the receiver of the communication and the 
communicator; and this occurs reciprocally. (UG: 371/60).  
 
Their perception of my use of the object becomes a “present co-accomplishment” for my 
companions. This falls into their systems of far retention, and they then reawaken the 
meaning hammer through their use of this object in this specific way and thus apperceive 
that use within their system of far protention. While any given cultural meaning has an 
initial production in a particular subject, this meaning is only ideal through the 
intersubjective activities of a community of subjects who incessantly reproduce and 
repeat that meaning within their own horizon of experience. 
 Finally, to return to the initial passage from the 5
th
 Cartesian Meditation, Husserl 
says that the constitution of the cultural world is a presupposition for the origin of 
cultural predicates in particular subjects and in general (Hua I: 162/135). However, is this 
not a circular statement? How can one say that the origin of cultural predicates is a 
cultural world, when the cultural world is composed of cultural predicates? This 
statement is only circular, however, from the perspective of formal or general logic. 
Phenomenologically, we can understand Husserl to be saying that the intersubjective 
activities of a community are the presupposition of cultural predicates – both their origin 
in me and their origin as such. That is, without a community acting and relating to a 
world, we would not have cultural meanings at all. 
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 We are now in a position to see the connection between the two sides of the 
correlate, i.e. the correlation between cultural predicates and their oriented experience by 
me, is my active relation to a community of other subjects and to the world, in which I 
am constantly “undergoing and doing.” First, cultural predicates are not innate within 
consciousness, and, as such, they can only be taken up through a relation to other subjects 
and to the world that we constituted together as shared and objective. Second, I 
apperceive these accrued cultural predicates passively within my experience of the world 
through association, retention, and apperception. The presentation of an object awakens a 
general type of experience held within far retention, and this general type of experience 
becomes associated with the present object as a horizon within the system of far 
protention. Third, cultural meanings as such are tied to the intersubjective activities of a 
community of subjects, as meanings are only ideal insofar as they are repeatable and 
reproducible.  
 However, the passage cited above goes on further, and we find Husserl making 
the following fascinating claim, which is entailed by the description given above. He 
writes,  
With this continual change in the life-world [i.e., the constant accrual of 
cultural predicates through the activities of a community], manifestly the 
men themselves also change as persons, since correlatively they must 
always be taking on new habitual properties. (Hua I: 162/135, Husserl‟s 
emphasis) 
 
Here, we find Husserl himself highlighting the following claim: how we understand 
ourselves changes as the cultural predicates change and accrue through the activities of 
human beings in a community. That is, at the passive level of experience we have the 
constitution of ourselves, already given beforehand, as imbued with cultural predicates – 
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e.g. I am this type of body or that type of body, which then influences (if not determines) 
my place within a social hierarchy, from which I express the experienced cultural 
predicates through my experience of the world from my perspective. As such, in this brief 
statement by Husserl, we find space for Foucault‟s argument that we are constituted as 
objects of knowledge, and that this constitution becomes embedded within “our 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors.” 
 However, a distinction must be made. The notion of “accrual” that Husserl 
employed above would give the sense that, once cultural predicates are sedimented in 
consciousness, they cannot change. This would then give the idea that cultural predicates 
create necessary limits of thought. However, Husserl‟s own analyses of the radiating 
backward and forward of meaning in apperception counters this interpretation. If we 
recall, Husserl describes the way in which an unfulfilled protention can motivate a 
“radiating back” of meaning into the system of far retention. In his example, he describes 
a red ball that he is turning in his hand – a ball that he protends within his experience as 
red and solid all around. However, as he turns the ball in his hand, he finds that, in fact, 
one side of the ball is green and indented. This disappointed protention (red and solid) 
radiates back into the system of far retention and then radiates forward as a change in my 
horizon of expectations, as regards this ball and perhaps other balls in the future. As such, 
these cultural predicates can always change, and the idea of accrual can be understood to 
denote the various layers of meaning within an intention, both influencing and influenced 
by current experience. 
 In any case, we have now outlined the fourth stratum within which the cultural 
world is constituted. It consists of the accrual of cultural predicates through my (and our) 
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active immersion in, and relation to, a community of other subjects and the world. These 
cultural predicates are then passively experienced by me as a horizon of possible 
experience within far protention, through the activities of retention, association, and 
apperception. This stratum, like the other three, is constituted passively, and is thus there 
for us before any active position taking of an ego. That is, we immediately perceive the 
world as cultural. 
 
§25. Apperception and Historical Constitution: Husserl’s “Pathological 
Object” 
 
  We can see the interplay of these strata of constitution in Husserl‟s description of 
the “pathological object” in his text Ideas II. In a subsection found within a larger section 
on the constitution of material nature, Husserl gives a description of the constitution of an 
objective world through intersubjectivity, specifically as regards the constitution of an 
object as enduring in an objective space and time. Husserl‟s description begins with the 
apperception of other subjects as suspended (Hua IV: 79/84). While this “apperceptive 
domain is lacking,” Husserl describes a world in which harmonious experience of the 
world still occurs, much as he did in his descriptions of the sphere of ownness in the 5
th
 
Cartesian Meditation, and thus a world in which the “influence” of empathy “would be 
absent from my world-image as now modified” (Hua IV: 79/84). Again, in the sphere of 
ownness we still have manifolds of sensations oriented towards our body, and, if 
experience is harmonious, then things “exhibit themselves as „actually being,‟ or 
otherwise, if discrepancies of a known kind occur as exceptional, the things show 
themselves as being „different‟ or not being at all” (Hua IV: 79/84). As such, “seemingly 
nothing has changed” – even with the apperceptions produced through empathy 
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suspended, I still have a world of coherent experience, i.e. the first stratum of the sphere 
of ownness (Hua IV: 79/84). 
 However, once we add intersubjectivity, i.e. others, back to our description, 
something very strange happens. Husserl writes, 
Now all of a sudden and for the first time human beings are there for me, 
with whom I can come to an understanding. And I come to an 
understanding with them about things which are there for us in common in 
this new segment of time. (Hua IV: 80/84) 
 
With the addition of others, a common world becomes constituted through the 
intersubjective constitution of an objective space and time. It is in and through this 
objective space and time that humans can “come to an understanding” “about things 
which are there for us in common.” That is, we share the same spatial world and the same 
temporal now in order to communicate, and to communicate about things.  However, as I 
communicate with other subjects, “something very remarkable comes about:” 
[…] extensive complexes of assertions about things, which I made in 
earlier periods of time on the ground of earlier experiences, experiences 
which were perfectly concordant throughout, are not corroborated by my 
current companions, and this not because these experiences are simply 
lacking to them […] but because they thoroughly conflict with what the 
others experience in experiences, we may suppose, that necessarily are 
harmonious and that go on being progressively confirmed. (Hua IV: 80/84, 
Husserl‟s emphasis) 
 
Various assertions that I have come to make on the basis of previous experience come 
into conflict with others when my harmonious experience of the world does not coincide 
with their own. While this is not Husserl‟s example, imagine a young male growing up in 
a predominantly homophobic culture, who, early in his life, becomes aware that he is 
sexually attracted to other men. Due to this attraction, the idea of homosexual intercourse 
makes sense to him, and thus is perceived by him as both desirable and natural. However, 
 109 
 
 
now imagine that same young male as he develops and he becomes more and more aware 
of his peers, elders, and cultures negative view of homosexuality. His experience of his 
desires will increasingly come into conflict with a society whose general outlook on these 
desires is negative. That is, while he experiences his desire for homosexual intercourse as 
natural, he will be increasingly faced with a culture that believes homosexuality, and thus 
homosexual intercourse, to be unnatural. After this conflict, Husserl writes: 
As I communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences and 
they become aware of how much these conflict with their world, 
constituted intersubjectively and continuously exhibited by means of a 
harmonious exchange of experiences, then I become for them an 
interesting pathological Object [einem interessant pathologischen Objekt], 
and they call my actuality, so beautifully manifest to me, the hallucination 
of someone who up to this point in time has been mentally ill 
[geisteskrank]. (Hua IV: 80/85, Husserl‟s emphasis) 
 
Through the conflict of the young man‟s experience with the intersubjectively 
corroborated experience of a community (perhaps through religion, politics, or popular 
media), his community apperceives him as a pathological object – as someone who is 
mentally ill and in need of help. The young man finds that his own experience of the 
world is somehow wrong, in that it does not match up with the experiences of others. 
Thus, not only does his experience conflict with the experience of others, but their 
experience conflicts with his. 
 Let us look at a number of consequences indicated by this description – 
consequences which Husserl does not take up but ones that we can draw from his 
analyses and the analyses done in the previous chapter of this text. First, what we must 
notice here is that all of the strata that were described in the previous sections of this 
chapter are operative within this description. We have the constitution of a thing within 
the sphere of ownness, and then modification of our experience of that thing through the 
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apperceptions gained by empathy, and the further apperceptions gained through social 
corroboration. As such, in his description of the conflict of experience between a subject 
and a community, we find Husserl employing each strata step-by-step, and in the final 
analysis, wherein a community perceives a particular subject as a pathological object, all 
four strata are in play. 
 Second, we must follow the lines of “conflict,” within the previous description, as 
they play out in both the young man‟s perception of himself, now as a pathological 
object, and the perception that his community has of him as a pathological object. As 
regards the first, when the young man reports his desire for homosexual intercourse to 
others in his community, a conflict occurs between his past harmonious experience and 
the experience that they have of him and of homosexuality as such. Thus, his recollected 
experiences of homosexual intercourse as a natural desire turn out to be “false,” since 
even though he has this desire it has now turned out (through the decision of the 
community) that the desire for homosexual intercourse is unnatural. This newly 
experienced conflict between the young man‟s experience and that of his community 
radiates back into his system of near and far retention, and now all of his previous 
recollections of feeling that the desire for homosexual intercourse was natural is overlaid 
with the sense “unnatural.” That is, his past is reinterpreted in light of this new 
information. This conflict not only radiates back into his system of recollections, but into 
his system of far retention as a modification to a general type of experience, which then 
radiates forward into his new continuous experience of the world. He still experiences a 
desire for homosexual intercourse, but now this desire is experienced by him as 
“unnatural” and therefore “wrong.” Furthermore, on the basis of this conflict and his new 
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experience of his desires as unnatural, the young man might decide to undergo 
“behavioral modification,” which often employs treatments like shock therapy, to rid him 
of these desires. 
 We must also follow the line of conflict through the experience of the community 
against whom the young man‟s experience has now come into conflict. When he reports 
his previous experiences of his desires as natural, the conflict radiates back into their 
system of near and far retention in a way analogous to that of the young man‟s. They now 
recollect him as before, but now with the added sense of “mentally ill” (through his 
“unnatural” desire). That is, they can recollect his behavior, which may have seemed 
“normal” before, but now this behavior is reinterpreted as the behavior of someone with 
“unnatural” desires, though they did not know it until now. Furthermore, this conflict 
radiates back within perception and then radiates forward through the alteration of a 
general type of experience which is then given as a horizon of experience as regards the 
young man. That is, they now apperceive “mental illness” when they perceive the young 
man, and since “mental illness” is a term embedded within a nexus of discourses 
(psychiatric, religious, political, biological, medical, etc.), the community then 
apperceives the young man in a way that is built up culturally, and thus (as Foucault has 
shown), historically. 
 Third, and we have already seen this, the apperception “pathological object,” 
whether given in the young man or in others, is an apperception that is constituted within 
the fourth stratum of experience, i.e. the layer in which cultural predicates accrue. And, 
as a pathological object (a set of cultural predicates) the young man is now changed in 
their experience as well as within his own, through the cultural predicates that they 
 112 
 
 
apperceive in their experience of him and that he apperceives within his own world. It is 
the discourse that surrounds the idea of the pathological object – the accumulated 
knowledge and its various practices and relations of power – that become effected within 
experience in apperception, whether it is in the experience of the community or in the 
young man‟s experience of himself (and, of course, his experience of them). 
As such, here we find Husserl at his limit, in which he begins to approach the 
analyses of Foucault, in so far as there is a layer of passive experience in which the world 
is given to me as cultural and in which I perceive myself and others with cultural 
predicates. Furthermore, even though this may not have been Husserl‟s intention, we can 
see how the predicates in this layer, even though they accrue, can be understood as 
malleable, in that they can always be altered through the way in which meaning radiates 
backward and forward within consciousness through apperception. 
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Chapter Four – Foucault at the Limit 
 
Basically, I had been doing nothing except 
trying to retrace how a certain number of 
institutions, beginning to function on behalf 
of reason and  normality, had brought their 
power to bear on groups of individuals, in 
terms of behaviors, ways  of being, acting, 
or speaking that were constituted as 
abnormality, madness, illness, and so on. I 
had done nothing else, really, but a history 
of power. 
-Michel Foucault66 
 
§26. Foucault and the Pathological Object 
  
 We ended the last chapter with an analysis of Husserl‟s description of the 
pathological object, wherein a conflict of experience between an individual and his 
community resulted in their labeling him, and his labeling himself, a pathological object. 
Though this is not Husserl‟s example, we used the example of a young man whose 
experience of sexual attraction to other men comes into conflict with the culturally 
constituted experience of a homophobic community. However, we only saw the young 
man‟s constitution of himself as a pathological object – we did not look at how the 
cultural predicates that were applied to him were historically accrued, or at the processes 
through which the community constitutes the young man as pathological, that is, we did 
not see the constitution of the young man as pathological within the experience of the 
community. As such, we found ourselves at the limit of Husserl‟s analyses. I now argue 
that once we approach this limit we will find the analyses of Foucault, i.e. the analyses of 
the processes of power and knowledge which constitute and impose forms of conduct 
upon individuals within a disciplinary society. In other words, we followed Husserl 
through the constitution of a shared world, and now he must pass the ball (as it were) to 
                                               
66 From “Interview with Michel Foucault,” in The Essential Works of Michel Foucault Vol. 2, pg. 282. 
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Foucault, who will then give us the other side of the constitution of our experience as 
disciplined subjects. 
 However, we must immediately note that this relationship is reversible, and its 
reversibility gives us, in turn, the limit in Foucault. This can be understood on two 
registers. First, Foucault‟s project is to show us that the limits of thought in our present 
era are those given to us through disciplinary society. Thus, Foucault is always talking 
about us – we who live within a disciplinary society – and, as such, it is our bodies and 
our thought that is the target of disciplinary power. And, insofar as we are the target, then 
it is us who are the limit of Foucault‟s thought, i.e. those who must take up the cultural 
predicates created through disciplinary normalization. Second, and this follows from the 
first register, if we are the targets of disciplinary normalization, then before we can have 
a world of intersubjective cultural meaning, we must constitute a shared and objective 
world. Thus, the reversibility – if we follow Husserl to the limit then we need the 
analyses of the constitution of the subject through power, knowledge, and conduct, and if 
we follow Foucault to the limit then we need the analyses of the constitution of a shared 
world, such that cultural meanings can accrue and be imposed upon the experience of 
individuals within a community. 
 In this chapter, I will use the community‟s constitution of the young man‟s 
homosexual desire as pathological as a guiding example to show how it is that, for 
Foucault, our experience of the world – our “perceptions, attitudes and behaviors” (FL: 
282) – is constituted through the processes of knowledge and power and the formation 
and imposition of forms of conduct, i.e. ways of being. As such, we will be examining 
the three axes of critical ontology – the constitution of the subject as an object of 
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knowledge, as a subject of power relations with others, and as a subject who takes up the 
forms of being constituted through these processes. Ultimately, the analyses contained 
within this chapter will show how it is that we can understand Foucault as analyzing the 
other side of Husserl‟s limit (and thus understand Husserl as describing the other side of 
Foucault‟s limit), as well as give an example of a contingent limit of thought that can be 
elucidated through bringing together the work of Husserl and Foucault. That is, we will 
see how a form of conduct is constituted through the relations of knowledge and power 
and then imposed from outside upon a subject‟s desire. The analyses of the third chapter 
of this text, and the example of the constitution of oneself as a pathological object, 
complete the picture by showing us how it was that we take up these imposed forms of 
conduct. 
 Drawing on passages from Foucault‟s lecture courses Abnormal (1974-75) and 
Psychiatric Power (1973-74), as well as from his major work The History of Sexuality 
Vol. 1 (1976), this chapter will proceed by analyzing this communal constitution along 
the axes of power, knowledge, and the imposition of forms of conduct. Specifically, we 
will first examine the axis of disciplinary power, as it is through disciplinary power that 
we find the constitution of a “permanent knowledge of the individual” [savoir permanent 
de l’individu] (PP: 79/78). Second, we will examine the axis of knowledge through the 
lens of the proliferation of discourses surrounding homosexuality during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries, in which a “form of conduct” is constituted through the linking of a desire with 
madness, and thus abnormality, which is consequently imposed on the desires of 
individuals. Finally, we will examine the ways in which these forms of conduct, 
constituted through the processes of power and knowledge, are imposed upon individuals 
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within a community, that is, normalization. It will turn out that all three axes presuppose 
one another, in a manner similar to Heidegger‟s notion of “being-in-the-world,” and thus 
the separation of the three axes from one another is only possible for explanatory means – 
the three axes are interwoven [verflochten or entrelacée] with each other (SP: 27/23). 
 
§27. First Axis: Power (Disciplinary Power)
67
 
 
For Foucault, disciplinary power is the process through which individuals within a 
society or given community are normalized. Foucault writes that disciplinary power is: 
[…] no more than a particular, as it were, terminal, capillary form of 
power; a final relay, a particular modality by which political power, power 
in general, finally reaches the level of bodies and gets a hold on them, 
taking actions, behaviors, habits, and words into account: the way in 
which power converges below to affect individual bodies themselves, to 
work on, modify, and direct […]. (PP: 42/40) 
 
Disciplinary power is the way in which bodies, actions, behaviors, habits and words 
figure into the constitution of a “normal” individual. In our example of the young man 
and his community, the constitution of heterosexuality is the “normal,” while anything 
that deviates from it is “abnormal,” e.g. homosexual desire. Specifically, Foucault argues, 
disciplinary power is composed of three primary characteristics: 
 
1. Principle of Complete Control: First, disciplinary power consists of an “exhaustive 
capture of an individual‟s body, actions, time, and behavior” (PP: 48/46). Whereas 
sovereign power attempted to seize a person‟s product and time spent while making this 
product, disciplinary power is “a seizure of the body, and not of the product; it is a 
                                               
67 We will focus here on power within disciplinary societies, i.e. disciplinary power, rather than sovereign 
power, since the former is the form of power at issue in the constitution of pathological objects. One of the 
best analyses of power as such in Foucault is given by Deleuze, and my interpretation here is heavily 
indebted to the latter‟s reading (F: 77/70-99/93). 
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seizure of time in its totality, and not the time of service” (PP: 48/46). For example, 
armies during the period of sovereignty consisted of “a group of people recruited for a 
finite time for the needs of the cause, and to whom food and lodging were assured 
through pillage and the occupation of any premises found on the” (PP: 48/46). Militaries 
at the time only laid hold of the soldier‟s product (war) and only during the time it was 
produced. However, during the middle of the 17
th
 century, Foucault argues, there is a 
profound change, wherein militaries began to take total control of their recruits. That is, 
these recruits now lived in barracks and were “engaged” not only in times of war, but in 
times of peace as well, thus constituting a “standing army” (PP: 48/47). By the late 18th 
century, this complete control of the soldier‟s time had differentiated further into the 
complete control of the soldier‟s body as well, in the sense that the soldier‟s body came 
to be viewed as “an inapt body,” out of which “the machine required can be constructed” 
(SP: 137/135). Quoting an ordinance of the French military from March 20
th
, 1764, 
Foucault writes, 
Recruits become accustomed to „holding their heads high and erect; to 
standing upright, without bending the back to sticking out the belly, 
throwing out the chest and throwing back the shoulders; and, to help them 
acquire the habit, they were given this position while standing against wall 
in such a way that the heels, the thighs, the waist and the shoulders touch 
it, as also do the backs of the hands, as one turns the arm outwards, 
without moving them away from the body… Likewise, they will be taught 
never to fix their eyes on the ground, but to look straight at those they 
pass… to remain motionless until the order is given, without moving the 
head, the hands or the feet.‟ (SP: 137/135). 
 
Here, we find that every movement the soldier makes must be completed in accordance 
with a strict set of requirements – even the direction of their gaze is under control. In this 
change we can see a movement from controlling the product and time invested for the 
creation of the product (sovereignty) to the controlling of an entire life through the 
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complete control of both time and bodies (discipline). Furthermore, and we will see this 
in much more detail momentarily, even the spatial arrangement of bodies within a room, 
e.g. the classroom or workshop, comes under control of disciplinary power. Thus, 
Foucault writes, “Every disciplinary system tends […] to be an occupation of the 
individual‟s time, life, and body” (PP: 49/47). 
 
2. Principle of Omnivisibility: Second, disciplinary power consists of procedures of 
constant observation. Foucault writes, “In the disciplinary system, one is not available for 
someone‟s possible use, one is perpetually under someone‟s gaze, or, at any rate, in the 
situation of being observed” (PP: 49/47). We will look at the notion of perpetual 
observation momentarily, but first we must examine the reason why this perpetual 
observation is set into motion. For Foucault, disciplinary power is always in relation to a 
“final or optimum state” (PP: 49/47). The optimum state of a disciplinary system is when 
it does not need any particular person, i.e. a sovereign, to run it, but is instead carried out 
by the very subjects that are disciplined through it.
68
 That is, a disciplinary system is in its 
final state “when discipline […] becomes habit” (PP: 49/47). Foucault gives the example 
of the 18
th
 century Prussian army, in which daily exercise became a mandatory activity 
for enlisted soldiers, whereas prior to this, exercise in an army occurred primarily through 
“tests of bravery” (PP: 49/48). The requirement for daily exercise constitutes a training of 
the body, in which the body is made ready for war at any moment. Thus, within his daily 
exercise, the soldier is made to internalize the disciplinary power of the military itself, 
repeating it incessantly. However, the indefinite continuance of a disciplinary system is 
                                               
68 Marilyn Frye discusses this notion, without reference to Foucault, in her essay “Oppression,” in which 
she argues that one of the primary characteristics of an oppressed group is the internalization of their 
oppression through self-discipline. 
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not only attained through exercise or training, but also through written records (PP: 
50/48). Written records, Foucault argues, brings together knowledge and behavior, as a 
kind of “tissue” [un tissue] (PP: 50/49), through ensuring “that everything that happens, 
everything the individual does and says, is graded and recorded” (PP: 50/48). These 
records of behavior are then transmitted “up through hierarchical levels” and, finally, 
made accessible to all (PP: 50/48). The recorded behavior of an individual then travels 
through a hierarchy of individuals who are employed to study the behavior in a number 
of different discourses, e.g. medical, biological, psychiatric, etc. Finally, their study of the 
behavior is then made accessible to some central point, which either keeps the 
information for itself or disseminates it more widely. Foucault uses the example of a 
“professional school of design and tapestry,” which, in 1737, began to require written 
assessments of students to determine whether or not that student had the potential to 
become a master. These assessments required that students were divided into groups by 
age and given tasks according to their level. The students were then observed for their 
“behavior, assiduity, and zeal while performing his work” (PP: 51/49). These assessments 
were then transmitted through various levels until the reports finally reached the minister 
of the King‟s Household (PP: 51/50). As such, Foucault argues, there is a proliferation of 
observing and recording centered on the student in the school. Furthermore, this 
accumulation of recorded behavior allows for disciplinary power to intervene 
immediately and punish those that resist normalization, since, because of this 
accumulation, it can “intervene without halt from the first moment, the first action, the 
first hint” (PP: 53/51). The need for disciplinary power to intervene from the first 
moment leads to a focus on potential behavior and its control. For example in the 18
th
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century, Foucault argues, workshops came to be organized on a principle of control over 
potential behavior, through both temporal and spatial means (PP: 53/51). Temporally, the 
worker‟s day was broken into segments of work and non-working activity, with both 
lateness and absence from work meticulously recorded, as well as prohibitions against 
distracting others during their time of work (PP: 53/51). Spatially, workers in the shop 
must be distributed so that their action can be observed at all times with the least number 
of observers, i.e. through a panoptic mechanism. Ultimately, the principle of 
omnivisibility is the principle of the Panopticon, that mechanism through which bodies 
were arranged such that the maximum number could be observed with the least amount 
of supervision, and, ultimately, with no supervision at all (through the internalization of 
disciplinary power within the individual). 
 
3. Principle of Isotopy: By isotopic, Foucault argues that disciplinary power has the 
characteristic of a kind of repeatability with its mechanisms (PP: 54/52). First, every 
disciplinary system consists of some kind of hierarchy which always consists of an above 
and a below, or its “subordinate” and “superordinate” elements (PP: 54/52). For example, 
there are the ranks within a school – the rank of each grade with each other and the ranks 
within an individual grade organized through performance and behavior. There are also 
ranks within the army, within a workplace, within academic and governmental 
institutions, usually divided by rank (understood primarily in terms of performance and 
behavior). Second, every disciplinary apparatus “must be able to connect up with each 
other,” and thus there must a certain repeatability of its elements (PP: 54/53). As such, 
Foucault writes, “school classifications are projected, with some modification, but 
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without too much difficulty, into the social-technical hierarchies of the adult world” (PP: 
55/53). Third, and we will examine this in a latter section, every disciplinary system 
necessarily produces an “unclassifiable” residue, which that system then works to 
classify, which then produces more abnormality, and so  on (PP: 55/53). These are the 
“margins” [marges] of a disciplinary power, which are also its “stumbling block” [le 
point d’achoppement] (PP: 55/53). 
 
These three characteristics of disciplinary power, i.e. its complete seizure of an 
individual‟s body and time, its requirement for constant observation and the proliferation 
of knowledge that results from it, and the isotopy of its apparatuses, all combine to show 
us the way in which, for Foucault, disciplinary power exercises a “subject-function” [la 
fonction-sujet], wherein disciplinary power is “applied and brought to bear on the body, 
on its actions, place, movements, strength, the moments of its life, and its discourses, all 
of this” (PP: 57/55).  That is, the subject-function of disciplinary power is the formation 
of a disciplined individual, i.e. one who has internalized discipline and is thus 
normalized. 
This analysis of disciplinary power has, for the most part, been quite abstract from 
the example of the young man given at the beginning of this chapter. However, we will 
examine the concrete power relations that give rise to the constitution of homosexual 
desire as abnormal (through disciplinary power) within the next section in the discussion 
of knowledge, as it is from power relations that knowledge is produced (PP: 79/78). In 
the example of psychiatry, Foucault writes, 
The first effect of this relationship of power is therefore the constitution 
[constitution] of this permanent knowledge of the individual [savoir 
 122 
 
 
permanent de l’indvidu] – pinned in a given space and followed by a 
potentially continuous gaze – which defines the temporal curve of his 
development, his cure, his acquisition of knowledge [savoir], or the 
acknowledgement of his error, and so forth. As you can see, the 
Panopticon is therefore an apparatus of both individualization and 
knowledge [connaissance]; it is an apparatus of both knowledge 
[connaissance] and power that individualizes one side, and which, by 
individualizing, knows [connaît]. (PP: 79/78) 
 
That is, disciplinary power in general, and the act of observing in particular, gives rise to 
a proliferation of discourses that allows for further, more refined, observation.  
 
§28. Second Axis: Knowledge (Discourse)
69
 
  
 The second axis, or process wherein disciplined subjects are constituted, is the 
constitution of subjects as objects of knowledge, i.e. of the constitution of the “permanent 
knowledge of the individual” (PP: 79/78). This permanent knowledge of the individual, 
understood as the proliferation of discourses surrounding ways of being, is, as we have 
already seen, the “first effect of the relationship of power,” since knowledge is both 
required for and produced by normalization (PP: 79/78). Specifically, as regards the 
constitution of the young man in our example as a pathological object by his community, 
there is the imposition upon his desire of a form that is constituted in advance as 
abnormal. This pre-constituted form of abnormal behavior is produced through the 
discourses of (at least) psychiatry, medicine, and criminal justice (HS1: 42/30), each of 
which consists of its own set of peculiar power relations which bring about the 
                                               
69 For purposes of simplicity, I will be employing Deleuze‟s distinction between discursive and non-
discursive formations in order to group discourse under the general heading of knowledge. Deleuze 
distinguishes between discursive and non-discursive formations on the basis of the distinction between 
knowledge and power. For Deleuze, non-discursive formations consist of “instructions, political events, 
economic practices and processes,” i.e. relations, while discursive formations consist “of statements” (F: 
18/9). We have examined this already in the first chapter of this text, but, insofar as a discourse is a field of 
statements, and statements can be such things as empirical observations or interpretations of behavior, i.e. 
psychiatry, then discourse and discursive practices are related to the axis of knowledge. I recognize the 
dangers of taking up the notion of discourse in this generic way, but a full analysis would take us too far off 
track.  
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proliferation of knowledge within each discourse. The point of connection for all of these 
discourses lies in both the community that enforces them and the individuals that take 
them up. Foucault writes,  
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, 
jurisprudence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species 
and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and „psychic 
hermaphrodism‟ made possible a strong advance of social controls into 
this area of „perversity‟: but it also made possible the formation of a 
„reverse‟ discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to 
demand that its legitimacy or „naturality‟ be acknowledged, often in the 
same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically 
disqualified. (HS1: 134/101) 
 
The constitution of discourses on homosexual desire, as a form of behavior, gives rise to 
further forms of discourse that proliferate through the power relations between those 
constituted as abnormal. This subject that takes up the form of conduct and produces a 
counter-discourse (from the standpoint of having this form imposed upon her) is a brief 
glimpse of the limit in Foucault, insofar as Husserl has shown us how it is that we can 
take up cultural predicates within experience, and thus have forms of conduct imposed 
upon us (for example, the predicate abnormal that attaches to particular contents, i.e. 
desires), as well as have a reaction against the predominant discourse. 
 In order to show how it is that knowledge constitutes its objects, we will use the 
example of the young man constituted by his society as a pathological object. Thus, we 
will examine Foucault‟s analyses of the way in which the content of homosexual desire 
came to be constituted as an abnormal form of behavior. This will be done in two ways. 
First, we will briefly analyze the way in which the relations of power within the church, 
specifically between the priest and the penitent, slowly changed the focus of confession 
from sexual acts to sexual desires, and inaugurated a mode of discourse in which subjects 
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feel obliged to disclose everything about their sexuality, or “the way in which sex is „put 
into discourse‟” (HS1: 20/11). Second, we will examine how the “formation of a meshing 
[engrenage] together” of psychiatry with judicial and familial discourses brought sexual 
behavior into the field of abnormality (A: 259/274). 
 
a) The Confessional  
 
For Foucault, the analysis of the transformation of the confessional within 
Christian religious practices is essential for understanding how sexuality came to fall 
within the realm of psychiatry and pathological disorders for two reasons. First, it is 
through the confessional that the body is put into discourse, through a transformation in 
the confessional from a focus on sins in the form of completed acts to a focus on sin in 
the form of “movements, senses, pleasures, thoughts, and desires of the penitent‟s body 
itself” (A: 173/186). Second, Foucault argues that the body is forced to speak – forced to 
confess its desires and thoughts – in the mode of a confession, or an obligation to put into 
speech everything that one sexually desires. Rather than our current and prevalent notion 
that sexuality is repressed within modern disciplinary society, sexuality is instead 
something that has been constantly forced to “speak” – to confess it‟s every desires and 
thoughts (A: 157/169, HS1: 48/35). This obligation to speak, a power relation first 
between priest and penitent and then psychiatrist and patient, is what gives rise to a 
proliferation of discourses surrounding the sexual desires, and the connection of sexual 
desire first with instinct and then with abnormality. Let us engage in a brief examination 
of Foucault‟s analyses of the confession in order to understand its double functionality. 
Our primary focus will be the knowledge produced, but, as always, knowledge is 
produced through relations of power. 
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Foucault argues that a peculiar and specific transformation occurred in the 18
th
 
century within the Christian act of confession. Of course, confession is the ritual whereby 
a penitent confesses her sins to a priest, who then absolves the penitent of her sins 
through his own relation to God. We can thereby see that the confession is a specific set 
of power relations, primarily between the penitent and the priest, and the priest and God. 
We have already seen Foucault argue that the production of a permanent knowledge is 
the first effect of relations of power, so what permanent knowledge is constituted within 
the act of the confession? The purpose of confession is to tell the priest all of the sins that 
one has committed throughout the year, such that the priest can cleanse her of these sins 
in the name of God.
70
 Thus, what is produced in confession is the knowledge of the 
penitent on the part of the priest, or more specifically on the part of God, in the sense that 
one has to confess, and thus put their sexual acts into speech in order to be cleansed. 
Also, permanent bodies of knowledge are produced through the production of manuals 
for priests, which contained instructions on how to carry out the act of confession. These 
manuals contained the questions that one must ask in order to faithfully carry out the 
spiritual cleansing of his penitents.  
The transformation that Foucault isolates, famously, is the shift within the act of 
confession between the confession of already temporally completed sexual acts (e.g. 
adultery or masturbation) to the confession of all sexual desires as such, especially as 
related to the body (HS1: 28/19). In the manuals of confession in the 18
th
 century, 
Foucault finds a subtle change in the questions pertaining to sex that priests are suggested 
to ask their penitents. Previously, the questions within manuals of confession focused 
                                               
70 In his lecture course Abnormal, Foucault gives a detailed description of the mechanisms through which 
the act of confession came to be mandatory (A: 155/167-180/194). 
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solely on completed temporal acts, and differed in degree based on how much detail of 
the actual act is required for a confession to be complete (HS1: 27/19). Thus, there was, 
on the one hand, manuals that asked questions in “veiled” ways (HS1: 27/18), and, on the 
other hand, manuals that required, for a complete confession, the:  
[…] description of the respective positions of the partners, the postures 
assumed, gestures, places touched, caresses, the precise moment of 
pleasure – an entire painstaking review of the sexual act in its very 
unfolding. (HS: 27/19) 
 
This focus on the act, however, begins to change in the 18
th
 century, Foucault argues, 
when an increasing importance is placed on “all the insinuations of the flesh: [the] 
thoughts, desires, voluptuous imaginings, delectations, combined movements of the body 
and the soul” (HS1: 28/19). Desire came to be seen as the origin and cause of sinful acts, 
so a complete confession came to require that one confess all of her sexual desires. Of 
course, the body was seen as a kind of locus of sexual feeling, so the body was constantly 
implicated within the confession of all of one‟s sexual desires and feelings. Insofar as the 
body was the locus of sexual desire, and the penitent was required to express all of her 
sexual desires, then the body was “put into discourse” through the act of speaking on the 
part of the penitent. 
As such, a discourse was constituted that “had to trace the meeting line of the 
body and the soul [la ligne de jonction du corps et de l’âme], following all its 
meanderings” (HS1: 28/20), and that proceeded through the act of the penitent putting her 
desires into speech, since it is only when spoken that the priest can cleanse the penitent‟s 
sin. This new discourse was the “new pastoral,” in which  
[…] sex must not be named imprudently, but its aspects, its correlations, 
and its effects must be pursued down to their slenderest ramifications: a 
shadow in a daydream, an image too slowly dispelled, a badly exorcised 
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complicity between the body‟s mechanics and the mind‟s complacency: 
everything had to be told. (HS1: 28/19) 
 
Thus, the power relations between the penitent and the priest led to the constitution of a 
permanent knowledge of sexual desires within Christianity, in the form of the act of the 
confession. Specifically, these relations bring about the obligation for the penitent to put 
all of her sexual desires into speech, such that the priest can cleanse her of her sins. As 
such, every time there is a new confession, more knowledge is added to the preexisting 
discourse. 
 Ultimately, we can see how it is for Foucault that the transformation of the 
confessional in the 18
th
 century can be understood as 
[…] a multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of exercise 
of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so 
more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to 
hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation 
and endlessly accumulated detail. (HS1: 26/18). 
 
Here we have an institution (the Christian church) which is comprised of a series of 
power relations (between the penitent and the priest, and the priest and God), that creates 
an incitement to speak – confess your sins in the presence of the priest or risk spending 
eternity in the depths of Hell. We also have a determination to hear sins spoken about on 
the part of both the priest, who cleanses his penitents of sin through his position in 
relation to God, and the penitent, who wants to spend eternity in Heaven. 
 As such, we are now in the position to see the double functionality of the 
confession in the 18
th
 century. First, it inserted sex into discourse through the requirement 
of the penitent to confess all of her sexual desires. Second, the confessional provided a 
model for the proliferation of discourse precisely in the form of the obligation of 
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confession. We will find this model taken up again within the psychiatric constitution of 
homosexual desire as an abnormal form of behavior. 
 
b) Psychiatry and the Constitution of Sexual Abnormalities 
  
 The confessional, for Foucault, only set the stage for the categorization of 
abnormal forms of conduct based on various sexual desires. The concretion of sexual 
abnormality, and thus the constitution of homosexual desire as an abnormal form of 
conduct, occur primarily through the way in which psychiatry, in the 19
th
 century, 
brought together “the problematic of the monster and instinct and the problematic of the 
masturbator and infantile sexuality” (A: 259/274). It is through the bringing together, or 
“the formation of a meshing [engrenage] together” as Foucault describes it in these 
passages, of the psychiatric discourse with both judicial and familial discourses that 
homosexual desire comes to be constituted as a pathology, and thus as an abnormal form 
of conduct, within the 19
th
 century (A: 259/274). 
 The first half of the formation of this “meshing together” was between “the 
psychiatric and the judicial,” which centered on the 19th century problem of the 
motiveless criminal (A: 259/274). In his Abnormal lecture course, Foucault argues that 
psychiatry was brought into the judicial setting, which is an institution with its own set of 
specific and highly regulated power relations and surrounding discourses, for the 
purposes of assessing the madness or rationality of a defendant (A: 29/31).
71
 While this 
initially was for the purposes of dismissing charges if someone was mad, a “kinship” [le 
cousinage] between madness and criminality began to form through the principle of 
extenuating circumstances (A: 30/32), which is itself the legal principle that one may be 
                                               
71 We will examine this process in much more detail in the next section. 
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indicted in absence of complete evidence (A: 9/9). Ultimately, the absence of complete 
evidence takes the form of expert psychiatric opinion, through which a connection is 
forged between the defendant‟s behavior and his crime, and thus between psychiatric and 
judicial discourses (A: 15/15-24/26).
72
  
This bringing together of psychiatric discourse with the judicial institution gave 
rise to three primary effects. First, Foucault argues, “there is the definition of a field  [un 
champ] common to criminality and madness” which consists of objects that belong to 
both discourses (A: 259/274). That is, by bringing together madness and criminality, 
psychiatry is required to generate a table of behaviors and their connections with crime, 
in terms of leading, causing, or motivating. As it turns out, this field is “confused, 
complex, and reversible,” in that “it seemed there might well be something like mad 
behavior behind every crime and, conversely, that there might well be the risk of crime in 
all madness” (A: 259/274). Second, this meshing together of madness and crime 
produced the need for a “medico-judicial authority” that is represented by the psychiatrist 
(A: 259/274), i.e. a “doctor-judge” (A: 21/22). If criminal trials require the differentiation 
between madness and rationality, then there must be someone who can sufficiently judge 
the difference, and then report this difference to the actual judge of the proceedings. Of 
course, this position is that of the psychiatrist, whose expert legal opinion is formed 
through a multiplicity of discourses (psychiatric, medical, biological, etc.). Third, 
Foucault writes, in the  
[…] privileged concept of this field of objects covered by psychiatric 
power, there appeared the notion of instinct understood as an irresistible 
                                               
72 This will be examined further in §29a, in which I examine Foucault‟s analysis of the process through 
which offense is transferred from the realm of the legal to the realm of being through expert psychiatric 
opinion. 
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drive, as behavior that is either normally integrated or abnormally 
displaced on the axis of the voluntary and the involuntary. (A: 259/274) 
  
That is, the connection between behavior and crime is conceptualized, within the 
psychiatric discourse of the 19
th
 century, as based on instinct. Individuals have different 
types of instinct, which are then placed on the table of behaviors and their associated 
crimes as the causal link between the two. It is in these three effects that we see the way 
in which the meshing of psychiatric and judicial discourse produces abnormality. 
 The second “meshing together,” Foucault argues, is between the discourses of 
“psychiatry and the family” (A: 259/274). While the first meshing together was 
motivated through the problem of madness and crime, this second meshing is motivated 
“by the everyday character of the adolescent masturbator rendered fantastically 
monstrous, or, at least, dangerous” (A: 259/275). The problem of masturbation 
constituted, in the 19
th
 century, a problem for the family in the sense that the sexual 
instincts of children must be carefully shaped and molded, and masturbation constituted 
an abnormal form of sexual behavior, in that procreation is not possible in 
masturbation.
73
 Thus, around masturbation, Foucault writes,  
[…] devices of surveillance were installed; traps were laid for compelling 
admissions; inexhaustible and corrective discourses were imposed; parents 
and teachers were alerted, and left with the suspicion that all children were 
guilty, and with the fear of being themselves at fault if their suspicious 
were not sufficiently strong; they were kept in readiness in the face of this 
recurrent danger. (HS1: 58/42)
74
 
 
In this passage we find Foucault bringing together the axes of power and knowledge in 
this description of the constant surveillance of child sexuality. Specifically, discourses, 
                                               
73 Foucault gives an extensive analysis of the “problem” of masturbation in the 18th and 19th centuries in his 
Abnormal course lectures (A: 217/231-243/258). 
74 In a fascinating passage from this same course, i.e. Abnormal, Foucault describes this surveillance as “the 
urgent folding [rabattement] of the parents‟ bodies over their children‟s bodies” (A: 233/248, my 
emphasis). 
 131 
 
 
bodies of knowledge, are brought to bear on childhood sexuality for the purpose of 
normalizing their behavior. Furthermore, these discourses are constituted through the 
accumulation of interpretations of empirical observation. 
 This second meshing produces three effects that are parallel to those we saw in 
the first meshing described above. First, an “affinity” between sexuality and illness 
appears through the connection between masturbation and various types of bodily 
illnesses (A: 259/275). Foucault argues that masturbation is both a “constant” and a 
“random” element within the discourses that arise from the identification of sexuality 
with illness. Masturbation is a constant element insofar as “it is found everywhere,” i.e. 
as the cause of a large-scale multiplicity of different illnesses. However, it is also 
“random” in the sense that “masturbation may provoke any illness whatsoever” (A: 
259/275). Second, this meshing “also reveals the need for recourse to a medical authority 
for intervention and rationalization within the family space” (A: 259/275). Similar to the 
way in which the way in the meshing together of psychiatric and judicial discourses 
produces the “doctor-judge,” this second meshing produces the need for someone who 
can intervene within the family, who can distinguish mental illness from rationality. This, 
of course, is the psychiatrist. The third effect produced by this meshing is the connection 
between sexuality and instinct. Let us look at this third effect more closely, as it is here 
that we will find the constitution of homosexual desire as pathology, and thus find the 
processes of knowledge wherein the young man‟s homosexual desire in our example is 
constituted as mentally ill (as well as the processes of power). 
 In and through this meshing of psychiatric discourse with, on the one hand, 
judicial power relations and discourses, and on the other hand, familial power relations 
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and discourses, psychiatry underwent a dramatic extension of its scope, since both 
criminality and sexuality began to fall within its field of jurisdiction (through expert legal 
opinion and familial psychiatric intervention). This sudden expansion, Foucault argues, 
led to the new task within the 19
th
 century of organizing “a unified field [un champ 
unitaire] of instinct and sexuality” (A: 261/276). Specifically, psychiatry was faced with 
the task of forming a unified field of objects of knowledge such that it could bring the 
discourses of criminality and sexuality under its purview. Indeed, Foucault writes, 
[Psychiatry] has to show that the sexual instinct is an element in the 
formation of every mental illness and, even more generally, in the 
formation of every behavioral disorder, from major offenses that violate 
the most important laws to tiny irregularities that disturb the little family 
cell. In short, [psychiatry] must constitute [constituer] not only a 
discourse, but also methods of analysis, concepts, and theories such that 
with psychiatry, and without going outside it, it is possible to pass from 
infantile autoeroticism to murder, from discreet and caressing incest to the 
voracity of monstrous cannibals. (A: 261/276) 
  
That is, in order to achieve its task of expansion through unification, psychiatry had to 
“constitute a discourse” within which it could speak of both criminality and sexuality. 
This constitution of discourse is accomplished through the accumulation and 
interpretation of empirical observations produced under various circumstances, which are 
themselves governed by particular methods determined through the interpretation of 
empirical behavior, etc. 
 Sexuality and instinct were brought together, Foucault argues, through the 
appearance within psychiatric literature of a naturalization of sexuality (A: 262/278). 
Specifically, Foucault isolates within Heinrich Kaan‟s Psychopathia Sexualis75 from 
1844 a general theme which consists of the idea that “human sexuality, through its 
                                               
75 The original Latin of the relevant passages can be found on A: 288. 
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mechanisms and general forms, is inscribed within the natural history of sexuality that 
can be followed back to plants” and is itself a “dynamic manifestation of the functioning 
of the sexual organs” (A: 262/278). This natural sexuality is theorized by Kaan, 
according to Foucault, as a natural instinct, and thus desire, for the procreative 
heterosexual act of intercourse (A: 263/278). 
 However, this instinct is itself “fragile” (A: 264/279) because its end, copulation, 
is “only its chronologically final end” (A: 264/279). As such, sexual instinct is prone to 
diversion from this chronologically final end through the imagination, in which 
“additional, derivative, or substitute means of satisfaction” are formulated and desired. 
Since copulation is defined through heterosexual desire, then anything that falls outside 
of this norm becomes “abnormal.” Among these abnormal forms of desire, in which the 
natural desire for copulation is diverted through the functioning of the imagination, 
Foucault cites Kaan as listing masturbation, pederasty, homosexual desire, necrophilia, 
and bestiality. 
 It is the conceptualization of sexual desire as tied to a “natural instinct” for 
copulation that brings together psychiatry with the discourses of criminality and the 
family. According to Foucault, Kaan‟s work ushers in a fundamental transformation in 
which the “the sexual instinct [is placed at] the origin of more than just somatic 
disorders” through the delineation of behaviors that supposedly stem from the frailty of 
sexual desire, i.e. the interaction between sexual instinct and the imagination (A: 
265/281). As such, Foucault argues, “A series of non-delirious behavior disorders enter 
the psychiatric field” (A: 266/281). If psychiatry had previously held dominion over 
madness alone, now it had brought madness into contact with both criminality and the 
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family through the constitution of a unified field of discourses based on the location of 
sexual desire at the level of natural instinct. Ultimately, an “etiology of mental illness”76 
is formulated on the “basis of the history of the sexual instinct and the imagination linked 
to it” (A: 267/282). As such, for Foucault, “This is the first time that homosexuality 
appears as a syndrome within the psychiatric field” (A: 293/310), insofar as homosexual 
desire is listed as one of the abnormal behaviors of sexual desire conceptualized on the 
basis of a heterosexual natural instinct.   
We can now return to our initial example of the constitution of the young man by 
his community as a pathological object. When the young man reports his sexual attraction 
to other men, his experiences comes into conflict with the experience, in the form of the 
“perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors,” of others who have attached the cultural predicate 
and ensuing form, “abnormal,” to homosexual desire. Thus, when he reports his desire 
for other men, the community believes his experiences conflict with their own, and 
immediately constitutes him as a pathological object. The notion that sexuality can fall 
under pathology is itself culturally constituted, and accrues through the power relations 
and discourses that surrounded, first, the Christian confessional, and then the connection 
forged in psychiatry between sexual desire and instinct. This cultural predicate is 
apperceived within the experience of the community, and is expressed through the 
conflict of their experience with the young man‟s (per the analyses of the third chapter). 
Furthermore, we can also see here a “contingent limit of thought,” if we recall the 
work done in the first chapter. The homophobic community, with which the young man‟s 
experience conflicts, can only think of desire through variations of heterosexual, i.e. 
                                               
76 Etiology is the study of origination. Thus an etiology of mental illness would be a study of the various 
causes of the various types of mental illness within individuals. 
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procreative, copulation. This limit to their thought is historically constituted through the 
accrual of cultural predicates surrounding psychiatry, in the form of discourse and power 
relations. And, because this limit is historical, it is therefore contingent. Ultimately, 
Foucault‟s analyses of sexuality, now seen as a form of conduct that is the product of 
knowledge and power, show us that sexuality, as a form, is a limit to thought. This limit 
has been apperceived and then sedimented within the consciousness of the individuals of 
that community, affecting how they perceive sexuality. 
Now, let us finally look at the third axis of critical ontology, i.e. ethics, or the 
imposition of forms of conduct upon the individual.  
 
§29. Third Axis: Ethics (Forms of Conduct/Ways of Being) 
 
 The analyses of power and knowledge in the previous two sections have relied 
heavily on a term which we will now investigate more closely, viz. “forms of conduct.” 
While the third axis of Foucault‟s critical ontology is commonly interpreted in terms of 
his late analyses of ethics, i.e. parrhēsia and the Ancient Greek theme of the care of the 
self, it can also be understood as a theme that was already present in both his early and 
middle period analyses. That is, while Foucault‟s late period analyses of ethics centered 
on the modulation of a form of conduct within oneself, the implication of forms of 
conduct as both product and presupposition of power and knowledge was present even in 
his early analyses of madness. Thus, Deleuze writes, “Perhaps this third axis was present 
from the beginning in Foucault (just as power was present from the beginning in 
knowledge)” (F: 103/96). Indeed, in the first hour of the Government of Self and Others 
lecture course (1982-83), in describing the application of the study of the history of 
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madness to the three axes of critical ontology, Foucault describes the third axis in the 
following way: 
Finally, third, this perspective involved studying madness insofar as this 
experience of madness defined the constitution of a certain mode of being 
of the normal subject, as opposed and in relation to the mad subject. 
(GSO: 3) 
 
Here we can see the explicit connection between the third axis of critical ontology, i.e. 
the constitution of oneself as a moral agent, and the forms of conduct that are produced 
and presupposed by disciplinary power. That is, if one wants to be normal, then one must 
comport oneself in set of specific ways, and thus one must take on a specific form of 
conduct or way of being [manière d’être].77 
 Understood in this way, we have been examining forms of conduct throughout 
this entire chapter, insofar as disciplinary society aims at imposing various forms of 
conduct which serve to self-discipline those who take them up. In the preceding sections 
of this chapter, we followed the example of a young man whose homosexual desire has 
come into conflict with the experience of his community. Specifically, we examined the 
ways in which the desire for the bodies that are the same sex as one‟s own has come to be 
historically and culturally constituted as a pathological form of conduct through the 
processes of knowledge and power. Since we saw how it is that one can take up a form of 
conduct as a cultural apperception in the previous chapter, what remains for us to 
examine is the ways in which forms of conduct become disseminated within a given 
community. Of course, for Foucault, there are a variety of such mechanisms for the 
                                               
77 The connection between “forms of conduct” [Foucault uses the terms se conduire and comportement, 
both of which are translated as “conduct” in one way or another by the translator of the Abnormal lecture 
course] and “ways of being” [manière d’être] is readily apparent within Foucault‟s Abnormal lecture 
course, in which the terms are used almost interchangeably. Specifically, see (A: 15/15-24/26, 115/124) 
and (CT: 14, 65, 160, 162, 178, 184, 220, 221, 265, 285, 329, 338).  
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dissemination of forms of conduct within society, but for our purposes it is enough to 
focus on two: (1) the way in which offense is transferred from law to being through 
expert legal opinion, and (2) the way in which the sovereign-power of the family unit acts 
as both the “hinge” [la charnière] (PP: 82/81) and the “zero-point” [le point zéro] (PP: 
83/81) for the various disciplinary apparatuses within society. It is through at least these 
two mechanisms that a historically and culturally constituted meaning, e.g. homosexual 
desire as pathology, is disseminated throughout a society. Let us now examine each in 
turn. 
 
a) From Law to Being: Expert Psychiatric Opinion 
 
 One of the primary mechanisms through which forms of conduct are disseminated 
within a society is through the use of expert psychiatric opinion in judicial settings, in 
which forms of conduct are inextricably linked to crime and delinquency. For Foucault, 
“Expert psychiatric opinion makes it possible to transfer the point of application of 
punishment from the offense defined by the law to criminality evaluated from a 
psychologico-moral point of view” (A: 17/18). This transference of offense from law to 
being works towards constituting a form of conduct, through the way in which “normal” 
forms of conduct are imposed upon a population through the punishment of “abnormal” 
forms of conduct, which can only be done when an “abnormal” form of conduct is itself 
made punishable, rather than a specific act. That is, what comes under punishment is not 
an act, but an “irregularity” (A: 16/16). The punishable irregularity is then disseminated 
throughout society in the form of an indictment or statement: Here is an abnormal and 
irregular form of conduct and those that take up this form of conduct will be punished. 
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Judicial discourse, Foucault argues, possesses “the power to determine, directly or 
indirectly, a decision of justice that ultimately concerns a person‟s freedom or detention, 
[…] life and death” (A: 7/6). Justice in the courtroom, with this power to determine life 
or death, passes judgment on those who have committed offenses, i.e. broken laws. 
However, disciplinary power, unlike sovereign power, always aims for complete control 
of the individual‟s body and time, such that its usability can be maximized. If we recall, 
sovereign power only sought control over a product and the individual‟s time spent in 
producing it, while disciplinary power seeks to have control over the individual even in 
those times when she is not working. This complete control, as we have seen, is in the 
name of a future state in which the disciplinary system functions with minimal 
supervision through the internalization of discipline within individuals. Hand-in-hand 
with this future state is a focus, within disciplinary systems, on the control of potential 
behaviors, in the form of the imposition of forms of conduct. As such, a shift was 
required, in which judges could pass judgment not on the breaking of actual concrete 
laws, but on the basis of forms of conduct, which then allowed for the normalization of 
subjects through the potential penalties that could be incurred through various ways of 
being constituted as abnormal. That is, there is a shift in offense from law to being. 
 Thus, this shift happens through expert psychiatric opinion in legal proceedings,  
[…] where the court and the expert encounter each other, where judicial 
institutions and medical knowledge, or scientific knowledge in general, 
intersect, [and] statements are formulated having the status of true 
discourses with considerable judicial effects. (A: 11/11) 
 
Foucault argues that within modern legal discourse we find the principle of profound 
conviction, which requires that a judge and jury take into consideration all available 
evidence in their deliberations. However, some types of evidence seem to count for more 
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than other pieces of evidence, and this is not due to the “rational structure” [structure 
rationnelle] of the evidence, but is instead “due to the status of the subject who presents 
the evidence [du sujet qui les énonce]” (A: 11/10). For example, the eye witness 
testimony of police officers is privileged over the eye witness testimony of a mere 
bystander (A: 11/10). As such, due to their status, the expert opinions given by 
psychiatrists within the legal setting are taken up as “privileged judicial statements that 
include statutory presumptions of truth, presumptions that are inherent in them according 
to who it is that states them” (A: 11/11). It is in this presumed truth that we find legal 
offenses transferred from the law to being and, consequently, the constitution of the 
criminal delinquent, i.e. that individual whose forms of conduct and ways of being must 
be avoided or punished. 
 The constitution of the delinquent within the courtroom does not consist in the 
painting of a representation, which the individual on trial is then supposed to match. That 
is, expert psychiatric opinion does not install a “scene” within the courtroom that is 
supposed to represent the committed crime (A: 15/15). Rather, expert psychiatric opinion 
involves “the introduction of successive doubles,” wherein a “coercive synthesis” [la 
synthèse coercitive] allows for the transfer of offense from law to being in the form of 
conduct (A: 15/15). The first doubling that allows for the transference of offense from 
law to being occurs through the doubling of the legal definition of the offense with a 
multitude of forms of conduct that are supposed to give the “starting point” of the offense 
(A: 15/15). Foucault writes, 
First, expert psychiatric opinion allows the offense, as defined by law, to 
be doubled with a whole series of other things that are not the offense 
itself but a series of forms of conduct, of ways of being that are, of course, 
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presented in the discourse of the psychiatric expert as the cause, origin, 
motivation, and starting point of the offense. (A: 15/15) 
 
Expert psychiatric opinion in the courtroom is supposed to describe the psychological 
background of the individual in question, such that the judge or jury can, in the absence 
of hard evidence, decide if the person was capable of committing such a crime. This 
occurs through the doubling of the actual offense with a series of terms, such as 
“psychological immaturity,” “display of perverted pride, “serious emotional disturbance,” 
or “a profound affective imbalance” (A: 15/15). The function of this doubling of the 
offense with a form of conduct “is to repeat the offense tautologically in order to register 
it and constitute [constituer] it as an individual trait” through the establishment of a 
causal relationship (A: 16/16). The offense is repeated as a general motivation found 
within a certain form of conduct, and thus one can “pass from action to conduct” (A: 
16/16). Foucault writes, 
Expert psychiatric opinion allows one to pass from action to conduct, from 
an offense to a way of being, and to make this way of being appear as 
nothing other than the offense itself, but in general form, as it were, in the 
individual‟s conduct. (A: 16/16) 
  
For instance, an act of stealing might be paired with the defendant‟s “display of perverted 
pride,” which is then used as the motivation for the crime. That is, the motivation for the 
crime is spread throughout the defendant‟s entire being, in that it is his form of conduct 
that is to blame for the offense. This doubling has a further function as well, which “is to 
shift the level of reality of the offense, since these forms of conduct do not break the law” 
(A: 16/16). This shift in reality occurs through the constitution of a “normal” background, 
against which the conduct of the defendant is set (A: 16/16). This normal background 
consists of four main facets: (1) the “optimum level of development,” against which the 
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defendant is described as having “psychological immaturity,” (2) a “criterion of reality,” 
(3) moral qualities, and (4) ethical rules (A: 16/16). Thus, the level of reality of the 
offense is shifted to a form of conduct through the constitution of the individual as 
abnormal in relation to a set of normal traits.  
Ultimately, Foucault argues, this initial doubling constitutes “the substance, the 
very material to be punished” (A: 15/15). Through the doubling of the offense with a 
form of conduct and the shift of reality from the offense to being, a criminal is constituted 
within the courtroom, who then himself becomes the target of the proceedings, rather 
than his crime. Foucault writes that “psychiatry does not really set out an explanation of 
the crime but rather the thing itself to be punished that the judicial system must bite on 
and get hold of” (A: 16/16). This constituted substance for punishment arises between the 
idea that the defendant “could have had some kind of responsibility” and the final verdict 
of guilt.  Foucault writes, 
A certain character has appeared who has been offered up, so to speak, to 
the judicial system: a man who is incapable of integrating himself in the 
world, who loves disorder, commits extravagant or extraordinary acts, 
hates morality, who denies its laws and is capable of resorting to crime. So 
that, when all is said and done, the person who will be convicted is not the 
actual accomplice in the murder in question, but this character who cannot 
integrate himself, loves disorder, and commits acts that go as far as crime. 
(A: 17/17). 
  
Thus, this first doubling, which consists of both the doubling of the offense with a form 
of conduct and the shifting of reality from law to being, provides the initial constitution 
of the criminal within courtroom – someone whose very being is on trial, rather than the 
act that got them there. Again, Foucault writes,  
What the judge will judge and punish, the point on which he will bring to 
bear the punishment, is precisely these irregular forms of conduct that 
were put forward as the crime‟s cause and point of origin, and the site at 
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which it took shape, and which were only its psychological and moral 
double. (A: 17/17) 
 
However, the transfer of offense from law to being is not yet complete. While the 
initial doubling paired the offense with a form of conduct that stands as its causal origin, 
the defendant must still be doubled with the form of delinquency. This occurs, Foucault 
argues, through expert psychiatric opinion, in which “the aim is to show how the 
individual already resembles his crime before he has committed it” (A: 19/19). This is 
done through coupling the defendant with a “series” of “misdeeds that do not break the 
law” (A: 19/19). That is, expert psychiatric opinion ties the crime for which the defendant 
is on trial with a series of misdeeds that are not themselves illegal. In effect, this creates a 
doubling between the defendant and the form of delinquency, in which crime is all but 
inevitable. Ultimately, this is tied, Foucault argues, to desire (A: 19/20). This doubling 
associates the defendant with a desire that is supposed to lie at the heart of delinquency, 
which, again, makes his future crime inevitable.
78
  
Though Foucault does not discuss this, the transfer of offense from law to being 
has a ripple effect throughout society. The tying of illegality to ways of being is a process 
of normalization, in that the delinquent form of conduct becomes “abnormal” and tied to 
the committing of crimes. If others in a given community want to avoid spending time in 
jail, then they need to avoid that form of conduct and to behave only in the ways that 
their society believes is normal. Furthermore, this ripple effect can also be seen in “early 
release” from prison for “good behavior.” 
                                               
78 A specific contemporary example of this can be found in the murder trial of teenager Trayvon Martin, 
who was killed by George Zimmerman, allegedly in “self-defense.” One of Zimmerman‟s attorney‟s 
primary tactics has been to try and show that Martin was familiar with guns, had engaged in fights, and 
smoked marijuana, thus arguing that Martin was a delinquent and had the potential to hurt Zimmerman, 
though he, in fact, did not. In any case, here we can see the attorney‟s pinning Zimmerman‟s innocence to 
the supposed abnormality of Martin‟s way of being. 
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b) The Zero-Point of Discipline: The Family 
  
Besides expert psychiatric opinion, one of the other primary mechanisms for the 
dissemination of forms of conduct occurs within the family unit, which, Foucault argues, 
is “the hinge, the interlocking point [le point d’enclenchement], [that] is absolutely 
indispensable to the very functioning of all the disciplinary systems” (PP: 82/81). The 
family unit has a double functionality which serves as “a kind of pinning of individuals” 
[d'épinglage des individus] to discipline and to provide the “zero-point” for the junction 
between disciplinary systems (PP: 83/81). In other words, if a disciplinary society wants 
to control potential behavior, then it is best served by normalizing children, since adults 
are much harder to normalize. Thus, there is an intensification of the family unit with 
regards to its role in fixing
79
 children to disciplinary apparatuses (PP: 83/81). 
 However, in order to understand how the family unit is able to play this role in the 
dissemination of forms of conduct, we ought first to examine how it is that the family is 
able to do this. For Foucault, the family unit is not itself to be understood as exercising 
disciplinary power, but rather sovereign power. Foucault writes, “[…] the family is a sort 
of cell within which the power exercised is not, as one usually says, disciplinary, but 
rather of the same type as the power of sovereignty” (PP: 81/79). While this may seem 
paradoxical, Foucault‟s point is actually quite important. That is, it is the sovereign top-
down power from parent to child that “pins” the child to discourse. This is because, 
Foucault argues, the father is “the most intense pole of individualization” (PP: 81/80). 
The father, “the bearer of the name,” issues commands from his position as sovereign, 
which the rest of the family are obligated to take up. The father is able to do this, and 
                                               
79 Foucault uses the word fixer (PP: 83/81). 
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have his orders followed, because the dependencies formed through marriage and birth 
“gives the family its solidity” (PP: 82/80). Furthermore, Foucault argues that the family 
unit is an “entanglement [enchevêtrement] of what could be called heterotopic 
relationships: an entanglement of local, contractual bonds, bonds of property, and of 
personal and collective commitments” (PP: 82/80). If we recall, one of the principle 
functions of disciplinary systems is isotopy, i.e. the repetition of disciplinary elements 
within different disciplinary apparatuses. The family, however, is the locus point between 
a multiplicity of different relationships, which are not themselves isotopic. It is the 
sovereign nature of the family unit that will allow for the disciplining of children. We 
will examine this again briefly in a moment. 
 The first function of the family unit is to “permanently fix [fixer] individuals to 
their disciplinary apparatuses, which will inject [injecter] them, so to speak, into the 
disciplinary apparatuses” (PP: 82/81). The sovereign power of the parents creates the set 
of obligations to which the child must adhere. Foucault writes, 
It is because there is the family, it is because you have this system of 
sovereignty operating in society in the form of the family, that the 
obligation to attend school works and children, individuals, these somatic 
singularities, are fixed and finally individualized within the school system. 
(PP: 82/81) 
  
These obligations are, of course, to go to school and to get a job when the child is at the 
right age. This obligation “fixes” the child to a disciplinary apparatus, specifically school, 
which then injects them into the disciplinary system as such (PP: 82/81). For instance, 
children are seated in aisles and rows for their optimal supervision by the teacher, who, 
through observation and grading, attempts to both train the child and to intervene at the 
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“first hint” of abnormality. It is the parents‟ obligation to normalize their children through 
fixing them to disciplinary apparatuses in the form of familial obligation. 
 The second function of the family unit is to provide a “zero-point” for the meeting 
of disciplinary apparatuses. Foucault writes that the family is “the switch point 
[l’échangeur], the junction [le point de junction] ensuring passage from one disciplinary 
system to another, from one apparatus to another” (PP: 83/81). The family is not the 
origin of disciplinary systems, but rather the point where all of the disciplinary systems 
meet. This can be seen, Foucault argues, through the way in which children are sent 
directly to their family if they cannot be normalized within a specific disciplinary 
apparatus. For example, a child at boarding school who refuses to be disciplined will be 
sent back to her parents, who will then insert the child into a different disciplinary 
apparatus in the hopes of eventual normalization. Thus there is a circulation of the child 
between disciplinary apparatuses. Foucault writes, 
When a number of disciplinary systems successively reject him as 
inassimilable, incapable of being disciplined, or uneducable, [the child] is 
sent back to the family, and the family‟s role at this point is to reject him 
in turn as incapable of being fixed to any disciplinary system, and to get 
rid of him either by consigning him to pathology, or by abandoning him to 
delinquency. (PP: 83/82) 
 
That is, when the child is rejected by every disciplinary apparatus as abnormal, the family 
is required either to cut ties with him (in the case of delinquency) or send him to a mental 
institution or rehabilitation clinic of some kind or another. 
 In any case, the importance of the family in the dissemination of forms of conduct 
should be clear. It is the family that forces the child into disciplinary apparatuses, and 
who must reject the child if the child cannot be normalized. Thus, the primary burden of 
normalization falls on the parents, with the child as the target of various discourses of 
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knowledge, relations of power, and of the imposition of forms of conduct that will lead to 
further discipline (or success as a disciplined, docile, and normalized subject). 
  
 We have now examined two of the primary mechanisms for the dissemination of 
forms of conduct within a disciplinary society. First, there is the transfer of offense from 
law to being through the use of expert psychiatric opinion in the courtroom. As we have 
seen, expert psychiatric opinion is introduced into the courtroom in order to provide 
“evidence” for a defendant‟s guilt or innocence in a crime through the connection 
between crime and types of behavior that prefigure the crime itself, and are thus given as 
motivations for the crime. However, what actually happens through this use of 
“evidence” is the constitution of a “substance” to be punished. Second, the family unit  
acts as both the “hinge” and “zero-point” for disciplinary apparatuses through the 
sovereign power exercised by the parents upon their children. That is, the family plays 
the role of fixing children to disciplinary apparatuses, e.g. school or jobs, and, when these 
apparatuses fail, of either passing the child off to other disciplinary apparatuses for the 
purpose of further normalization or the outright rejection of the child as such. 
 Let us return to our example of the young man whose homosexual desire comes 
into conflict with the historically and culturally constituted experience of a community 
that holds homosexual desire to be pathological. This culturally and historically 
constituted form of conduct is disseminated throughout society through the threat of 
punishment and through the family‟s role in fixing children to disciplinary apparatuses. 
Foucault shows the way in which homosexual desire is intertwined with criminality by 
beginning his Abnormal lecture course with a reading of two expert psychiatric opinions 
from then recent court cases in France, in which homosexuality is constantly brought up 
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within the psychiatrists‟ descriptions of the defendants, and either implicitly or explicitly 
connected to the crimes themselves. For instance, in the 1973 trial in France of three 
individuals accused of blackmail and robbery (who Foucault labels as X, Y, and Z), the 
homosexuality of all three individuals is repeatedly raised within the context of the crime. 
As to X, the report states that, 
Morally, he has been homosexual since he was twelve or thirteen years 
old, and to be with his vice could only have been a compensation for the 
teasing he suffered, when, as a child raised by the social services, he lived 
in the Manche. Perhaps his effeminate appearance aggravated this 
tendency toward homosexuality, but it was the lure of money that led him 
to blackmail. X is completely immoral, cynical, and even a chatterbox. 
Three thousand years ago he would certainly have been an inhabitant of 
Sodom, and the heavenly flames would have justly punished him for his 
vice. (A: 6/5)
80
 
 
This same report describes “the most characteristic feature” of Y as 
[…] an idleness whose importance can hardly be described. It is evidently 
less tiring to change records and find clients in a nightclub than it is to 
really work. Furthermore, he himself recognizes that he became 
homosexual from material necessity, from the attraction of money, and 
that having acquired a taste for money he persists in it. (A: 6/5) 
 
In both cases, the defendants‟ homosexuality was brought into the context of the opinion. 
In the case of X, his homosexuality is directly connected to vice. In the second, the case 
of Y, homosexuality is brought up only as a kind of addition to the opinion. However, 
once again, homosexuality is raised only to connect it with vice, i.e. excessive idleness 
and attraction to money. Here, again, we find the limit in Foucault – those individuals 
whose desires are directly connected to vice through expert psychiatric opinion, and those 
individuals who then take up “normal” forms of conduct for fear of punishment. The 
family, through its role in fixing children to disciplinary apparatuses, must constantly 
                                               
80 The original opinion is found in “Expertise psychiatrique et justice,” Actes: Les cahiers d’action 
juridique 5/6, December 19784-January 1975, pg. 38-39. 
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observe their children for abnormal forms of conduct which will hurt the child‟s insertion 
into whichever disciplinary apparatuses are in question. In both cases, one of the primary 
functions of these mechanisms is to disseminate forms of conduct within a given society. 
 
§30. Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, using the example of the young man‟s desire, we have analyzed 
the historical and cultural constitution of homosexual desire as a pathological way of 
being, or, in other words, as an abnormal form of conduct. Specifically, we analyzed 
Foucault‟s arguments with regard to disciplinary power, the insertion of sex into 
abnormality through discourse, and the dissemination of forms of conduct through the 
mechanisms of expert psychiatric opinion and the family. In each case, the analyses were 
brought back to the example of a young man whose experience of a homosexual desire 
comes into conflict with the experience of a community that has culturally constituted 
this desire as pathological.  
 It is in this example that we can find the limit in Foucault. Specifically, the limit 
in Foucault appears the moment when we cross from the historical and cultural 
constitution of cultural predicates to the subject that apperceives these cultural predicates 
within her own experience as those of her “functional community” (Hua I: 150/122). That 
is, Foucault gives us the contingent, cultural, and historical constitution of specific ideas, 
e.g. madness or sexuality, and when we must then figure out how it is that we take up 
these ideas “within our perceptions, attitude and behavior” (FL: 282), we cross into the 
work of Husserl. Likewise, Husserl describes for us how it is that we both (1) 
intersubjectively constitute a shared and objective world, which is the basis for the 
constitution of a cultural world, and (2) are able to apperceive, within experience, 
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meanings that are not themselves given. However, when we need to understand how it is 
that these cultural meanings have been formed, as well as their contingent limits on 
present thought, then we must pass into the work of Foucault.  
The middle ground between the two philosophers is our cultural experience of the 
present. This middle can be seen as a knot, as it consists of, on the one hand, the 
intertwining of apperceived meanings with perceived bodies, and, on the other hand, the 
intertwining of the processes of knowledge and power on bodies and the forms of 
conduct constituted therein. This intertwining within embodied experience can then be 
followed in two directions: along the way in which apperceived meanings are constituted 
within experience and along the line of the constitution of that meaning culturally 
through knowledge and power.  
Thus, the relationship between Husserl and Foucault is reversible – you can pass 
from the thought of one to the other through our cultural experience of the present. And, 
in this reversibility, we find each philosopher‟s limit in the other. Husserl‟s limit is the 
way in which cultural meanings are constituted separately from the processes of 
constituting consciousness and Foucault‟s limit is the way in which these cultural 
meanings are taken up and lived by individuals upon which they are imposed. 
Furthermore, we can see the necessity of both sides of the limit. That is, if we want to 
understand our experience of the world, we must understand that various ways of being 
are not natural or necessary to human beings, but are in fact culturally constituted through 
processes that function separately from the constitutive activities of human 
consciousness. However, we must also understand the ways in which these meanings are 
taken up and experienced within the very real lives of individuals.   
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Husserl and Foucault, each the companion of the other, “always remains hidden 
but always makes it patently obvious that he is there; a double that keeps his distance, an 
accosting resemblance” (PD: 562/163). As such, our experience of the present is haunted 
by these companions as well, and its analysis requires that we follow each philosopher 
through his respective analyses. 
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Conclusion 
 
[M]y problem is to construct myself, and to 
invite others to share an experience of what 
we are, not only our past but also our 
present, an experience of our modernity in 
such a way that we might come out of it 
transformed. 
-Michel Foucault81 
 
§31. The Critical Project: Two Lines of Inquiry 
  
 Through the dialogue between Husserl and Foucault in this text, I propose that a 
differentiation can be made within Foucault‟s general idea of a “critical project.” 
Specifically, I argue that the general critical project that he proposes, i.e. of isolating the 
contingent limits of thought such that we can think new forms of being, can be 
differentiated into two lines of inquiry: (1) critical ontology, and (2) critical 
phenomenology. Critical ontology, in our age of disciplinary society, is the line of inquiry 
pursued by Foucault, in which we examine the ways in which specific processes of 
knowledge and power constitute forms of conduct that act as limits on thought. Since 
these limits of thought are historically constituted, then, through critical ontology, we are 
led to discover that they are contingent, and other ways of being are possible. Critical 
phenomenology is the description of the ways in which contingent limits of thought are 
experienced and intersubjectively constituted through those actual concrete bodies that 
are the targets of disciplinary power. Through the phenomenological description of the 
ways in which these limits (1) function in consciousness as such (through apperception 
and on the basis of a  passively given shared, objective, and cultural world and (2) are 
expressed and taken up in concrete circumstances, we are then able to find ways in which 
these limits might be removed. To use a more concrete analogy, one might say that the 
                                               
81 From “An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in The Essential Works of Michel Foucault Vol. 3, pg. 242. 
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knowledge of how the machinery works is essential to locating and removing 
obstructions within it. Thus, by bringing the work of two supposedly diametrically 
opposed philosophers into dialogue, we have now filled out Foucault‟s general project. 
Let us look at this more closely, as well as some of the further effects from this dialogue. 
 
a) The Intertwining of Experience 
  
 In a number of places in this text, in the analyses of both Husserl and Foucault, 
we have encountered the term “intertwining” or “interweaving.” So much so, in fact, that 
it is fair to say that our experience of the present, i.e. the experience of ourselves, each 
other, and the world, consists of a knot of different levels and kinds of constitution 
intertwined with one another. On Husserl‟s side, there is the structural intertwining within 
internal time consciousness, in which retention, impression, and protention are 
interwoven with each other at the structural level. Then, there is the general intertwining 
of apperception with presentation within perception as such, which can then be 
differentiated further into (1) the intertwining of our body and our stream of appearances 
in the sphere of immanence, (2) the intertwining of the alter-ego and the body of the 
other, (3) and the intertwining of cultural predicates, at the passive level, within our 
experience of ourselves, each other, and the world. On Foucault‟s side, while Deleuze 
often uses the idea of intertwining [entrelacement] to describe Foucault‟s various 
concepts (F: 61/54, 119/112, 129/121), Foucault uses the image as well in a number of 
passages. First, knowledge and power are interwoven with one another in the formation 
of ways of being (SP: 27/23). Second, we saw that psychiatric discourse constituted 
homosexual desire as abnormal through the “meshing together” of psychiatry with 
judicial and family discourses. 
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 If Foucault is describing for us the systems of thought that have become 
embedded within our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior,” then he must mean that these 
systems have become intertwined within experience. That is, to use the work done in the 
previous chapters on Husserl, the forms of conduct that are produced through the 
processes of power and knowledge are taken up by subjects and apperceived within 
experience as such. Thus, the intertwining of knowledge and power is itself intertwined 
with our experience of the present, which itself consists of a multiplicity of intertwining. 
As such, we can say that our experience of the present is itself a knot of intertwined 
constitutive activities: (1) those activities that allow for the apperception within 
experience of meanings that are not themselves directly present and that passively 
constituted a shared, objective, and cultural world, and (2) the activities of knowledge 
and power, through which forms of conduct are produced and disseminated within a 
community. If, under the critical project, our task is to isolate contingent limits of thought 
such that we can think new forms and ways of being, then we must follow out the lines of 
constitution on both the sides of Husserl and Foucault – the intertwining within 
experience of internal time consciousness, passive synthesis, and the processes of power 
and knowledge. Not only are forms of conduct produced through processes that are 
external to the subject, but they are also taken up by the bodies they are targeting, which 
then experience and express these historically formed limits in a number of different 
ways. 
Let us return to our example of the young man who has been constituted by his 
community as a pathological object, due to his homosexual desire. After reporting this 
desire to his community, the community imposes upon him an abnormal form of conduct, 
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which the young man then apperceives as intertwined within his general experience of 
himself, others, and the world, in specific and concrete ways, primarily in the form of a 
conflict. That is, the young man will still experience his desires as normal, but 
intertwined with this normality there will be a conflicting sense of abnormality which he 
is forced to take up in light of the community that he lives within. The young man‟s 
experience of his desire will be an experience of the conflict between the normality that 
he feels, as regards to this own desires, and the abnormality that others tell him he should 
be feeling. If the young man takes up the imposition of abnormal upon his desires, then 
this conflict will result in the perception of his desire as shameful, or something that he 
wishes that he could rid himself of. Perhaps he will even go so far as to undergo 
“behavior modification” in an attempt to rid himself of these desires. If the young man 
resists the imposition of abnormality on his desires, then, in light of this conflict, he will 
experience his desires as not only normal, but perhaps revolutionary, something to take 
pride in. In this case, his experience of his desire is still directly in dialogue with the 
imposition of abnormality from outside by the community – he has created a counter-
discourse in the face of those discourses that seek to determine his behavior as 
pathological. Similarly, the community that imposes this form of conduct on the young 
man will apperceive “abnormality” as intertwined with their experience of the young man 
as well. This predicate attaches to everything the young man does, and thus abnormality 
is intertwined with the community‟s experience of the young man. Perhaps they will go 
so far as to suggest, if not force, some kind of “behavior modification” on him. 
Furthermore, this constitution of the young man as pathological is intertwined within the 
consciousness of each of the individuals within the community, in terms of themselves, 
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their own bodies, their relationships with each other, and the world, in the form of the 
apperception of normality and abnormality as a horizon around behavior as such. In 
either case, this intertwining of cultural apperception is itself constituted on the basis of 
an intersubjective constitution of a shared and objective world, which is the result of the 
intertwining between the presentation of a lived body and the appresentation of an alter 
ego in the process of empathy. The intertwining of all of these lines of constitution are 
expressed in our experience of the present, through apperception and the passive 
synthesis of a cultural world. 
 
b) Critical Phenomenology and Critical Ontology 
 
In the brief analysis of the intertwining of experience in the previous sub-section, 
in terms of both the young man whose homosexual desire has been constituted as an 
abnormal form of conduct and the community that has constituted and imposed this form 
of conduct upon him, we are already able to see the two lines of inquiry that can be 
followed out in the form of a critical phenomenology and a critical ontology. Let us use 
this example to delineate the two lines of inquiry generated by the problem of the 
contemporary constitution of homosexuality as an abnormal form of conduct: 
 
Critical Ontology: A critical ontology of homosexuality as an abnormal form of conduct 
seeks to analyze the processes through which this form of conduct was historically 
constituted and imposed upon individuals within a given society. This occurs through the 
reversal of the phenomenological method, in which we suspend the culturally presumed 
naturalness of procreative heterosexuality as a normal form of sexual desire as well as the 
constitutive activities of the subject. This suspension then allows us to open up a field of 
 156 
 
 
analysis in which we find that the constitution of homosexuality as abnormal is in fact not 
a necessary feature of humanity as such, but an historical constitution which occurred 
through the intertwining of various processes of knowledge and power. And, since this 
constitution is historical, then the form of conduct that it imposes, and the subsequent 
limits of thought that it imposes, is found to be contingent, and thus one that can be 
moved beyond. In essence, this is the line of inquiry pursued in the fourth chapter. 
 
Critical Phenomenology: A critical phenomenology examines the ways in which the 
constitution of homosexuality as an abnormal form of conduct has become embedded 
within our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior.” That is, it seeks to isolate the myriad 
ways in which the cultural constitution of homosexuality as abnormal permeates both the 
young man‟s experience and the experience of the individuals within the community that 
has forced this way of being upon him, and limits our experience of other possible ways 
of being through affecting how we perceive sexuality. This isolation within experience is 
undertaken in order to show us where these historically contingent limits lie within our 
experience of ourselves, each other, and the world, and, on the basis of the functioning of 
consciousness, how it is that we might develop strategies to remove them. 
 
c) The Transcendental and the Historical 
  
 As we saw in the first chapter of this text, one of Foucault‟s primary criticisms of 
phenomenology, and thus the transcendental subject, is that the notion of constituting 
consciousness carries with it a kind of “transcendental destiny” [destination 
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transcendentale] (AS: 148/112) in the form of an implied teleology (AS: 54/39).
82
 This 
implied teleology in the transcendental subject, Foucault argues, must be dismissed and 
the historical must be given primacy, otherwise discontinuity in history, and in change as 
such, would be impossible. That is, for Foucault, the relationship between the 
transcendental is one of “either/or” – either there is a transcendental subject and there is 
no such thing as the constitution of the subject through knowledge and power, or the 
subject is constituted through knowledge and power, and thus there is no such thing as 
the transcendental subject. 
 However, in light of the dialogue between Husserl and Foucault that we have now 
examined, and thus the relationship between ontology and phenomenology within the 
critical project, this relationship changes – specifically, it becomes a relationship of 
mutual reciprocity, rather than dichotomy, hierarchy, or primacy. In the third and fourth 
chapters of this text, I showed the way in which we can understand Husserl and Foucault 
as each working one respective side of common limit. In the third chapter, we followed 
Husserl through this description of the constitution of a cultural world, which is always 
passively present within experience. At this point, we passed into the work of Foucault, 
and, in the fourth chapter, examined the way in which disciplinary society constitutes 
contingent limits of thought through processes of normalization, in the form of normal 
and abnormal forms of conduct. In this sense, the transcendental and the historical need 
each other. On the one hand, if we have a passively present cultural world before us in all 
waking experience, then the content of this cultural world must be constituted in one way 
or another. On the other hand, if cultural meaning, and thus how we understand 
                                               
82 This argument is partially worked out in Part Two, Chapter Five of the Archaeology of Knowledge, “The 
Historical a priori and the Archive” (AS: 166/126-173/131). 
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ourselves, is constituted through the normalizing processes of power and knowledge, then 
these processes need a substance – a body to work on, shape, sculpt, or mold. In any case, 
the transcendental and the historical are not, under this interpretation, mutually exclusive, 
but instead reciprocal. 
 Furthermore, insofar as Foucault is critical of phenomenology for the implied 
transcendental destiny or teleology within the transcendental subject, the work done in 
the second chapter of this text allows us to see a different transcendental subject – a 
subject that does not impose any destiny or teleology on how it understands itself or the 
world. As such, this subject is able to act as the target of disciplinary apparatuses and 
have her experience constituted through the imposition of forms of conduct upon her own 
way of being. 
 
d) The Indefinite Work of Freedom 
 
Finally, I would like to end by briefly examining how this revision of Husserlian 
phenomenology, through a dialogue with Foucault, can be of service to Foucault‟s larger 
project of thinking and being otherwise than we are now. In an interview from 1971, 
Foucault tells us the following: 
It has seemed to me that the work of an intellectual, what I call a „specific 
intellectual,‟ is to try to isolate, in their power of constraint but also in the 
contingency of their historical formation, the systems of thought that have 
now become familiar to us, that appear evident to us, and that have 
become part of our perceptions, attitudes and behavior. (FL: 282)  
 
Here, we find the same general critical project repeated in an earlier form. Of course, we 
can see that Foucault sees his role as the “specific intellectual” who attempts to isolate 
specific present forms of constraint on being. I suggest that the revision of Husserlian 
phenomenology found within this dialogue with Foucault offers a tool for the specific 
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intellectual in the form of critical phenomenology. That is, under this interpretation, the 
job of the specific intellectual is two-fold, or, at least, the problem of the isolation of the 
contingent limits of thought must occur on two reciprocal registers. There must, on the 
one hand, be the analyses of how it is that cultural meanings embed themselves within 
our “perceptions, attitudes and behavior” through the functioning of consciousness as 
such. However, on the other hand, there must also be the analyses of the historical 
formation and dissemination of cultural meaning, and thus the analyses of knowledge and 
power. In other words, in order to follow out the lines that form the knot of our present 
experience, one must take on the analyses at the level of one of these two registers.  
Ultimately, this revision of Husserlian phenomenology as critical phenomenology 
allows us to contribute to Foucault‟s general project of isolating and passing over 
historically constituted contingent limits of thought by showing us two things. First, it 
shows us how forms of conduct can act as limits to thought (i.e. through apperception and 
the passive constitution of a cultural world). Thus, if we know how these limits form 
within consciousness, then perhaps this can act as the first step in the formation of 
strategies to undo these limits. Second, it brings us back to the subject from its 
postmodern rejection, in the form of a project of indefinite freedom. That is, it is we who 
are in question and our ways of being that we want to transform. 
  
 160 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Béatrice Han. Foucault’s Critical Project. Trans. Edward Pile. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2004. Translated by Seán Hand 
as Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. 
 
Evans, Fred. The Multivoiced Body: Society and Communication in the Age of Diversity. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Les anormaux: Cours au Collège de France 1974-1975. Paris: 
Gallimard Le Seuil, 1999. Translated by Graham Burchell as Abnormal: Lectures 
at the Collège de France 1974-1975. New York: Picador, 2003. 
 
Foucault, Michel. L'archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1969. Translated by A.M. 
Sheridan Smith as The Archaeology of Knowledge. New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1982-83. New York: Picador, 2011. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique - Folie et déraison. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1972. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa as History of 
Madness. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Histoire de la sexualité Vol I: La Volonté de savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 
1976. Translated by Robert Hurley as The History of Sexuality Vol. I: An 
Introduction. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Histoire de la sexualité Vol II: L'Usage des plaisirs. Paris: Gallimard, 
1984. Translated by Robert Hurley as The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of the 
History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Histoire de la sexualité Vol III: Le Souci de soi. Paris: Gallimard, 
1984. Translated by Robert Hurley as The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of the 
History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage Books, 1988. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “La vie: l‟experience et la science,” in Dits et Ecrits II, 1976-1988. 
Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001, pg. 1582-1595. Translated by Robert Hurley as 
“Life: Experience and Science,” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, 
volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: 
The New Press, 1998, pg. 465-478. 
 
 161 
 
 
Foucault, Michel. Les mots et les choses - une archéologie des sciences humaines. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1966. Translated as The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the 
Human Sciences. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.  
 
Foucault, Michel. Naissance de la clinique - une archéologie du regard medical. Paris: 
PUF, 1963. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith as The Birth of the Clinic: An 
Archaeology of Medical Perception. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l‟histoire,” in Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975. 
Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001, pg. 1004-1024. Translated by Donald F. 
Brouchard and Sherry Simon as “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Essential 
Works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 2: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. 
Ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1998), pg. 369-391. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “La pensée du dehors,” in Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975 Paris: Quarto 
Gallimard, 2001. Pg. 546-567. Translated by Brian Massumi as “The Thought of 
the Outside,” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 2: Aesthetics, 
Method, and Epistemology. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1998, 
pg. 147-169. 
 
Foucault, Michel. Le pouvoir psychiatrique: Cours au Collège de France 1973-1974. 
Paris: Gallimard Le Seuil, 2003. Translated by Graham Bruchell as Psychiatric 
Power: Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-1974. Ed. Jacques Lagrange. 
New York: Picador, 2006. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Qu‟est-ce qu‟un auteur?” in Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975 Paris: Quarto 
Gallimard, 2001. Pg. 817-849. Translated by James Harkness as “What is an 
Author?” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, volume 2: Aesthetics, 
Method, and Epistemology. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1998. 
Pg. 187-204 
 
Foucault, Michel. Surveiller et punir. Paris: Gallimard, 1975. Translated by A.M. 
Sheridan Smith as Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995. 
 
Foucault, Michel. “Qu‟est-ce que les Lumieres?” in Dits et Ecrits II, 1976-1988. Paris: 
Quarto Gallimard, 2001, pg. 1381-1397. Translated by Catherine Porter as “What 
is Enlightenment?” in Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume I: Ethics. 
Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press, 1994. Pg. 303-319. 
 
Frye, Marilyn. “Oppression” in Gender Basics: Feminist Perspectives on Women and 
Men 2
nd
 Edition. Ed. Anne Minas. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000. Pg. 10-16. 
 
Gutting, Gary. “Foucault‟s Philosophy of Experience.” boundary 2 29.2 (2002): 69-85. 
 
 162 
 
 
Gyllenhammer, Paul. “Normality in Husserl and Foucault.” Research in Phenomenology 
39 (2009): 52-68. 
 
Hacking, Ian. “Making up People,” in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy,  
Individuality and the Self in Western Thought. ed. Thomas C. Heller. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1986. Pg. 222-236. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge.  Edited by S. 
Strasser. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Translated by Dorion 
Cairns as Cartesian Meditations. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführungin die reine Phänomenologie 1. 
Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage - Nachdruck. Edited by Karl Schuhmann. The 
Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. Translated by F. Kersten as Ideas 
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, 
Book I. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen 
Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phänomenologie, 
2. Halbband: Ergänzende Texte, (1912--1929). Edited by Karl Schuhmann. The 
Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz 
and Andre Schuwer as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a 
Phenomenological Philosophy, Book II. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstesens (1893-1917). 
Edited by Rudolf Boehm. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. 
Translated by John Brough as On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of 
Internal Time (1893-1917). Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und 
Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918-1926. Edited by Margot Fleischer. The Hague, 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Translated by Anthony Steinbock as 
Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001. 
 
Husserl, Edmund. “Der Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historiches Problem,” in 
Husserliana VI, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
tranzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische 
Philosophie. Edited by Walter Biemel. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976. Pg. 365-386. Translated by David Carr as “The Origin of 
Geometry,” in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. Pg. 353-378. 
 
Hyder, David. “Foucault, Cavaillès, and Husserl on the Historical Epistemology of the 
Sciences.” Perspectives on Science 11.1 (2003): 107-129. 
 
 163 
 
 
Iyer, Arun. “Is the Historicity of a Scientific Object a Threat to its Ideality? Foucault  
Complements Husserl.” Philosophy Today 54.2 (2010): 165-178. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” Berlinische 
Monatsschrift 4 (1784), pg. 481-494 Translated by Lewis White Beck as “What is 
Enlightenment?” in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1959. Pg. 85-92. 
 
Lawlor, Leonard. Derrida and Husserl. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. 
 
Lawlor, Leonard. The Implications of Immanence. New York: Fordham University Press, 
2006. 
 
Lawlor, Leonard. Thinking Through French Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Lawlor, Leonard. Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2011. 
 
Oksala, Johanna. Foucault on Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Rodemeyer, Lanei. Intersubjective Temporality. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006. 
 
Thompson, Kevin. “Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the 
Phenomenology of the Concept.” History and Theory 47 (2008): 1-18. 
 
Turetzky, Philip. “Immanent Critique.” Philosophy Today 33.2 (1989): 144-158. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
